GWYN JR.
v.
KRAMER
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The court held that a federal prisoner cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, and such claims are barred by abstention doctrines.
Plaintiff, a detainee, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his speedy trial rights and constitutional…
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To the extent Gwyn requests that the Court intervene in his pending state court criminal case,3 such a request is barred by the abstention doctrine and the principles of exhaustion and comity. Absent some exceptional circumstances meriting equitable relief, a federal court should refrain from
1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Younger and its progeny reflect the longstanding national public policy, based on principles of comity and federalism, of allowing state courts to try cases already pending in state court free from federal court interference.”) (citation omitted); Chambersel v. Florida, 816 F. App’x 424, 426 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). “In Younger, the Supreme Court set out three exceptions to the abstention doctrine: (1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 377 F. 3d 1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45). Gwyn has not shown that any of these three exceptions to the abstention doctrine apply in his case. Moreover, Gwyn’s attempt to use a § 1983 action to challenge an ongoing criminal proceeding is not permitted. “[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). In his Complaint, Gwyn challenges the very fact of his confinement by contesting the state court’s application of Florida’s speedy trial rule. See generally Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191. Accordingly, his claim is more appropriately brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F. 3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006). (“[I]f the relief sought by the inmate would either invalidate his conviction or sentence or change the nature or duration of his sentence, the inmate's claim must be raised in a § 2254 habeas petition, not a § 1983 civil rights action.”). In light of the foregoing, this case is due to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Therefore, it is now ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminating any pending motions, and closing the case. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of May, 2022.
United States District Judge
Jax-9 C: Franklin R. Gwyn, Jr. #116033
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Authorities Cited (19 total)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1971)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1973)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1989)
- Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1997)
- Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2011)
- Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2008)
- Zatler v. Louie L. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1986)
- Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1992)