MARTIN ARIAS

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Plaintiff Nurian Olibia Martin Arias seeks judicial review of a denial of Social Security disability benefits. The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration filed the transcript of the proceedings (Doc. 18),1 and the parties filed a joint memorandum (Doc. 22). As discussed in this opinion and order, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. I. Eligibility for Benefits and the Administration’s Decision

A. Eligibility

The Social Security Act and related regulations define disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of one or more medically determinable physical or mental impairments that can be expected to result in death

B. Factual and procedural history

On May 22, 2018, Martin applied for disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 22, p. 1). She asserted an onset date of April 28, 2018, alleging disability due to pain in her legs and back, depression, and anxiety. Id. As of the alleged onset date, Martin was 53 years old. (Tr. 59). She has a high school education (Tr. 325), and her past

On the administration’s behalf, a state agency⁵ denied Martin’s application initially on August 16, 2018, and upon reconsideration on October⁵, 2018. (Tr. 21). At Martin’s request, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Raymond Rogers held a hearing on December 16, 2019. (Tr. 36-58). On January², 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Martin not disabled from April 28, 2018, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 15-31). Martin’s timely request for review by the administration’s Appeals Council was denied on August 13, 2020. (Tr. 1-8). Martin then brought the matter to this court, and the case is ripe for judicial review. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings. (Doc. 17).

C. The ALJ’s decision The ALJ must perform a five-step sequential evaluation to determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). This five-step process determines: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether these impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether, in light of her age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.

Washington, 906 F. 3d at 1359 (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F. 3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001)). At step one, the ALJ found Martin had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 28, 2018, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 23). At step two, the ALJ characterized Martin’s severe impairments as: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spine; and obesity. Id. At step three, the ALJ determined Martin did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an agency-listed impairment. (Tr. 25). As a predicate to step four, the ALJ arrived at the following RFC: The claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; and stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday. Occasional climbing of ramps or stairs but may never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling and crouching; and no crawling. Must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and extreme heat and no exposure to hazardous machinery and unprotected heights.

(Tr. 26). At step four, the ALJ determined Martin was capable of performing her past relevant work as a stockroom supervisor (DOT #222.137-034, light, SVP⁶, skilled);

sewing machine operator (DOT #786.682-170, light, SVP 3, semi-skilled); and garment inspector (DOT #789.687-070, light, SVP 3, semi-skilled).⁶ (Tr. 30). Consequently, the ALJ did not proceed to step five.

II. Analysis

The issue on appeal is whether the ALJ properly considered Martin’s subjective allegations of pain-related symptoms and limitations. (Doc. 22, p. 9).

A. Standard of review

The court “may not decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations, or reweigh the evidence.” Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 997 F. 3d 1127, 1132 (11th Cir. 2021). While the court must account for evidence both favorable and unfavorable to a disability finding and view the evidence as a whole, Foote v. Chater, 67 F. 3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995), the court’s review of the administration’s decision is limited to determining whether “it is supported by

“[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). The inquiry is “case-by-case,” and “defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” Id. at 1157. In other words, a “presumption of validity attaches” to the ALJ’s factual findings. Walker v. Bowen,

826 F. 2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). And if supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s findings of fact are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This means the district court will affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the court finds that the evidence “preponderates against” the agency’s decision. Noble v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 963 F. 3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F. 2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991)). B. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of Martin’s alleged leg and back pain.

Martin claims that her degenerative disc diseases causes severe leg and back pain, and that this pain limits her ability to sit, stand, and walk for prolonged periods. (Doc. 22, p. 13; see also Tr. 43-45). Martin also alleges that because of her pain, she must lie down for short periods of time throughout the day, and that she cannot lift weight. (Tr. 45).

Medical provider treatment notes and various opinion evidence echo Martin’s alleged pain and the aforementioned externalities. (Tr. 302, 304, 306, 351-352, 362- 368). However, not all of this evidence is persuasive (See e.g., Tr. 369 (stating “[t]he patient refused services at this time.”)). Thus, the ALJ concluded Martin’s subjective statements were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence of record: Diagnostic imaging of the neck and spine support severe impairments; however, the claimant’s allegations of disabling pain are not entirely supported. Physical examinations do not reveal any motor sensory deficits and gait is normal and without the use of an assistive device. With the exception of some trigger point and epidural injections, treatment has generally been conservative. She has been prescribed appropriate medications for her pain and did not appear to report any adverse side effects. The record reveals a period of at least six months that the claimant was without medications, which is inconsistent with her allegations of disabling level pain. The record also reveals resistance to treatment recommendations initially for pain injections and physical therapy, which is also inconsistent with her allegations of disabling level pain. The claimant has not undergone any surgical intervention and does not appear to be a surgical candidate. Furthermore, the claimant’s allegations are not supported by her high functioning activities of daily living that include driving, cooking simple meals, doing laundry, doing light household chores, paying bills, and managing finances/financial accounts. Overall, the record does not support the claimant’s allegations of disabling symptoms or functional limitations to the extent purported. Accordingly, she retains the capacity to perform light work with postural and environmental limitations.

(Tr. 28-29). A bare assertion of a claimant’s subjective pain, or other symptoms, cannot establish disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)-(b). If objective medical evidence fails to substantiate the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her alleged symptoms, then the ALJ must consider other record evidence to determine if, and to what extent, such symptoms limit a claimant’s ability to do work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). As required by the administration’s regulations, the ALJ considered Martin’s subjective allegations of pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (stating “[w]e will consider your statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of your symptoms, and we will evaluate your statements in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence, in reaching a conclusion as to whether you are disabled.”). But the ALJ determined Martin’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence of record. Id. Therefore, the ALJ stated that

“[a]lthough the medical evidence of record does not support the claimant is as functionally limited to the extent she alleged, the residual functional capacity has been reduced to account for her supported impairments/symptoms and supported functional limitations.” (Tr. 30).

Turning to the record evidence, Martin displays an absence of motor and sensory deficits, normal gait, and no use of an assistance device for ambulation (See Tr. 382, 387, 392), and the regulations acknowledge that such factors may call subjective complaints of disabling pain into doubt. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). (stating “[o]bjective medical evidence … such as evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle spasm, sensory deficit or motor disruption … is a useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of your symptoms and the effect those symptoms, such as pain, may have on your ability to work.”).

The evidence of record generally supports the characterization of Martin’s treatment as conservative, reflects that she is not a surgical candidate, and confirms she rejected her doctor’s recommendation of injection treatments and physical therapy. (See e.g., Tr. 376 (finding “[s]he does not want to proceed with the injection

… [and] [d]oes not want a referral to physical therapy.”)). The medical evidence of record also indicates that—after the alleged onset date—Martin went without her pain medications for six months. (See Tr. 379 (stating “[p]atient issued¹ prescription. She lost her last 3 prescriptions.”)). Moreover, Martin’s activities of daily living include driving, cooking, and household chores (Tr. 221, 327, 383, 399), and state-agency medical consultants found that she could perform light work. (Tr. 74-82).7

III. Conclusion

Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties and the administrative record, the court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment,

context of analyzing the subjective allegations). terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED on March 30, 2022.

Liebales E “Lise

NICHOLAS P. MIZEL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE