CLEMENTS

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

This is an appeal of the administrative denial of disability insurance benefits (DIB) and period of disability benefits.¹ See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff argues the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred by assigning little weight to the opinions of his treating psychiatrist Morteza Nadjafi, M.D. After considering the parties’ arguments and the administrative record, I find the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. I affirm.

A. Background

Plaintiff John Clements was born on January 27, 1967, and was 51 years old on the date of his administrative hearing. (R. 26) He alleges he has suffered from disabling bipolar disorder since August¹, 2013. For treatment, Plaintiff testified he self-medicated with alcohol for years before starting mental health therapy in July 2015, when he felt he could no longer control his behavior. (R. 52-53) He was “extremely emotional. If, if someone, you know, did something that I felt was, was wrong to me, that’s all I could fixate on. . . . I was afraid that it would get to the point where I was going to do something really bad.” (Id.) He was worried he “was going to hurt somebody

with some limitations (R. 23) Specifically, Through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: no climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds and no exposure to obvious hazards. The claimant could also: understand, carry out and remember simple instructions where the work is no fast paced, meaning no work where the pace of productivity is dictated by an external source over which the claimant has no control such as an assembly line or conveyor belt; make judgments on simple work, and respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting that is repetitive from day to day with few and expected changes; and respond appropriately to supervision but not with the general public, and occasional contact with coworkers where there is no working in team or tandem with coworkers.

(R. 23) In an August², 2018, decision, the ALJ found that, with this RFC, Plaintiff could not perform his past work but could work as a laundry laborer, floor waxer, and meat trimmer. (R. 26) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council (AC), which denied review. (R. 2) Plaintiff, his administrative remedies exhausted, filed this action.

B. Standard of Review

To be entitled to DIB, a claimant must be unable to engage “in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A “‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). The Social Security Administration, to regularize the adjudicative process, promulgated detailed regulations. These regulations establish a “sequential evaluation process” to determine if a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found disabled at any point in the sequential review, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Under this process, the Commissioner must determine, in sequence, the following: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment(s) (i.e., one that significantly limits his ability to perform work-related functions); (3) whether the severe impairment meets or equals the medical criteria of Appendix¹, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P; (4) considering the Commissioner’s determination of claimant’s RFC, whether the claimant can perform his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the tasks required of his prior work, the ALJ must decide if the claimant can do other work in the national economy in view of his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). A claimant is entitled to benefits only if unable to perform other work. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 142 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f), (g). In reviewing the ALJ’s findings, this Court must ask if substantial evidence supports those findings. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). The ALJ’s factual findings are conclusive if “substantial evidence consisting of relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion exists.” Keeton v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. 3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation and quotations omitted). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ even if it finds the evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s decision. See Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F. 2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). The Commissioner’s “failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” Keeton, 21 F. 3d at 1066 (citations omitted).

C. Discussion

1. Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Nadjafi

Plaintiff advances one argument: the ALJ erred by discounting the mental RFC assessment of his treating psychiatrist of two years, Dr. Nadjafi, who opined in November 2017, that Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder seriously impairs his interpersonal skills and social relationships and that Plaintiff is seriously limited in his ability to maintain attention and regular attendance, get along with co-workers, complete a normal workday, respond to criticism, and cope with stress. (Doc. 28 at 12; R. 335-38) The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Nadjafi’s mental RFC assessment as inconsistent with the psychiatrist’s own treatment notes and with the findings of Jeff Oatley, Ph.D., who examined Plaintiff once and completed a psychological evaluation in October 2016, and non-examining state agency consultants Nancy Dinwoodie, M.D. and Adrine McKenzie, M.D., who completed mental RFC assessments at the initial and reconsideration levels, respectively (Doc. 32; R. 77-92). I agree with the Commissioner. The method for weighing medical opinions under the Social Security Act is in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).² Relevant here, the opinions of examining physicians are generally given more weight than non-examining physicians, treating more than non-treating physicians, and specialists more than non-specialist physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1-5). A court must give a treating physician’s opinions substantial or considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F. 3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). Good cause for disregarding such opinions “exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F. 3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). This rule – the “treating physician rule” – reflects the regulations, which recognize that treating physicians “are likely to be the medical professionals most likely to provide a detailed,

longitudinal picture of . . . medical impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion but “must clearly articulate the reasons for doing so.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 631 F. 3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 at 1240 n.8). And the ALJ must state the weight given to different medical opinions and why. Id. Otherwise, “it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence.” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F. 2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981).

and you can never get off. There’s no peace. . . I’m tired of fighting.” (R. 58) But throughout Plaintiff’s treatment (and especially through his DLI), Dr. Nadjafi opined Plaintiff’s prognosis was fair, his medications were working, and there were not as may ups and downs – his moods were stabilizing. Dr. Oatley’s October 2016 consultative psychological evaluation of Plaintiff offers additional support for the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Nadjafi’s mental RFC assessment. Dr. Oatley observed Plaintiff on the verge of tears as he described racing thoughts, insomnia, regret over past decisions, and constant worry about being a good dad. Plaintiff admitted he had contemplated suicide but never followed through because of his kids. (R. 309) Plaintiff relayed that earlier in the progression of his disease his manic episodes were productive for his career but that his most recent one (a year earlier) resulted in him getting fired. According to Plaintiff, since starting treatment with Dr. Nadjafi, “he believes the medications are reducing the frequency of mania.” (Id.) This is consistent with Plaintiff’s statement to Dr. Nadjafi in December 2016, that he was depressed but feeling better. (R. 358) Dr. Oatley observed Plaintiff’s fund of knowledge, short-and long-term memory, and thought processes appeared intact. (R. 309) And, Plaintiff said he drives, shops, takes care of his kids while his wife works, and does household chores (albeit hastily before his wife comes home). Dr. Oatley diagnosed Plaintiff with mild bipolar I disorder and opined Plaintiff’s prognosis was fair if he continued treatment. (R. 310) The ALJ summarized Dr. Oatley’s findings in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 25) Also, in September 2016 (Plaintiff’s DLI), general practitioner Brittany Newton, M.D. evaluated Plaintiff at the agency’s request. (R. 315) Regarding his mental state, Plaintiff was tearful and depressed, yet he stated his medications afford him “pretty good” control over his moods as long as there are no triggers. (Id.) Also supporting the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Nadjafi’s opinion are the findings of state agency non-examiners, Drs. Dinwoodie and McKenzie, who completed separate mental RFC assessments at the initial and reconsideration levels. Dr. Dinwoodie opined in April 2016, that Plaintiff could maintain concentration, persistence and pace for up to two hours at a time, interact with coworkers, make simple work-related decisions, adapt to workplace changes, and complete a normal workday. (R. 79) In October 2016, at the reconsideration level, Dr. McKenzie opined that Plaintiff was fairly stable on medication. (R. 92) He had some problems with concentration and moderate problems with socialization, according to Dr. McKenzie. (Id.) Consequently, the ALJ determined Plaintiff suffered from more severe social limitations than those assessed by Dr. Dinwoodie and assigned these opinions “some weight.” (R. 25) See Forsyth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 503 F. App’x 892, 893 (11th Cir. 2013) (it is not error for ALJ to rely on statements from non-examining physicians if ALJ articulates good cause to discount treating physician’s opinion). Overall, the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Nadjafi’s mental RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence, namely Dr. Nadjafi’s treatment notes (which tracked Plaintiff’s incremental yet steady improvement with treatment), Dr. Oatley’s consultative examination (a month after Plaintiff’s DLI; it was consistent with Dr. Nadjafi’s treatment notes), Dr. Newton’s observation that Plaintiff’s medications helped him control his moods, and to some extent Drs. Dinwoodie and McKenzie’s mental RFC findings that Plaintiff was stable on medication. Additionally, the ALJ’s task of formulating a claimant’s RFC is a legal, not a medical, one; the ALJ was not duty-bound to accept Dr. Nadjafi’s RFC assessment so long as the ALJ supports her findings with substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). Here, for the reasons stated above, she has done so. The ALJ did not err in her consideration of Dr. Nadjafi’s opinions. At this point, I reiterate that, when reviewing an ALJ’s decision, my job is to determine whether the administrative record contains enough evidence to support the ALJ’s factual findings. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, ___ U.S. ___; 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). “And whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. In other words, I am not permitted to reweigh the evidence or substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ even if I find the evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s decision. See Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F. 2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).

D. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED: (1) The ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED; and (2) The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for Defendant and close the case. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on August 25, 2020.

MARK A. PIZZO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE