SARASOTA YOUTH SAILING, INC.

v.

UNKNOWN

Before the Court is claimant Riley Baugh’s motion to extend the Court’s injunction precluding the prosecution of claims against Petitioner Sarasota Youth Sailing Program, Inc. (Sarasota Youth Sailing), to include all claims and proceedings currently pending against Baugh in state court. (Doc. 18). For the reasons set forth below, Baugh’s motion is denied.

I.

This case arises out of a November 2020 maritime incident that occurred while Baugh was operating a vessel owned by Sarasota Youth Sailing, Baugh’s then employer. (Docs. 1, 10, 16, 17). According to the filings to date, Baugh allegedly lost control of the vessel, causing it to kill Ethan Max Isaacs and injure Lauren-Taylor Nock. Id. Malinda Martin Isaacs, as the personal representative of Ethan Max Isaacs’ estate (hereinafter, Isaacs), as well as Eugene Nock and Jessica Nock, as parents and natural guardians of Lauren-Taylor Nock (hereinafter, Nock), filed separate state court lawsuits against Baugh. (Doc. 20 at 5; Doc. 21 at 4–5). In January 2021, Sarasota Youth Sailing initiated this action seeking to minimize, if not eliminate altogether, its exposure to any liability arising from the incident pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (the Act), and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Supplemental Rule F). The Act grants a vessel owner, like Sarasota Youth Sailing, the right to confine its liability for damages or injuries arising from a maritime accident to either the vessel’s value or the owner’s interest in the vessel and pending freight, provided that the accident occurred without the owner’s privity or knowledge. 46 U.S.C. § 30505; Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F. 3d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir. 1996). The Act, along with Supplemental Rule F, sets forth the procedures for such limitation proceedings. In short, a vessel owner wishing to invoke the Act’s protections must file a federal action pursuant to the Act and deposit with the court a sum equal to the amount or value of the owner’s interest in the vessel and pending freight, or deposit approved security therefor. 46 U.S.C. § 30511; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(1). If the vessel owner complies with these requirements, the Act authorizes the court where the case has been brought to stay all proceedings against the owner or the owner’s property regarding the matter in question and to direct all potential claimants to submit their claims against the owner with that court. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(3),

(4). In accordance with this procedure, Sarasota Youth Sailing filed an Ad Interim Stipulation for Costs and Value as security for any claims stemming from the incident here.¹ (Doc. 3). At the same time, Sarasota Youth Sailing requested that the Court bar the further prosecution of any proceedings against it arising from any claims subject to limitation and mandate that any claimants pursue their claims in this action.2 (Doc. 4). Based on these submissions, the Court ordered the issuance of a monition and injunction, which stated, in relevant part: [t]he commencement or further prosecution of any action or proceeding against [Sarasota Youth Sailing], the Vessel, or other property of [Sarasota Youth Sailing] with respect to any claims for which [Sarasota Youth Sailing] seeks exoneration from or limitation of liability herein, including any claim arising out of or incident to or connected with any loss, damage, injury, death, or destruction, more fully described in the complaint, be and the same is hereby restrained, stayed, and enjoined until the hearing and determination of this action.

(Doc. 7 at 5) (emphasis added). Isaacs and Nock subsequently filed their respective answers and claims against Sarasota Youth Sailing. (Docs. 10, 17). In response, Sarasota Youth Sailing alleged,

In addition to these filings related to Isaacs and Nock, Baugh separately asserted a claim in this matter for “maintenance and cure” benefits against Sarasota Youth Sailing.³ (Doc. 16). Baugh averred in his claim that he suffered emotional trauma and distress due to the incident, for which he required medical care and treatment. Id. By way of the instant motion, Baugh now requests that the Court expand the injunction entered in favor of Sarasota Youth Sailing to encompass Isaacs and Nock’s state court lawsuits against Baugh. (Docs. 18, 33). Sarasota Youth Sailing joins Baugh’s request (Doc. 25), while Isaacs and Nock oppose it (Docs. 20, 21).4

II.

The purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act include “promot[ing] investment in the domestic commercial shipping industry.” Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F. 2d 1225, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181–188).5 “The

1036–37 (citations omitted). To do so, courts engage in a two-step analysis: “First, [they] must determine what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the accident. Second, [they] must determine whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of those same acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.” Keys, 893 F. 2d at 1230 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Act provides that only an owner of a vessel may initiate a limitation of liability proceeding. 46 U.S.C. § 30511(a) (“The owner of a vessel may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for limitation of liability under this chapter.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(1) (stating that “any vessel owner may file a complaint in the appropriate district court . . . for limitation of liability pursuant to statute”) (emphasis added). The Act defines the “owner” of a vessel to “include[ ] a charterer that mans, supplies, and navigates a vessel at the charterer’s own expense or by the charterer’s own procurement.” 46 U.S.C. § 30501.

the old statutory scheme, for clarity, the Court refers to sections 30501–30512. Notwithstanding this restriction, Baugh asks that the Court apply the injunction entered in favor of Sarasota Youth Sailing to him as well even though he is not the owner of the vessel at issue. (Doc. 18). This gist of Baugh’s argument is that allowing Isaacs and Nock’s state court matters to proceed against him during the pendency of this case will deplete the available insurance proceeds and may also lead to inconsistent rulings with respect to the enforceability of the waivers executed by Isaacs and Nock. Id. To buttress this contention, Baugh largely relies on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F. 2d 756 (9th Cir. 1986). (Doc. 18 at 6–12). In that action, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to stay proceedings against a vessel’s captain on the grounds that doing so furthered the Act’s purposes, which it identified as “permit[ting] the shipowner to retain the benefit of his insurance” and “aggregat[ing] all claims against a shipowner so that they may be decided at one time.” Paradise Holdings, 795 F. 2d at 762. The Ninth Circuit explained that allowing the simultaneous litigation of a limitation action against the owner and a state court lawsuit against the captain would frustrate these goals and create the “possibility that the state litigation will have some preclusive effect on issues in the limitation proceeding.” Id. As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court could stay the state court case against the captain in its discretion. Id. at 763 (holding that “a district court has discretion to stay the state action or otherwise to shape the limitation proceedings in a manner that promotes the purposes of the Act”). Baugh’s argument that Issacs and Nock’s state court matters should be stayed pursuant to the Act fails. To begin, numerous courts have rejected the analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in Paradise Holdings and have held that only the owner of a vessel is entitled to a stay of any related state court proceedings. See, e.g., Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, 926 F. 2d 484 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Gore Marine Corp., 2009 WL 2365882, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2009); In re Thunder Marine, Inc., 2001 WL 1660254, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2001); In re Water Taxi of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 1993 WL

13964702, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 21, 1991).6 These courts have reasoned that the Act’s benefits are, “by their plain terms,” conferred solely on ship owners and that, regardless of whether the objectives of the Act may be inconsistent with its remedies, “it is not within the province of [the c]ourt[s] to reconcile any such inconsistencies when the language of the Act is plain.” Zapata, 926 F. 2d at 486; see also Thunder Marine,

2001 WL 1660254, at *2–3 (declining to enjoin a suit against a vessel’s captain based on the Act’s “plain language” and adding that, while “‘allowing actions to proceed against the members of a ship’s crew may strip a shipowner of insurance protection and give rise to later preclusive effects,’” such concerns are “for Congress, and not the courts, to address”) (quoting Water Taxi, 1993 WL 13964702, at *1); Gore Marine, 2009

WL 2365882, at *2 (concluding that a “plain reading” of the Act allowed the vessel owner “to enjoin the state court action against it, but [did] not authorize the Court to enjoin the state court action against [any] other defendants”).

IV.

In light of the above, Baugh’s Motion to Extend the Injunction (Doc. 18) 1s denied. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 5th day of August 2021.

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. TUITE

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to: Counsel of record