CHRISTOFF
v.
INGLESE
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The court held that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not the proper vehicle to dismiss a claim solely for being duplicative, and that the claim for declaratory relief did not require factual determinations at this stage.
Plaintiff, a shareholder, brought a derivative action on behalf of Galexa, Inc. against Paul Inglese and Northstar Technologies Group, Inc. The claims…
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derivatively on behalf of Galexa, Inc., a Florida corporation,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:20-cv-546-SPC-NPM
PAUL INGLESE, NORTHSTAR
TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC.
and GALEXA, INC.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER1
Before the Court is Defendants Paul Inglese and Northstar Technologies Group, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 85). Plaintiff Michael Christoff responded (Doc. 103). The Court denies the Motion.
BACKGROUND
This is a shareholder derivative action. Christoff sues on behalf of nominal Defendant Galexa, Inc. for fraud (trademark and computer), conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, and declaratory relief.
LEGAL STANDARD
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F. 3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “If a comparison of the averments in the competing pleadings reveals a material dispute of fact, judgment on the pleadings must be denied.” Perez, 774 F. 3d at 1335. To decide if judgment is appropriate, courts accept all material facts alleged as true and view them most favorable to the nonmoving party. Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F. 3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). In general, a 12(c) motion follows “the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F. 3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
The Court first tackles duplicity. Defendants contend Count 3 must be dismissed because it is duplicative of other claims. Not so. Time and again, this Court refused to dismiss declaratory judgment actions simply because they might duplicate another claim. E.g., Hanus v. AIG Prop. Cas. Co., No. 2:20-cv-814-FtM-38NPM, 2020 WL 6154813, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2020). The reason is simple: 12(c) motions “only test the validity of a claim, not its redundancy.” See Falcaro v. Integon Nat’l Ins., No. 2:20-cv-327-FtM-38MRM, 2020 WL 4734902, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2020) (citation omitted); Carbone,
910 F. 3d at 1350. The Federal Rules buttress that conclusion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 (“The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a declaratory judgment that is otherwise appropriate.”). Typically—as here—a pleading-stage motion to dismiss a duplicative dec action is really a mislabeled request to strike. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike . . . any redundant . . . matter.”). Apart from that procedural irregularity, these motions rarely accomplish anything. In short, they’re “time wasters” like other motions to strike. See Luxottica Grp. S.P.A. v. Cash Am. E., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (citation omitted). If
Count 3 is truly duplicative, it will add nothing to this case. And the Court can address that matter later in the proceedings at its discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (stating a court “may” declare rights and relations); Smith v. Casey, 741 F. 3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 2014).2
With duplicity out, Defendants contend judgment is proper because Count 3 requires factual determinations. Again, the Court disagrees. Declaratory relief exists “to clarify the legal relations and is not for the purpose of making factual determinations.” Medmarc Cas. Ins. v. Pineiro & Byrd
PLLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (S.D. Fla. 2011). As the Court understands Christoff’s theory, there will be no need to resolve disputed questions of fact through Count 3. Christoff believes Inglese had a fiduciary duty to assign the IP to Galexa.
Right now, the Court does not see how the allegations supporting Count 3 require resolving any facts. What’s more, to the extent that they might, it seems the dispute would overlap in part with Count 5 (breach of fiduciary duties). See Ono’s Trading Co. v. Parnell, No. 04-0706-CG-C, 2006 WL
8437743, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 22, 2006) (addressing similar theory within a
DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February2, 2022.
, Lh platrathe 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies: All Parties of Record
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Enora Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2014)
- Cannon v. City OF W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2001)
- Davide M. Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018)
- Medmarc Cas. Ins. v. Pineiro & Byrd PLLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
- Smith v. Casey, 741 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2014)