BRIGHT

v.

THOMAS

This cause comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Julie S. Sneed (Doc. 7). In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Sneed recommends that the Court: (1) dismiss, without prejudice, Plaintiff Leon Bright’s complaint and provide him with leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within 20 days; (2) deny, without prejudice, Bright’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 5); and (3) deny, without prejudice, Bright’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). Doc. 7 at 6–7.

Bright received a copy of the R&R, and the Court afforded him an opportunity to object in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Bright timely objects (Doc. 8). Upon consideration of the R&R, Bright’s objections, and the Court’s independent examination of the file, the Court will overrule Bright’s objections, except that the Court will provide Bright with 28 days to file an amended complaint, adopt the R&R,

and dismiss Bright’s complaint, without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Proceeding pro se, Leon Bright sues numerous defendants (Doc. 1) and moves to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2).1 Bright also moves for injunctive relief (Doc. 5).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections” to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When a party makes a timely and specific objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The district judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The district judge reviews legal conclusions de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F. 3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994); Ashworth v. Glades Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1246 (M.D. Fla. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court begins with the paragraphs that Bright labels as objections. The Court will overrule these objections. Bright first objects that the “vague” R&R directs him to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without citing “any substance of law or facts” showing that he did not comply with Rules 8(a) or 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Doc. 8 at 1. He also contends that his complaint does not constitute a shotgun pleading. Id. But the Magistrate Judge cites to Rules 8(a) and 10(b) and explains that complaints that violate

Rule 8(a) are referred to as “shotgun pleadings.” Doc. 7 at 3–4. The Magistrate Judge also identifies the four general types of shotgun pleadings. Id. at 4. And the Magistrate Judge articulates the reasoning behind her conclusion that the complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading. For example, the Magistrate Judge explains that the complaint does not separate the allegations into separate claims for relief or identify which facts, if any, pertain to each defendant. Id. The Magistrate Judge also highlights that the complaint fails to identify the wrongful conduct of each defendant or how each defendant may have been involved in the alleged incidents. Id. Thus, Bright’s arguments lack merit.

Bright also “objects to this court’s pattern of animus, biases, and umberage [sic] toward” him, contending that the Magistrate Judge “has continued to behave in a similar fashion” in another case where his complaint “has been stonewalled and held up” in the Magistrate Judge’s chambers “for two consecutive years without ever allowing the valid substantiable and facially sufficient [c]omplaint to reach ta[r]geted Defendants.” Doc. 8 at 1. This objection also lacks merit. Bright’s reference to another case, along with Court rulings in that case, does not serve as a basis to set aside the R&R. The Magistrate Judge’s purported “animus, biases, and umberage [sic]” towards him do not serve as a basis for setting aside the R&R, either. If Bright seeks the recusal of the Magistrate Judge, he must file a motion. Bright’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s adverse rulings alone may not serve as the basis for recusal. See Leonard v. Monroe Cnty., 789 F. App’x 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2019). Bright also objects to the Court’s “indifferent practice of compelling [him] to senselessly resubmit filings,” which he considers “no more than retribution and means to discourage” him “from complaining upon government officials.” Doc. 8 at 1. He asserts that “[t]hese actions waste judicial resources,” burden clerks, delay justice, and “exacerbate deep expenses at the cost to taxpayers.” Id. at 2. Bright’s reference to the

Court’s “practice” likely refers to another case before the Court, in which the Court has granted Bright leave on multiple occasions to file a complaint in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bright v. City of Tampa, No. 8:20-cv-1131-CEH- JSS (M.D. Fla.), Doc. 36 at 2–5, 17–25.3 But the Court’s provision of several

R&R and includes the portion of this paper within the same document as his objections, the Court construes this portion as objections to the R&R. Neither Rule 60(a) nor Rule 60(b) provides a basis for the Court to vacate the nonfinal R&R. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a)–(b). Also, none of his arguments, such as his argument that the R&R “conflicts with well establish[ed] law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” or his argument that the R&R “misapplies the proper liberal pleading standard” articulated in a Third Circuit case, is meritorious. Further, some of his arguments erroneously reference pleadings, allegations, or Court orders in another case.⁴ Doc. 8 at 3–5. Bright also buries an unmeritorious request for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 in this portion of the paper.⁵ Id. at 5. The conclusion section of this portion of the paper

Rules⁶, 26, and 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to file a motion to recuse the Magistrate Judge. Id. at 6. Based upon the title of the section, Bright also appears to seek a stay of action pending a ruling on the “Motion to Vacate” in the previous portion of this paper. Id. Bright also states that complying with the Court’s “vicious” and “strenuous” order within 20 days “is simply ridiculous” or “impossible” due to “the highly increased ratio” of COVID-19, his medical needs, and the closings of Hillsborough County libraries and businesses providing access to copy machines. Id. As such, he seeks an extension of time to “reply/comply.” Id. Bright’s request for a stay of this action, or an extension of time, so that he can file a motion to disqualify the Magistrate Judge falls short. He does not articulate the impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “The test under § 455(a) ‘is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.’” Johnson v. Wilbur, 375 F. App’x 960, 965 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F. 2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988)). The statute also enumerates other circumstances in which a judge must disqualify herself, such as where she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). But “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Indeed, “a judge’s adverse ruling—without more—is insufficient to demonstrate the requisite pervasive basis and prejudice against a party that would mandate recusal.” Leonard, 789 F. App’x at 851. Here, Bright fails to provide a reason for recusal under § 455; he simply cites all subsections of § 455 and “where this Court’s bias can be reasonably assumed and presumed or questioned.” Doc. 8 at 5. Similarly, he broadly cites to “Canon³ of the Code of Judicial Conduct . . . and under other similar case law,” without providing argument or analysis. Id. need for a stay or the basis for moving to disqualify the Magistrate Judge, aside from a vague reference to “Judicial Misconduct and obvious partiality.” Id. He does not articulate a need for an extension of time, either. 28 U.S.C. § 455 does not require bright to seek disqualification within a certain period of time.⁶ He may file a motion requesting that relief at any time. Bright’s request for a stay pending a ruling on his “Moton to Vacate” also lacks merit because the Court has rejected the arguments in that portion of the paper. Bright also does not demonstrate a need for an extension of time to “reply” to the R&R; he has responded by filing the instant paper. But the Court will provide Bright with 28 days, rather than 20 days, to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even upon a liberal construction of the complaint, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading. See Hughes v. Lott,

350 F. 3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys). The R&R sets forth Rules 8(a) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defines a “shotgun pleading,” and identifies the four common types of shotgun pleadings; the Court need not repeat all of those principles here. But, for

Bright’s benefit, the Court will provide examples of the complaint’s deficiencies.

“Municipal Defendants herein vicariously liable for subordinate employee tortfeasors.” Doc. 1 at 6–7. He also alleges that “every other Lawfirm, its agents and Attorneys are being sued under all theories of personal, as well as official and or professional capacities” and that “[e]ach subordinate was acting in the scope of their employment.” Id. at 7. He proceeds to allege, in his factual statement, the acts or omissions of defendants collectively, consistently referencing “each named Defendant above, their Attorneys, [and] their Lawfirms.” Id. at 7–9. Compounding the confusion, Bright alleges actions or omissions of individuals or entities whom he does not identify as defendants in the case caption or his recitation of the parties, such as “Pat Frank, Clerk of Court,” “Ronald Ficarrotta,” “Bush Ross, P.A.,” and “Gov. Charlie Cris[t].” Id. at 9–10, 12. He also brings claims against these individuals and entities, even though he fails to identify them as defendants in the case caption or in his recitation of the parties to the action. Id. at 14, 17. Conversely, he names Derek J. Bush, Esq., Celeste Hansell, and “Elizibeth [sic] Durham” as defendants, but he does not bring any claims against them. Id. at 1. He also fails to identify the defendants against whom he brings Count Four. Id. at 21.

Against this backdrop, Bright also changes the names of, or the manner in which he references, certain defendants throughout the complaint. For example, he identifies “Certain Underwriters LLC” and “Lloyds of London Corp.” as separate defendants in the case caption and in select portions of the complaint, but also refers to “Certain Underwriters LLC Lloyd of London” as one defendant. Id. at 1, 3, 8. As such, the defendants whom he seeks to sue is unclear. Similarly, he initially identifies “Austin Thomas” as a defendant, but later refers to “Thomas Austin.” Id. at 2, 14. He also identifies “Ursula Richardson P.A” as a defendant in the case caption, yet refers to “Ursula Richardson – City of Tampa” and “Ursula Richardson” throughout the complaint. Id. at 1, 5, 14. And he identifies “Sheila King” as a defendant in the case caption, but later refers to “Black Female ‘Jane Doe’ (possibly named Sheila King hereinafter).” Id. at 1–2. If Bright elects to amend the complaint, he must clearly articulate which defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions and which claims he brings against which defendants.

The complaint also contains numerous conclusory, vague, or immaterial facts not connected to any particular cause of action. See Weiland, 792 F. 3d at 1322 (identifying a common type of shotgun pleading as a complaint that is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”). For example, Bright seems to describe a state-court judge as “[a]n edomite, and from the exact seed and bloodline of the AMALEKITES who have hated the so-call[ed] Israelite American ‘nigroes’ from NIGER, a country in ISRAEL, now under slavery/captivity in AMERICA to present date.” Doc. 1 at 10. Similarly, Bright alleges in Count One that the actions of certain defendants “defied the Constitution just like Christopher Columbus who NEVER discovered America [and who] [o]nly poisoned and KILLED the Native Real Americans in this Country with Smallpox, and other venereal diseases through blankets.” Id. at 16. If Bright amends, he must ensure that any amended complaint removes conclusory, vague, or immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular claim. Finally, some counts include multiple claims for relief. See Weiland, 792 F. 3d at 1322–23 (identifying a common type of shotgun pleading as one that fails to separate into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief). For example, in Count

One, which Bright labels “Conspiracy to Deprive Plaintiff of Due Process, Equal Protection and Right to Complain,” he alleges that certain defendants violated “ABA/Florida Bar rules and regulations as well as the Federal Constitution,” “the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment as well as Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process” and that each named defendant failed to afford him “Due

Process, Substantive due process, equal protection or access to the court as well as fair and equal justice . . . .” Doc. 1 at 14–15. Similarly, Bright labels Count Two as “(1) Custom, Systemic racism, Indifference, Animus and Malice, (2) Negligent Appointing and Retention, (3) Failure to Correct and Discipline, or Fire, Unappoint” a state-court judge. Id. at 17. If Bright amends, he must ensure that no count includes multiple claims for relief. The examples above are just that—examples. In amending, Bright must ensure that he complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and avoids shotgun pleading pitfalls. If Bright desires guidance or professional assistance to ensure that an amended complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he should reference the resources for pro se parties in the first footnote of this order. Therefore, the Court will overrule Bright’s objections, except the Court will provide Bright with 28 days to file an amended complaint, and adopt the R&R. As such, the Court will deny Bright’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, without prejudice. Finally, following a review of Bright’s Motion for Injunctive Relief and the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation for the Court to deny that relief, to which Bright does not object, and given that the Court will dismiss the complaint, the Court will deny the Motion for Injunctive Relief, without prejudice. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. The objections in Leon Bright’s “List of Objections to Magistrate’s Order for Rehearing/Reconsideration and Notice to Rule Within Reasonable

Time” (Doc. 8) are OVERRULED, except that the Court will provide Bright with 28 days to file an amended complaint. 2. The Report and Recommendation entered by Magistrate Judge Julie S. Sneed on January 31, 2022 (Doc. 7) is ADOPTED, CONFIRMED, and APPROVED in all respects and is made a part of this order for all purposes, including appellate review. 3. Leon Bright’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED, without prejudice. The Court grants Bright leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within TWENTY-EIGHT (28) DAYS of the date of this order. Failure to file an amended complaint within the time provided will result in the dismissal of this action, without prejudice, without further notice. 4. Leon Bright’s “Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form)” (Doc. 2) is DENIED, without prejudice. 5. Leon Bright’s “Affidavit and Request for Injunction Relief’ (Doc. 5) is DENIED, without prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on April 27, 2022.

Chak tries Ochudtandx: Mone Ap el Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge

Copies to: Counsel of Record and Unrepresented Parties, if any