DANIEL P. BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
DEALERS INSURANCE COMPANY AND FLORIDA MANAGING GENERAL AGENCY, INC., # 555, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1988-12-13
No. 88-880
Smith, C.J., Zehmer, J., Barfield, J.
534 So. 2d 908 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Summary judgment for insurance company defendants was reversed because material facts remained in dispute regarding whether an insurance agency was acting as agent for the plaintiff or the defendants, and regarding alleged misrepresentations on the insurance application.


Holding

Summary judgment is improper when material facts are in dispute concerning an agent's authority and the truthfulness of insurance application statements.


Headnotes

[1] When an insurance agent's authority and the accuracy of application statements are disputed, summary judgment is improper and the case must proceed to trial.

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Facts & Procedural History

Daniel P. Brown sought insurance through Kirkpatrick Insurance Agency. Kirkpatrick had a contractual relationship with FMGA, which was a designated ag…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The summary final judgment for appel-lees, Dealers Insurance Company and Florida Managing General Agency, Inc., # 555, is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. The record reveals material facts in dispute concerning whether Kirkpatrick Insurance Agency was acting as the agent of appellant, Daniel P. Brown, or of appellees. FMGA was a designated agency for Dealers Insurance Company, and FMGA had a contractual relationship with Kirkpatrick Insurance Agency for the placing of insurance. It cannot be said as a matter of law that Kirkpatrick Insurance Agency was at all times acting as the agent for appellant, Daniel P. Brown, and was not acting within the real or apparent scope of authority from FMGA. See Gaskins v. General Insurance Company of Florida, 397 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Russell v. Eckert, 195 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Savigliano, 422 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

Similarly, we find material facts are in dispute concerning the alleged misrepresentations on the application for insurance that preclude the entry of summary judgment for the appellees because appellant and Kirkpatrick’s employees have given different versions of the facts. Beneby v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 402 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SMITH, C.J., and ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Almerico v. RLI Ins. Co., 716 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1998)
    …e legislature has intended here, it is within its discretion to change the language of the statute. . The factual backdrop and professional relationships among the insurance company and its sales/marketing network in Brown v. Dealers Insurance Co., 534 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), resembles that of the case before us and illustrates the sometimes amorphous nature of an insurance broker. There, the First District reversed a summary judgment in favor of the insurance company (Dealers Insurance) and the mana…

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