VAUGHN BERNARD COSTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Coston was convicted of both delivery of cocaine and possession of the same cocaine following an undercover drug transaction. The court held that these convictions violate the double jeopardy clause because possession is an inherent element of delivery, making the convictions multiplicitous.
The convictions violate double jeopardy because possession of cocaine is an inherent element of delivery of cocaine, making the dual convictions multiplicitous. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate one conviction and recalculate the sentence based on the remaining count.
[1] Possession of cocaine is an inherent element of the offense of delivery of cocaine.
[2] A conviction for both possession and delivery of the same cocaine violates the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Possession of cocaine is an inherent element of delivery of cocaine.”
Establishes that the two offenses are multiplicitous and cannot both be charged for the same conduct.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo undercover officers were flagged down by Coston and two companions. After an officer asked if they had 'rock,' Coston obtained cocaine from his co…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Delivery Of Cocaine cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
On June 27, 1986, two undercover officers were driving through an area of Hills-borough County when they were flagged down by two black males and a black female. After the officers stopped, appellant approached their vehicle. One of the officers asked if appellant and his companions had any “rock.” Appellant went back to the other black male, took something from the other black male, and returned to the officers with cocaine in his hand. The officers gave appellant two marked five dollar bills in exchange for the cocaine.
After the exchange, the officers drove away. A backup unit moved in and arrested the two black males. The two undercover officers circled back and identified the men that were arrested. Appellant was subsequently searched. Appellant did not have any drugs or marked bills.
Appellant was charged with one count of delivery of cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine in violation of sections 893.-13(l)(a)(l) and 893.13(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1985). After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty on both counts.
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting appellant of both delivery of cocaine and possession of that same cocaine. Appellant contends that conviction of both offenses violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions. We agree. The legal analysis necessary for our disposition has been provided in Gordon v. State, 528 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) and will not be repeated here.
Possession contains a single element: possession. Delivery is defined as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.” Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.), p. 220. Thus, although delivery contains an element that possession does not contain: delivery, possession does not contain an element that delivery does not also contain. Possession of cocaine is an inherent element of delivery of cocaine. We reverse and remand with instructions to vacate one or the other of appellant’s convictions and to recalculate the sentence for the remaining count without the improper count being scored.
DANAHY and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.