PRUITT
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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The court granted the attorney's motion for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), awarding $9,950.
Plaintiff's attorney moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) after securing a favorable judgment for the plaintiff in a Social Security dis…
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Paul Pruitt’s attorney Michael A. Steinberg moves for an award of $9,950 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b). (Doc. 23). The Commissioner opposes the amount of fees sought.1 (Doc. 24). Mr. Pruitt applied for disability insurance benefits. (Tr. 184–87). After disability specialists denied his applications initially and after reconsideration, Mr. Pruitt requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found Mr. Pruitt not disabled. (Tr. 14–85, 88–104, 112–120). The Appeals Council denied Mr. Pruitt’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 3–8). Mr. Pruitt then filed a complaint in this court. (Doc. 1). The court remanded the ALJ’s decision, and the Clerk later entered judgment for Mr. Pruitt. (Docs. 17, 18). The Commissioner found Mr. Pruitt disabled on remand, and the Social
Mr. Steinberg states he has no fee agreement with Mr. Pruitt. (Doc. 23, p. 6). Without a valid agreement addressing fees for court-level representation, applying the lodestar method for calculating a reasonable fee is proper. See Sanfilippo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, No. 8:04-CV-2079-T-27MSS, 2008 WL 1957836, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2008) (“In the absence of a contingent fee agreement, the most useful starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the ‘lodestar’-the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”) (citation omitted). Mr. Steinberg requests $9,950 in attorney fees for 19.9 hours. (Doc. 23, pp. 6-7). Mr. Steinberg requests a reasonable hourly rate of $200 but contends the court should apply a multiplier.2 (Id. at p. 7). In determining a reasonable fee, the court should consider the Gisbrecht principles—including the character of the representation, the results achieved, and the balance between the benefits and the time counsel spent on the case. Gisbrecht
agreement). Thus, Mr. Steinberg may recover attorney’s fees under Section 406(b) for 9,950 (19.9 x $200 x 2.5). The court awarded Mr. Steinberg $3,885.67 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). (Doc. 22). However, Mr. Steinberg states he has was not paid this fee. (Doc. 23, p. 3). When an attorney receives attorney’s fees under the EAJA and Section 406(b), the attorney must refund the smaller fee. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (quotation and citation omitted); DeRoche v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:14-CV-189-FtM-CM, 2019 WL 931957, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (citations and footnotes omitted). If Mr. Steinberg had received attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the fees would have to be refunded. Accordingly, Mr. Steinberg’s motion for attorney’s fees under Section 406(b) (Doc. 23) is GRANTED. Mr. Steinberg is awarded $9,950 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b).
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on August 31, 2020.
Amanda Angew [...] Sassone_
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE
United States Magistrate Judge