MARTIN V. HORN

I. Status

Plaintiff Thaddeus Chaylon Martin, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on March⁶, 2018, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1). He filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) on June¹⁴, 2018, and a Second Amended Complaint (SAC; Doc. 24) on November¹³, 2018.2 In the SAC, Martin asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Corrections Officers Horne and Mobley. He alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right when they used excessive force against him on

46); Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 121). Martin filed a response in opposition to the Motion. See Response (Doc. 134). He also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (P. Motion; Doc. 122), a Brief (Doc. 123), a Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 124), a Declaration (P. Decl.; Doc. 125), and a Notice of

Exhibits (Doc. 136). Defendants filed a response in opposition to Martin’s Motion. See Response (Doc. 131). The Motions are ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations³ In his verified SAC,⁴ Martin asserts that Defendants Horne and Mobley violated his Eighth Amendment right when they used excessive force against him on August 29, 2016, in HCIA’s H dormitory. See SAC at 5. He states that inmates warned him that “the officers were setting [him] up to be hurt” by assigning him to a cell with a disciplinary confinement (DC) inmate that he describes as a troublemaker and homosexual infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Id. He maintains that he and the DC inmate would not have been compatible cellmates because Martin’s DC time had expired. See id. Martin avers that he “politely declined” the housing assignment and asked to speak to a supervisor. Id. He also alleges that he was not a threat to anyone and was in leg shackles and holding his property bag with his hands cuffed behind his back. See id. He maintains that he was “physically choked, manhandled, and force[d] into [the] cell,” and Horne unnecessarily sprayed him with chemical agents. Id. Additionally, Martin

asserts that Horne and Mobley threw him on the ground where Horne sprayed him again in his eyes, ears, nose, and mouth. See id. at 5-6. According to

Martin, he begged Horne to stop spraying because he has asthma and seizures and could not breathe. See id. at 6. Martin describes his injuries as a dislocated shoulder, a reinjured knee, a nosebleed lasting weeks, neck and collarbone wounds, and permanent nerve damage to his arm. See id. at 5-6.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules(s)), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).⁵ An

The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,

93 F. 3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co.,⁹ F. 3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381

F. 3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F. 2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F. 3d

development of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable. 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami,⁵² F. 3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F. 3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F. 3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Notably, the instant action is before the Court on cross-motions seeking summary judgment. “The principles governing summary judgment do not change when the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment.” T-Mobile S. LLC v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Instead, applying the same principles, “the Court must determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.” Id.

IV. Summary of the Arguments

In the Motion, Defendants maintain that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment in their favor as to Martin’s Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Motion at 10-21. They also assert that the Eleventh Amendment bars Martin’s claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacities, see id. at 21-

22, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity, see id. at 22-24. Additionally, they state that Martin fails to state claims for negligence under Florida law or the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See id. at 24. In his Response, Martin contends that the video evidence shows that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right when they used excessive force. See Response (Doc. 134) at 4. Additionally, he maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor as to Defendants’ liability, see P. Motion at 1, and that his claims for damages against Defendants “must be determined at trial,” Brief (Doc. 123) at 9.

V. Law

A. Excessive Use of Force

With respect to the appropriate analysis in an excessive use of force case,

the Eleventh Circuit has explained. [O]ur core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.¹, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In determining whether force was applied maliciously and sadistically, we look to five factors: “(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates[, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of facts known to them]. . .” Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F. 3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted).

McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App’x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). When considering these factors, courts “must also give a ‘wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security,’ including when considering ‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F. 3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Parker, 898 F. 2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.¹, 9-10 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). Notably, a lack of serious injury is relevant to the inquiry. See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 524 F. App’x 511, 513 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (per curiam)). The United States

Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular situation.” Ibid. (quoting Whitley, supra, at 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. . . . An inmate who complains of a “‘push or shove’” that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Id., at 9 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).

Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38.

B. Qualified Immunity

The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

The qualified-immunity defense reflects an effort to balance “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The doctrine resolves this balance by protecting government officials engaged in discretionary functions and sued in their individual capacities unless they violate “clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F. 3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

As a result, qualified immunity shields from liability “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F. 3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). But the doctrine’s protections do not extend to one who “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

To invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first demonstrate that he was acting within the scope of his or her discretionary authority. Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F. 3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we have explained the term “discretionary authority,” it “include[s] all actions of a governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his authority.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F. 3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that Defendant Officers satisfied this requirement, as they engaged in all of the challenged actions while on duty as police officers conducting investigative and seizure functions.

Because Defendant Officers have established that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to [plaintiff] to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate. See id. To do that, [plaintiff] must show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, the facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers violated [plaintiff’s] constitutional right and that that right was “clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition[,]” at the time of Defendant officers’ actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808. We may decide these issues in either order, but, to survive a qualified immunity defense, [the plaintiff] must satisfy both showings. Maddox, 727 F. 3d at 1120- 21 (citation omitted).

Jones v. Fransen, 857 F. 3d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2017). The Court also has instructed: Because § 1983 “requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation,” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F. 2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citation omitted), each defendant is entitled to an independent qualified immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and omissions. So[,] we must be careful to evaluate a given defendant’s qualified immunity claim, considering only the actions and omissions in which that particular defendant engaged.

Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F. 3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018).

VI. Analysis9

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

Martin asserts that Defendants Horne and Mobley violated his Eighth Amendment right when they used excessive force against him on August 29, 2016. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Martin’s Eighth Amendment claims against them. They argue that Martin “cannot demonstrate a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because no reasonable jury could believe [Martin]’s allegations….” Motion at 10. They also assert that the material facts are not in dispute because Martin admits in his deposition that he refused to enter the cell, stepped back away from the cell, braced his body against the door frame to physically resist entering the cell, used his foot to forego entering the cell, and ignored Horne’s verbal commands. See id. at 13. Additionally, they maintain that the video evidence “confirms that [Martin] violently struggled against officers in front of the cell” and contradicted Horne’s lawful commands. Id. at 14 (citing Def. Ex. I, camera⁴ at 19:04:35-19:07). In

support of their position, Defendants submitted exhibits, including incident reports, Docs. 120-1 through 120-5; Martin’s medical records, Doc. 120-6; the

Declaration of Kellie Caswell, RN, BSN (Caswell Decl.), Doc. 120-7; and Martin’s deposition (P. Depo), Doc. 120-8. With the Court’s permission, see Order (Doc. 130), Defendants also submitted two digital video discs under seal. See Notice to Court (Doc. 133); Doc. S-132, Def. Exs. I, cameras⁴, 5, 6 (fixed wing recordings); J (handheld recording). In an incident report, Defendant Horne described the circumstances related to the incident involving Martin. He stated in pertinent part: On August 29, 2016 at approximately⁷:05 PM, while assigned as H-Dormitory Housing Officer, Officer William R. Schneier and I escorted Inmate MARTIN, Thaddeus DC#M85852 to cell H-2214 where Inmate BLACK, Jonathan DC#X47686 was present. Inmate BLACK was placed in hand restraints and ordered to step to the back of the cell to which Inmate BLACK complied. Inmate MARTIN was placed in the cell at which time Inmate MARTIN braced himself against the door frame and utilized his foot to prevent me from securing the cell. I ordered Inmate MARTIN to remove himself from the door frame and allow the cell door to be secured. Inmate MARTIN became argumentative and belligerent in reference to his disapproval of his cellmate. I implemented the Incident Command System advising of the aforementioned incident. I ordered Inmate MARTIN to cease his physical resistance to which he refused by lunging towards me in an aggressive manner, while utilizing his lower extremities to attempt to strike me in my lower torso, and lower extremities, while attempting to break from my grasp. As a result of Inmate MARTIN’s aggressive combative actions, and physical resistance to multiple lawful commands, I retrieved my assigned MK-4 OC chemical agent canister #16-25 and administered one continuous burst of chemical agent, striking Inmate MARTIN[’s] torso and facial area. Officer Schneier and I secured a hold to Inmate MARTIN’s upper extremities and torso area as Inmate MARTIN lifted his feet, continuing his physical resistance, by falling chest first to [the] floor. When chest down on the floor Inmate MARTIN ceased his combative behavior but continued his physical resistance by refusing to stand when ordered to do so. Officers Perry Mobley and Zachary Smith responded and assisted by obtaining a hold to inmate MARTIN[’s] upper extremities in order to escort inmate MARTIN to the decontamination shower. Inmate MARTIN reluctantly complied with orders given by the responding officers and was assisted to a standing position, however during the escort from cell H-2214 to the decontamination shower inmate MARTIN lifted his feet from the floor multiple times and was held in a standing position briefly by the escorting officers until inmate MARTIN placed his feet back on the floor[] and resumed walking. Inmate MARTIN was ultimately placed in the decontamination shower and all forced ceased. I am certified in the use of chemical agents as indicated on my firearms card.

Doc. 120-1. Officer William R. Schneier provided a similar account of what transpired that night. See Doc. 120-2. According to Horne and Schneier, Officers Perry Mobley and Zachary Smith responded to the incident and assisted by obtaining a custodial hold on Martin’s upper extremities to escort him to the decontamination shower. See Docs. 120-1; 120-2. In an incident report, Defendant Mobley describes his role during the events that transpired when he arrived at the scene that night. He stated in pertinent part:

On August 29, 2016 at approximately 7:07 PM, while assigned as H-Dormitory Housing Officer, I responded to an ICS (Incident Command System) incident initiated by Officer Sam Horne. I arrived to the Cell Front of Cell H2214 and assisted Officer Horne by securing a hold to Inmate MARTIN, Thaddeus DC#M85852’s upper extremities and ordered inmate MARTIN to assume a standing position in order to be escorted to the Wing Two (02) decontamination shower. Inmate MARTIN reluctantly complied with orders given, and with the assistance of responding Officer Zachary Smith I escorted inmate MARTIN from cell H-2214 to the Decontamination Shower. During this escort inmate MARTIN lifted his feet from the floor multiple times and it became necessary to assist inmate MARTIN in maintaining a standing position until he complied with orders given and resumed walking unaided. Inmate MARTIN was placed in the decontamination shower without further incident and all force ceased by me.

Doc. 120-3. Officers Zachary Smith and Wayne A. Haley provided similar narratives of the incident. See Docs. 120-4; 120-5. To defeat the Motion, Martin is required to present evidence to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. In opposing Defendants’ Motion, Martin asserts that the video evidence “clearly shows” that Horne excessively sprayed him with chemical agents, choked him, and punched him with a closed fist. See Response (Doc. 134) at 4-5 (citing Def. Ex. I, camera⁴ at 19:04-19:06). Additionally, Martin maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor as to Defendants’ liability. See P. Motion at 1. He argues that the video footage neither showed him lunging at the guards nor attempting to kick them.

See Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 124) at 2. In a Declaration, Martin provides a factual account that is similar to the allegations in his SAC. He states: I never rec[ei]ved any disciplinary report or action on 8-29-2016 at all because I was not at fault and I was the victim.

. . . .

Video footage shows me stepping backwards away from guards, all while fully secured with hand[]cuff[]s behind [my] back, s[h]ackles on [my] feet, and holding all my property in my hands before Defendant Horn[e] start[ed] to cho[]k[e] me, punch me, and physically forc[e] [me] into an un[]assigned cell with an occupant already in there that we did not match up. Due to me being Administrative Confinement Status and inmate Black[] being Disciplinary Confinement Status these prison guards could not put me in that cell. You can clearly hear me say I cannot go in there please let me speak to your “Captain” and before I knew what was going on Defendant Horn[e] said “you can’t speak to nobody and get your a** in this cell” as he cho[]ked me, punched me, and sprayed me over and over with chemical agen[t]s in my eyes, nose[], ears, [and] mouth as I pled for him to stop[.] I can’t breathe. I told Defendant Horn[e] I have as[t]hma and seizures while he continued to spray chemical[]s inside my mouth. Video footage showed Defendant Horn[e] and Defendant Mobley throw me on [the] ground all while still fully secured with handcuffs behind [my] back and s[h]ackles on [my] feet after already be[ing] sprayed with chemical agen[t]s. As I am on [the] ground video footage showed Defendant Horn[e] and Defendant Mobley jumping on me and continue attacking me on [the] ground and continue to spray me with chemical[]s. Video showed Defendant Horn[e] get up and stand straight up to look around to see who is watching him abuse me as all of the prisoners began to scream at him, c[u]rse at him, and kicking doors to alert staff about Defendant[’]s abuse. Defendant Horn[e] stood up[,] look[ed] around[,] took few steps away[,] look[ed] around again[,] then came right back and jumped on me again and finish[ed] emptying the “gas can” filled with chemical agen[t]s. Please review 8-29-16 video.

P. Decl. at 1-3. At his deposition, Martin similarly stated that Defendant Horne used excessive force when Martin refused to enter the cell. See P. Depo at 40-