SHERRELL C. SUTTON, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, APPELLEES
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Sherrell Sutton challenged the Department of Corrections' refusal to credit 183 days of unlawful liberty toward his sentence and its notation of an escape in his records after his mistaken release and subsequent recapture. The court affirmed the trial court's order requiring an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Sutton escaped or was released through DOC error, with sentencing credit and record expungement contingent on the hearing outcome.
A prisoner released by mistake is entitled to credit for time spent at liberty unless the prisoner was at fault. The trial court properly required an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Sutton's release was through his own fault or DOC error. If the hearing shows Sutton did not escape, or if DOC fails to hold the hearing, Sutton is entitled to credit for the 183 days and expungement of escape references from his records.
[1] A prisoner's sentence continues to run when released from prison by mistake, absent fault on the prisoner's part.
[2] A trial court may order an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a prisoner escaped from custody.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a prisoner is released from prison by mistake, his sentence continues to run in the absence of some fault on his part.”
Establishes the legal standard that governs whether Sutton is entitled to credit for the 183 days of unlawful liberty.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn July 1981, shortly after incarceration for robbery, Sutton was taken to a bus station by DOC personnel, who mistakenly believed he was being releas…
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MILLS, Judge.
Sherrell C. Sutton appeals that portion of the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of mandamus. The Department of Corrections (DOC) cross-appeals the requirement in that order that Sutton be afforded a hearing. We affirm the order, save for the modification stated below.
In July 1981, shortly after his incarceration for robbery, Sutton was informed by DOC that he was being released. Sutton and DOC agree that he was taken to the bus station by correctional personnel. DOC contends that Sutton fled the station when officials discovered their mistake, Sutton stated that he simply got on the bus officials told him to take. In any case, Sutton remained at liberty for 183 days until his arrest on other charges in January 1982.
When a prisoner is released from prison by mistake, his sentence continues to run in the absence of some fault on his part. Carson v. State, 489 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Based on its contention that Sutton “escaped”, DOC has refused to deduct the 183 days he spent at liberty from his sentence. Further, while never charging or obtaining a conviction for escape, DOC has noted in its records that Sutton escaped in July 1981 so that that action has been counted against him by the Parole and Probation Commission in calculating his presumptive parole release date.
The instant mandamus petition sought the deduction of 183 days from Sutton’s sentence and the expungement from his records of any reference to an escape in July 1981 so that his parole date might be recalculated without that factor. The trial court entered its order requiring DOC to afford Sutton an evidentiary-hearing on the issue of the exact events of the day Sutton left DOC custody. The order went on to state that, if the hearing showed that Sutton had not escaped, or if DOC failed to afford such a hearing, Sutton’s records were to be expunged of references to “escape.” The trial court denied outright Sutton’s claim for credit for the time he spent at liberty.
With regard to the trial court’s requirement that DOC conduct a hearing on the basic factual issue of the case, that is, whether an “escape” occurred in July 1981, DOC cites no law to support its contention that the trial court exceeded its authority in establishing that requirement. Regarding the type of hearing to be provided, the trial court outlined no specific procedure that DOC must follow. If the incorrect proceeding or procedures are employed, that is a situation which can be reviewed after the fact.
However, with regard to the trial court’s outright denial of Sutton’s claim to credit for the time he spent at liberty, we amend the final order so that the denial is contingent on the outcome of the hearing or on DOC’s failure to provide one, just as the deletion of escape references is contingent thereon. If the outcome of the hearing is that Sutton’s release was through no fault of his own, it is clear he would be entitled to credit for the time spent at liberty. Carson, supra.
With the foregoing modification, we affirm.
SMITH, C.J., and NIMMONS, J., concur.
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Reynolds v. State, 590 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…ity to consider the merits of the claim. As Brown suggests, the appellant might seek a writ of mandamus should the Department of Corrections fail to comply with its obligation under section 921.-161(2). See also, Sutton v. Department of Corrections, 531 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). And in Drumwright v. State, 572 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), upon which the appellant relies, the sentencing court was not required to expressly incorporate such credit in an amended sentence. But see, Carson v. State, 489 S…
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State v. Mendiola, 919 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…la. 2d DCA 1986))), review denied, 640 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.1994); Hester v. State, 730 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Jones v. State, 676 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Drumwright v. State, 572 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Sutton v. Dep’t of Corr., 531 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); cf. Fraser v. State, 602 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Fla.1992)(defendant entitled to credit for time on community control because “it would be unfair and inequitable to penalize [defendant] for a clerical mistake for which he was not res…
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Beres Waite v. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…the sentence continues to run while the prisoner is at liberty, and the prisoner’s sentence must be credited with that time. Carson v. State, 489 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (citations omitted); accord Sutton v. Department of Corrections, 531 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); cf. § 944.405, Fla.Stat. (1993) (as amended by ch. 93-406, § 34, Laws of Fla.). The point most strongly urged by petitioner is that Attorney General’s Opinion No. 92-96 is in error in its statutory construction. Petitioner argu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carson v. State, 489 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)