NAJJAR
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court affirmed the Commissioner's decision denying disability benefits, finding the ALJ's decision supported by substantial evidence and proper legal standards.
Plaintiff appealed the denial of disability insurance benefits. The Magistrate Judge recommended affirming the Commissioner's decision. Plaintiff obje…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Supportability And Consistency Of Medical Opinions cases and more on FLexlaw
Plaintiff Denise Najjar appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 1.) The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 31.) Upon review of the record, the Report and Recommendation, and Ms. Najjar’s timely objection (Doc. 32), the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party makes a timely and specific objection to a report and recommendation, the district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. In this Social Security appeal, the Court must determine whether the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F. 3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s. Id. Even where the Court finds that the evidence more likely supports a different conclusion, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F. 2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Ms. Najjar raises one objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, contending that this Court “should decline to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion evidence was supported by substantial evidence.” (Doc. 32 at 1.) Upon review, Ms. Najjar’s sole objection is unpersuasive. In evaluating opinion evidence, an ALJ must “articulate how [he] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he] find[s] all of the medical opinions.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b). The ALJ should consider the following factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) the relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and the ALJ is required to explain how the factors were considered in reaching his decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).1 Here, the ALJ determined that although Ms. Najjar had severe impairments,
including impairments related to her spine, she possessed the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for six hours in an eight hour workday; stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight hour workday; occasional operation of foot controls; occasional climbing of ramps or stairs . . . .” (Doc. 17-2 at 19–20.) In so finding, the ALJ rejected opinions of Dr. Alain Alvarez and Dr. Joseph Kandel that Ms. Najjar had significant functional limitations, finding the opinions inconsistent with each other and with other evidence, including evidence of normal strength, muscle tone, gait, and ability to balance, an adequate range of motion at major and minor joints, and controlled pain. (Id. at 27.)2 The ALJ concluded that, based on the RFC, Ms. Najjar could perform past relevant work as an x-ray technician. (Id. at 26–27.) Accordingly, Ms. Najjar’s claim for disability insurance benefits was denied. (Id. at 28.)
“inconsistent with the doctors’ recommendations that [Ms. Najjar] engage in regular exercise.” (Doc. 32 at 1.) Ms. Najjar reasons that this determination “fails to establish a logical connection” or “logical bridge” between the recommendation to exercise and the ALJ’s conclusion, and that the ALJ could not “use this advice as evidence of non-disability without further explanation.” (Id. at 1–2.) She, however, cites no persuasive authority in support of this proposition.3 In all events, the substantial evidence standard is satisfied. As the Magistrate Judge and ALJ observed, Ms. Najjar was advised by Dr. Kandel and Dr. Alvarez to engage in regular exercise at several of her appointments, which would appear to undermine the physicians’ opinions of more severe limitations. (Doc. 17-9 at 23, 151; Doc. 17-10 at 22, 28, 34, 42); see, e.g., Trujillo v. Comm’r, SSA, 818 F. App’x 835, 845 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding advice to exercise “relevant, at the very least, to the credibility of [the claimant’s] allegations of extreme physical limitations”); Romine v. Colvin, 609 F. App’x 880, 887–88 (8th Cir. 2015) (“A lack of functional restrictions on the claimant’s activities
“severe facet arthrosis” renders his decision a “complete mischaracterization of evidence” or unsupported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 32 at 4; Doc. 17-7 at 37.) Indeed, the ALJ did address a “review of a cervical MRI” from May 2018 which indicated “some left C5-6 foraminal stenosis that was moderately severe.” (Doc. 17- 2 at 21–22.) And in all events, “there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [this Court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [her] medical condition as a whole.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F. 3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation and some modifications omitted); see also Dolsak v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 724 F. App’x 914, 914 (11th Cir. 2018). As noted, the ALJ’s decision was not such a broad rejection. In summary, the Court agrees with the well-reasoned Report and Recommendation in finding that the ALJ thoroughly analyzed the supportability and consistency of the opinions of Dr. Alvarez and Dr. Kandel, and that substantial evidence supports the RFC finding and, thus, the ALJ’s decision.
CONCLUSION
After an independent review of the record, it is ORDERED: 1. Ms. Najjar’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32) is OVERRULLED. 2. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 31) is ADOPTED and made part of this Order. 3. The decision of the Commissioner denying disability insurance benefits is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the file. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida, on August 29, 2022.
As he a \ofithna, Lt
JOHN L. BADALAMENTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2005)
- Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1990)