ORANGE BUICK COMPANY, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,

v.

JACK F. DURIE, JR., APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Moreland v. State, 552 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
  …he circumstances. Under these facts the stop was valid because it was shown that “a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose.” Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla.1988). See also Clemons v. State, 533 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Nor do we agree with defendant’s argument that his consent for the officers to search the inside of the car was not established to have been voluntary. The officer’s request for the consent (“Do you mind if I look inside your c…
• Velez v. State, 554 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
  …nd not others for the offense of following too closely, with no correlating explanation of the factual circumstances of those instances, falls far short of the criterion established by Kehoe, and we are bound by that criterion. See Clemons v. State, 533 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).1 The second issue for our consideration is whether or not the consent to search executed by Hector Velez was valid notwithstanding the improper stop. The voluntariness of that consent must be assessed by the trial court pursuan…

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• State v. Gibson, 560 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
  …ge. We are once again confronted with a Kehoe question: was a warrantless stop of a vehicle one which a reasonable officer would have made absent an additional invalid purpose? See Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla.1988); Clemons v. State, 533 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Unlike Clemons, wherein the trial judge had neither credited nor discredited the testimony of the arresting officer, the trial judge in the instant case specifically found: That the evidence presented in this cause by the witn…