LOGAN

v.

CLEMMONS

I. Status

Plaintiff, James Alexander Logan, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections, is proceeding pro se on a civil rights complaint (Doc. 1; Compl.) against Defendant Sergeant T. Spradley. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spradley was deliberately indifferent to his safety when Spradley saw his cellmate attack him on December 15, 2016, and failed to intervene. See Compl. at 9, 13.2 Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72;

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F. 3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F. 3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F. 3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F. 2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically

U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F. 3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F. 3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). III. Defendant’s Motion Defendant Spradley argues the evidence shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s request for protection (under a failure-to-protect theory) or whether he failed to intervene during the attack (under a failure-to-intervene theory).

See Motion at 8, 10-11. Additionally, Defendant Spradley maintains Plaintiff’s request for compensatory and punitive damages must be dismissed because he suffered only de minimis injuries. Id. at 13- 14. Finally, Defendant Spradley invokes qualified immunity. Id. at

15.

Defendant Spradley does not dispute Plaintiff was injured on December 15, 2016. See Motion at 3. However, Defendant disputes all other pertinent allegations, including that Plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate, Inmate Banks.⁴ In his declaration (Doc. 72-1; Def. Ex. A), Defendant Spradley avers the facts relayed by Plaintiff “are not true.” Def. Ex. A ¶ 3. In stark contrast to

Plaintiff’s version of events, Defendant Spradley says the following transpired on December 15, 2016: I was on quad⁴ of F dormitory cell front F4208, where Inmate Logan . . . and Inmate Banks . . . were housed. Inmate Banks and Inmate Logan both told me they had issues and could no longer be housed together. In

Id. Defendant Spradley wrote an incident report on December 15, 2016, relaying the facts as stated in his declaration (Doc. 72-2; Def. Ex. B). The shift supervisor noted there were no witnesses to the incident and Inmate Banks was “a confirmed member of the security threat group known as ‘Gorilla Stone Ganstas.’” Def. Ex. B at 1. The supervisor forwarded the incident report to the Office of the Inspector General (IG) and placed Plaintiff on protective management pending a review by the ICT (Institution Classification Team). Id. A nurse evaluated Plaintiff, recorded his injuries, and cleansed his lacerations. Id. at 2-3, 6. Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance on December 19, 2016, reporting that Defendant Spradley ignored Inmate Banks’s initial attack (a punch) and allowed another gang-member inmate to slide a knife under their shared-cell door to Inmate Banks (Doc. 72-3; Def. Ex. C). Plaintiff expressly requested video footage be retained pursuant to section 33-602.033 of the Florida Administrative Code. Def. Ex. C at 3, 4. The Warden’s office approved Plaintiff’s grievance and referred his complaint to the IG’s office for “appropriate action.” Id. at 2. The response did not address Plaintiff’s request to preserve video evidence.

IV. Analysis & Conclusions

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spradley was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety for Spradley’s failure to protect Plaintiff and his failure to intervene when Plaintiff’s cellmate attacked him. See Compl. at 9, 17. In his response, Plaintiff clarifies that he does not proceed under a failure-to-protect theory but under a deliberate-indifference theory. In fact, Plaintiff asserts he did not tell Defendant Spradley he and Inmate Banks had issues, and he disputes that Defendant Spradley moved him to a holding cell to separate the two inmates. See Pl. Resp. at 5, 7; Pl. Ex. at 2-3.

A. Eighth Amendment Claim & Qualified Immunity

In his verified complaint,⁵ Plaintiff asserts Defendant Spradley saw Inmate Banks punch Plaintiff and then walked away

and that Defendant Spradley was aware another gang-member inmate armed Inmate Banks with a knife, Plaintiff provides enough evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact whether Defendant Spradley was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

B. Injuries

Defendant Spradley asserts Plaintiff’s request for compensatory and punitive damages must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not sustain a constitutional injury during the attack on December 15, 2016. Motion at 12-13. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a plaintiff seeking damages demonstrate the conduct he alleges violated his constitutional rights caused a physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). The PLRA does not define “physical injury,” but the Eleventh Circuit has explained a physical injury is one that is not simply

On the other hand, a prisoner need not demonstrate a permanent, long-lasting injury to satisfy the PLRA’s “physical injury” requirement. Thompson v. Smith, 805 F. App’x 893, 903 (11th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit recently pronounced that, in accordance with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, “routine discomfort[s] associated with confinement” are not the kinds of “injuries” for which compensatory and punitive damages are recoverable, but the PLRA “was not intended to allow only those prisoner-plaintiffs with severe physical injuries to recover [such] damages.” Id. at 904. The court clarified that to constitute a “physical injury” under the PLRA, a prisoner’s condition need not be so severe as to require “professional medical attention.” Id. at 904. Rather, temporary injuries, such as the temporary effects of pepper spray, may satisfy the PLRA’s standard. Id. at 904-05 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to damages because a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the prisoner-plaintiff suffered more than de minimis injuries from being pepper sprayed sadistically and without penological justification). Defendant Spradley argues Plaintiff provides no proof of a physical injury and implies Plaintiff’s assertions are merely conclusory and “blatantly contradicted” by medical records. Motion at 13. Defendant’s position is confusing given the exhibits he himself provides confirm Plaintiff sustained injuries on December 15, 2016, following an inmate altercation. Immediately after the incident, a nurse documented multiple lacerations and a swollen nose. See Def. Ex. B at 2, 6. The lacerations required cleaning and bandaging. Id. at 3. Additionally, according to post-incident medical records, Plaintiff reported left shoulder pain and received treatment for a suspected dislocated left shoulder, which he attributed to the December 15, 2016 incident. Def. Ex. D-3 at 3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 35. See also Pl. Ex. at 4. The prison doctor found Plaintiff’s complaints serious enough to warrant an x-ray, and Plaintiff’s shoulder was immobilized. Def. Ex. D-3 at 8. The x-

ray results showed Plaintiff did not sustain a fracture and had no malalignment or dislocation at the time. Id. at 31, 32, 34. The Court is not inclined to conclude as a matter of law that multiple lacerations, a nose injury, and a shoulder injury requiring an x-ray are de minimis injuries under the PLRA. While Plaintiff did not sustain broken bones or require stitches, he sustained more than scrapes and bruises. The evidence is enough to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude Plaintiff’s injuries meet the “more-than-de-mimimis” threshold. Accordingly, Defendant Spradley fails to carry his burden on summary judgment, and Plaintiff’s request for compensatory and punitive damages is not barred as a matter of law under the PLRA. V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Spradley is not entitled to summary judgment. This case is in a posture to proceed to settlement conference and trial. As such, and because of the troubling, alleged spoliation-of-evidence issue the Court has addressed previously, see Orders (Docs. 69, 77), the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Bass v. Perrin, 170 F. 3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court will refer this case to the Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program. If counsel is appointed to represent Plaintiff, the Court will afford counsel an opportunity to file a motion to reopen discovery for a limited period if counsel deems it necessary. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72) is

DENIED.

2. This case is referred to the Jacksonville Division Civil

Pro Bono Appointment Program so the designated deputy clerk of the Court may seek counsel to represent Plaintiff. 3. The Clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Defendant Spradley’s last name. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of July 2020. 4 De =f J. DAVIS United States District Judge

Jax-6 Cc: James Alexander Logan Counsel of Record