IN THE INTEREST OF R.S., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In a juvenile delinquency case, the First District Court of Appeal reversed R.S.'s adjudication for obstructing a police officer, holding that merely advising a friend not to answer questions, without physical force, verbal abuse, or threats, does not constitute obstruction under Florida law.
The conduct does not rise to the level of obstructing a police officer. While frustrating and annoying, advising a friend not to answer questions in the absence of physical overtures, verbal abuse, or threats is insufficient to constitute obstruction under the statute.
[1] A person's refusal to answer questions from a police officer does not constitute obstruction of justice when the person is not under arrest or officially detained.
[2] Advising a companion not to answer police questions, without physical force, verbal abuse, or threats, does not rise to the level of obstructing a police officer.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While his actions were frustrating and annoying, we are unprepared to say that under the circumstances of this case they sufficiently impeded the deputies so as to constitute a violation of this criminal statute.”
Establishes the court's holding that mere frustration and annoyance do not constitute obstruction without sufficient impediment
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeputy sheriffs responded to a complaint about rowdy behavior at an apartment pool. R.S. and others were located in the laundry room. Although not und…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals his adjudication of delinquency for obstructing a police officer contrary to section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1987). We reverse, finding that the facts in this case do not rise to the level of obstructing a police officer. The sheriff was called by an irate tenant at an apartment complex, about an altercation at the complex swimming pool. Appellant and others were being “rowdy” and splashing the tenants while they were trying to sun and read.1 Two deputy sheriffs responded to the call and talked to the complainant. The appellant and the others had left the pool area, but later were located in the apartment laundromat. Appellant and his friend were not placed under arrest nor were they advised that arrest was imminent. One of the deputies admitted that the appellant was not being officially detained and that he was free to leave.
The deputies attempted to talk to appellant and his friend. Appellant refused to answer any questions so the deputy turned to his companion to ask him some questions. Appellant told his friend not to answer the questions. Under the circumstances, the pair were free to decline to answer questions.2 The deputy asked appellant to keep quiet but she did not tell him he was free to leave nor did she ask him to leave. Appellant continued to advise his friend not to say anything. The deputy was frustrated in her questioning by appellant’s repeated admonitions so she placed him under arrest for interfering with her investigation. There is no evidence in the record that appellant made any physical overtures toward the deputies in any way. There is no evidence that he was verbally abusive toward the deputies nor is there any evidence that he verbally threatened them.3 While his actions were frustrating and annoying, we are unprepared to say that under the circumstances of this case they sufficiently impeded the deputies so as to constitute a violation of this criminal statute. See generally, the cases collected in Annot., What Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting an Officer, In the Absence of Actual Force, 44 ALR 3d 1008 (1972), including this court’s decision in English v. State, 293 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); compare Johnson v. State, 433 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See also, B.H. v. State, 505 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); and C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
REVERSED.
SMITH, C.J., and JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . Appellant lives with his mother at the apartment complex.
. Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.1985); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
. By our recitation of the absence of these facts, we do not imply that these facts must be present to constitute "obstruction.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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D.G. v. State, 661 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…person or property, the person’s words alone can rarely, if ever, rise to the level of an obstruction. Thus, obstructive conduct rather than offensive words are normally required to support a conviction under this statute. See, e.g., R.S. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Johnson v. State, 433 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); [*77] English v. State, 293 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). See also S.D. v. State, 627 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that defendant’s verbal and nonverbal conduct c…
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H.A.P. v. State, 834 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…the constitution does not permit that result.’ ”) (quoting L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)); J.G.D. v. State, 724 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); S.D. v. State, 627 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). See also R.S. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The interpretation of section 843.02 given by the majority in this case and the First District in Wilkerson renders the statute unconstitutionally overbroad and [*242] vague as to the respondent. I would reverse and certify con…
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F.P. v. State, 778 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…sting without violence. The officer admitted that he had no reason to believe that appellant was or had been engaged in criminal conduct. This was not a Terry stop. It seems clear that one can walk away from a citizen encounter. See R.S. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); H.H. v. State, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); S.G.K. v. State, 657 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The trial court’s observation that “from his testimony I find that he [the officer] felt that the Defendant could be…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985)
- English v. State, 293 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- C.K. v. State, 487 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Johnson v. State, 433 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Kranis v. C. Gary Zahler, M.D., 505 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- B.H. v. State, 505 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)