PORTER LUMBER COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
TIM KRIS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, ROBERT E. MACNAB AND WILLIAM D. GINN D/B/A PHOENIX MACNAB PROPERTIES, A PARTNERSHIP, AND TIMOTHY J. KRIS A/K/A TIM KRIS, APPELLEES
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Porter Lumber appeals from a mechanics' lien judgment in a construction materials dispute. The court affirmed the lien award but reversed the denial of a motion to vacate a premature satisfaction of judgment entered before the appeal period had expired.
The court affirmed the mechanics' lien calculation awarding Porter its pro rata share of $16,756.32 (the remaining funds after deductions) rather than the larger amount Porter sought, because Phoenix MacNab complied with mechanics' lien law. The court reversed the denial of the motion to vacate the satisfaction of judgment because a judgment cannot be satisfied while an appeal is pending.
[1] A party is entitled to a pro rata share of the remaining funds after payments to a contractor and reasonable costs of completion are deducted from the total contract pric…
[2] A judgment is not final until the appellate process is completed and the mandate is issued, precluding satisfaction of the judgment prior to the expiration of the time fo…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 55.141, Florida Statutes (1987) requires a judgment to be final before it can be satisfied by a deposit in the court registry.”
Establishes the legal requirement that a judgment must be final before satisfaction, which is the basis for reversing the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePorter Lumber supplied building materials for a townhouse development constructed by Phoenix MacNab Properties. Kris, a building contractor hired by P…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
This is a consolidated appeal from several orders entered in a mechanics’ lien action. We affirm the final judgment awarding Appellant Porter Lumber a mechanics’ lien together with attorneys fees and costs and reverse the order denying the motion to vacate the satisfaction of judgment.
The facts are briefly that Porter Lumber had supplied building materials for a townhouse development which was constructed by the owner/developer, Phoenix MacNab Properties, in Martin County in 1983. Phoenix MacNab had contracted with Kris, a building contractor, to perform some of the construction and Kris obtained building materials for the job from Porter Lumber under an open line of credit. Kris worked on the townhouse development for four months and then abandoned the job without paying Porter the amount of $77,112.37 for materials which were subsequently incorporated into the job by another contrac tor hired by Phoenix MacNab to complete the project.
Porter filed suit against Kris and Phoenix MacNab to recover the unpaid sum, alleging breach of contract against Kris and seeking a mechanics’ lien recovery against Phoenix MacNab. Kris did not respond to the lawsuit and Porter obtained a default judgment against Kris for $96,-314.84, which included the amount left unpaid on the Porter account, interest, costs and attorneys fees. Porter also recovered under a mechanics’ lien against Phoenix MacNab for $12,439.03 plus interest, attorneys fees and costs. Porter has appealed the mechanics’ lien award.
Porter alleges error in the trial court’s determination of the amount of money available to satisfy the claims of lienors. Porter contends that the court should have calculated its lien from the funds available for completion of construction at the time that Kris abandoned the job, or $274,900, rather than $16,756.32, which remained after payments to Kris and the reasonable costs of completion were deducted from the contract price. Pursuant to Alton Towers, Inc. v. Coplan Piper & Supply Co., 262 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1972) and Tamarac Village, Inc. v. Bates & Daly Co., 348 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), Porter contends that it was entitled to the more favorable calculation because Phoenix MacNab did not comply with the mechanics’ lien law.
We affirm the final judgment based on the lower court’s conclusion that Phoenix MacNab complied with the mechanics’ lien law and the determination that Porter was entitled to its pro rata share of $16,756.32 which remained, after a deduction of Phoenix MacNab’s payments to Kris and the reasonable costs of completion, from the total contract price. Alton Towers; Tama-rac Village, Inc. v. Bates & Daly Co., 348 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Meredith v. Lowe’s of Florida, Inc., 405 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Miller v. Duke, 155 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
We reverse the order denying appellant’s motion to vacate the satisfaction of judgment entered per section 55.141, Florida Statutes (1987). Section 55.141, Florida Statutes (1987) requires a judgment to be final before it can be satisfied by a deposit in the court registry. The record shows that the time for appeal had not passed as of the date the satisfaction issued and, in fact, the appellant entered an appeal from the final order on the same day the satisfaction was entered by the clerk of court. The appellate process was timely invoked and therefore the judgment will not be final until it is completed, when the mandate is issued. McCuiston v. State, 507 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Whitley v. Maryland Casualty Company, 376 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979; Cicero v. Paradis, 184 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
We affirm the final order awarding appellant a mechanics’ lien with attorneys’ fees and costs. We reverse the order denying the motion to vacate a satisfaction of judgment, with instructions to vacate the satisfaction of judgment.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
DOWNEY, WALDEN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.’
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GEICO Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Kramer, 575 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…the judgment, that appeal in fact prevents execution of the “Findings and Final Judgment.” Florida follows the rule that a judgment becomes final only when the appellate process, once started, has been completed. Porter Lumber Co. v. Tim Kris, Inc., 530 So. 2d 398, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); McCuiston v. State, 507 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), approved, 534 So. 2d 1144 (Fla.1988); Whitley v. Maryland Casualty Co., 376 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Cicero v. Paradis, 184 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 2d…
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Grant A. Ring and Eleanor v. Ring, 578 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…btained and therefore, appellants could not set it aside. In essence, appellants sought to stay entry of the satisfaction of judgment because their judgment did not include the attorney’s fees awarded to them. Porter Lumber Co., v. Trim Kris, Inc., 530 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), stands for the proposition that a satisfaction of judgment cannot be entered before the time for appeal has passed. Although Porter is factually distinguishable, the court held: We reverse the order denying appellant’s motion t…
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Mazurek v. Vasco Ferraro, 944 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…st 8, 2001, when the appellate mandate issued. See McCuiston v. State, 507 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), aff'd, 534 So. 2d 1144 (Fla.1988); Cicero v. Paradis, 184 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Porter Lumber Co., Inc. v. Tim Kris, Inc., 530 So. 2d 398, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). We reverse the order denying the motion to vacate and remand to the trial court to determine the amount due for the February 1990 and April 1991 judgments, with interest accumulated thereon, as of August 8, 2001. The $37,7…
Authorities Cited
- McCUISTON v. State, 507 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Alton Towers, Inc. v. Coplan Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 262 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1972)
- Cicero v. Paradis, 184 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Miller v. Duke, 155 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Tamarac Vill., Inc. v. Bates & Daly Co., 348 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Kikis v. Ford Motor Co., 405 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Whitley v. Md. Cas. Co., 376 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)