IN THE MATTER OF: THE COMPLAINT OF AWE WATERSPORTS, LLC, AS OWNER OF THE 2019, 10'7" SEA DOO, PERSONAL WATERCRAFT, BEARING HULL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER YDV47195B919 AND REGISTRATION NUMBER FL9

OPINION AND ORDER1

Before the Court is Petitioner AWE Watersports, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Claimant’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 62), along with Claimant Jessica Castillo’s Response in Opposition (Doc. 71). For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion.

XX, which alleges breach of a third-party beneficiary contract against AWE and Third-Party Defendant The Hyatt Corporation and HST HRCP LLC (collectively “Hyatt”). AWE moves to dismiss Count XX.

LEGAL STANDARD

Together, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10 establish the minimum pleading requirements. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). And each “party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). A defendant can attack a complaint for not stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party must plead more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F. 3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). But acceptance of a complaint’s allegations is limited to well-pled allegations. See La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F. 3d 840,

845 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Count XX specifically alleges that: (1) AWE and Hyatt entered a contract to which Castillo was not a party; (2) the contract’s various obligations intended primarily and directly to benefit Hyatt’s hotel guests; (3) Hyatt’s hotel guests comprise a well-defined class of readily identifiable persons; and (4) Castillo and M.R. were members of that well-defined class. (Doc. 51 ¶¶ 252, 253).

Next, Count XX alleges the contract imposed various insurance, safety, and service obligations upon AWE, including: (1) full compliance with all laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances that govern or regulate AWE’s services benefiting the hotel guests; and (2) acquiring, carrying, and maintaining at least $2 million in general liability insurance against injuries to hotel guests.

(Doc. 51 ¶¶ 254, 255). Count XX then alleges that Hyatt failed to ensure AWE complied with the contract and that AWE breached the contract in several ways, including: (1) failing to comply with Florida’s statutes governing liveries, Fla. Stat. §

327.54, and personal watercraft safety, Fla. Stat. § 327.39; (2) failing to satisfy Florida Administrative Code Rule 68D-36.107, which governs minimum training requirements for personal watercraft rentals; and (3) failing to acquire, carry, and maintain $2 million in comprehensive general liability insurance. (Doc. 51 ¶¶ 256, 257). Finally, Count XX alleges M.R. was seriously injured and died as a direct and proximate result of these breaches. (Doc. 51 ¶ 258). It then outlines the damages suffered by M.R. and her family. (Doc. 51 ¶ 259).

In its Motion, AWE focuses on Castillo’s allegations about insurance coverage and urges the Court to dismiss Count XX because Castillo has not established a condition precedent: obtaining a judgment against AWE and being unable to collect.³ (Doc. 62 at 5). AWE attempts to force a square peg into a round hole.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record