PATRICIA (CLARK) FOSTER AND BRENT FOSTER, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
MICHAEL STEIN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court vacated a final judgment of adoption and an agreed order regarding paternity because the county judge who entered the orders was never properly assigned to act as a circuit judge, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Only a duly qualified circuit judge has jurisdiction over paternity and adoption proceedings under the Florida Constitution.
The judgment and order are void because they were entered without subject matter jurisdiction. Only the circuit court, acting through a duly qualified circuit judge, has jurisdiction in paternity and adoption proceedings under the Florida Constitution. The appellants' motion for relief from the judgment as void should have been granted, and the case is remanded with directions to vacate the orders.
[1] A final judgment of adoption and an agreed order of paternity are void and subject to vacation when entered by a county judge not appropriately assigned to the cause as a…
[2] Circuit courts, acting through duly qualified circuit judges, possess exclusive jurisdiction over paternity and adoption proceedings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since only the circuit court, acting through a duly qualified circuit judge, has jurisdiction in paternity and adoption proceedings, Art. Y, § 5(b), Fla. Const., the order and judgment were entered without jurisdiction over the subject matter and are totally void.”
Establishes the fundamental jurisdictional requirement and the consequence of violation—absolute voidness of the orders.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatricia and Brent Foster sought relief from a final judgment of adoption and an agreed order regarding paternity under Florida Rule of Civil Procedur…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Extrinsic Fraud cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The issue in this case concerns the viability of a final judgment of adoption and the agreed order regarding paternity upon which it was based. A careful review of the pertinent orders of the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit clearly reveals that the county judge who executed the order and judgment was never appropriately assigned to the cause as an acting circuit judge. Since only the circuit court, acting through a duly qualified circuit judge, has jurisdiction in paternity and adoption proceedings, Art. Y, § 5(b), Fla. Const., the order and judgment were entered without jurisdiction over the subject matter1 and are totally void. Caudell v. Leventis, 43 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1950); Corak Constr. Corp. v. Scott, 184 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 189 So. 2d 633 (Fla.1966). On that ground,2 the appellants’ motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4) for relief from the order and judgment as void should have been granted. See Gelhop v. Gelkop, 384 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Osceola Farms Co. v. Sanchez, 238 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)3,4 The cause is therefore remanded with directions to vacate the order and judgment.
. We need not consider the effect of the highly disturbing fact that all of the parties herein: the "surrogate” mother; the “natural” father; his wife, the adoptive mother; and the child were and are residents of Michigan who never so much as set foot in Florida. It is apparent therefore that, for unknown reasons, our courts have been employed as an unwelcome means of promoting the interests of persons who have no contact with this state.
. It may be added that the motion was apparently also properly based on allegations of extrinsic fraud relating to the sequential representation by the same counsel of, first, the "surrogate mother” and then the adoptive parents. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b)(3); DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1984).
. This was the ruling of a trial judge in an identical prior situation. Stern v. Whitehead, No. 86-12060 (Fla. 11th Cir. September 4, 1986) (order granting respondent's motion for relief from judgment and respondent's supplemental motion for relief from judgment).
. The county judge was properly assigned to hear the Rule 1.540 motion itself.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Stein v. Foster, 557 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1990)…McDonald, justice. We review Foster v. Stein, 534 So. 2d 1218 (Fla.3d DCA 1988), because of conflict with Card v. State, 497 So. 2d 1169 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987). Our jurisdiction is based in article Y, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We hold that th…
Authorities Cited
- DeCLAIRE v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984)
- Dov Gelkop v. Gelkop, 384 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Osceola Farms Co. v. Sanchez, 238 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Caudell v. Leventis, 43 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1950)
- Dixon Stanford v. State, 189 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1966)
- Staples v. Staples, 189 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1966)
- Corak Constr. Corp. v. Scott, 184 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)