AMBROSE

v.

ST. JOHNS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant St. Johns County School Board’s Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 13; Motion), filed on May 27, 2022.1 In the Motion, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Corrected Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Demanding a Jury Trial (Doc. 11; Complaint) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),2 Federal Rules of

Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 14; Response), filed June¹⁷, 2022. Plaintiffs also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 24) on January 4, 2023. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F. 3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements.

Pleadings.” Motion at 1. However, despite the title, Defendant only references a judgment on the pleadings twice. See Motion at 1, 3. And Defendant devotes the substance of the Motion to addressing the standard for, and arguments in support of, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 5 (presenting the standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss); id. at 20 (requesting, in conclusion, that the Court “dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice”). As such, the Court construes the Motion as only seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Regardless, a request for judgment on the pleadings is improper at this stage of the proceedings. A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The pleadings are not closed where, as here, the Defendant has not filed an answer. See Lillian B. ex rel. Brown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 631 F. App’x 851, 852–53 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The [defendant] hadn't filed an answer when it moved for judgment on the pleadings, so the pleadings weren't closed at that time.”). Thus, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is premature at this time. See id. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F. 3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F. 3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

II. Background3

Ambrose is a disabled veteran. Complaint ¶ 1. She suffers from lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, an anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder. Id. ¶ 14. Her young son, B.D., attends Hickory Creek Elementary School, which is in

Defendant’s school district. See id. ¶¶ 1, 19. Other Hickory Creek students in B.D.’s subdivision take the bus to school, see id. ¶¶ 37–38, but, because of Defendant’s bus transportation policy, B.D. cannot do so. See id. ¶¶ 40–41. Pursuant to its policy, Defendant does not provide bus transportation for families that live less than 2 miles from the school. Id. ¶¶ 3, 33. B.D. lives 1.9 miles from the school, and as a result does not qualify to ride the bus. See id. ¶¶ 4, 40. But Ambrose cannot drive B.D. to school because of her disabilities, which frequently prevent her from leaving the house. See id.

¶¶ 43, 46. She also cannot walk B.D. to school due to her mobility constraints. Id. ¶ 44. And B.D., who is five years old,4 cannot walk to school safely by himself. See id. ¶¶ 44–45.

B.D. to ride the bus. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. But Defendant denied the request, and later “removed the hardship exemption from its policies.”⁵ Id. ¶ 53. A few months later,6 Ambrose asked Defendant to modify the two-mile rule to

Id. ¶ 59. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and declaratory relief, along with an injunction requiring Defendant “to provide a reasonable modification to the two-mile rule.” Id. at 20. In Count I, Ambrose asserts that

Defendant was deliberately indifferent to her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by failing to accommodate her disability. See id. ¶¶ 70–74. In Count II, B.D. raises a claim of associational discrimination under the ADA based on his mother’s disability status. See id. ¶¶ 78–85. In Counts

III and IV, each Plaintiff asserts the same claim as in Counts I and II, respectively, but under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”). See id. ¶¶ 89–96, 100–07. Last, in Count V, Ambrose alleges that she experienced unlawful discrimination under Article I, Section II of the Florida

Constitution. See id. ¶¶ 110–15.

III. Summary of Arguments

In the Motion, Defendant contends that both Ambrose and B.D. have failed to state any claim for relief. See Motion at 2–3. As to Ambrose’s claims, Defendant makes three primary arguments. First, Defendant argues that Ambrose is not a qualified individual with a disability as defined by the ADA because she does not meet the essential requirements for bus transportation services or education. See id. at 7–10. Second, Defendant argues that Ambrose has not been denied meaningful access to any benefit because B.D. “makes it to and from school ‘most of the time.’” See id. at 12. Third, Defendant argues that Ambrose was not subjected to disability-based discrimination because her home’s location—not her disability—was the reason she was denied services. See id. at 15–17. Further, Defendant asserts that Ambrose cannot establish intentional discrimination because she never notified Defendant of any hazardous conditions on B.D.’s route, and because school officials responded reasonably to Ambrose’s requests for accommodation. See id. at 16–17. According to Defendant, these arguments foreclose all of Ambrose’s claims. See id. at 6 (asserting that the same standards apply to Ambrose’s claims under the ADA, Section 504, and the Florida Constitution).⁷

IV. Discussion

The Court will first address Ambrose’s claims before turning to B.D.’s claims of associational discrimination.

A. Ambrose’s ADA and Section 504 Claims Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, pursuant to Section 504, any program or activity that receives federal funding is prohibited from denying an individual with a disability the benefit of or participation in its services “solely by reason of his or her disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “Only public entities are liable for violations of Title II of the ADA.” Edison v. Douberly, 604 F. 3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010). Defendant does not dispute its status as a public entity subject to the ADA or a recipient of federal funds subject to the mandates of Section 504. Because the same general standards apply to discrimination claims under the ADA and Section 504, the

Court will analyze them interchangeably for purposes of the Motion. See Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F. 3d 1312, 1316 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because the same standards govern discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, we discuss those claims together and rely on cases construing those statutes interchangeably.”).⁹

1. Qualified Individual with a Disability

Under Title II of the ADA, a “qualified individual with a disability” is someone who has a disability and “meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity,” with or without reasonable modifications. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Defendant argues that Ambrose does not fall within this definition because she fails to meet the “essential eligibility requirements” for School

District transportation services. Motion at 8. Relying on People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1215 (N.D. Ala. 2020), Defendant

Defendant, the two-mile rule is an essential eligibility requirement, and, as such, Ambrose is categorically ineligible for receipt of transportation services. See id. at 8–9. The Court is not persuaded. As noted by the court in Merrill, “[a] public entity cannot merely state that the discriminatory requirement is essential to the fundamental nature of the activity at issue—it must provide evidence that the procedural requirement is necessary to the substantive purpose undergirding the requirement.” Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 1216.10 In other words, distinguishing essential eligibility requirements from mere rules, policies, and practices is a fact-specific inquiry. See Mary Jo C. v. New York State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F. 3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2013); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 & n.21 (1985) (explaining that “[t]he benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled”). Indeed, “the term ‘essential eligibility requirements’ does not refer to all formal legal eligibility requirements.” Mary Jo C., 707 F. 3d at 157 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs. See Pritchard, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. More importantly, Pritchard and the cases on which it relies are factually distinguishable in significant respects. In Pritchard, a high school athlete, who had to repeat the tenth grade due to a learning disability, sought to play football for a fifth consecutive year. See id. at 1083–84. In finding that the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits of his ADA claim,¹¹ the court determined that an age limit for participation in high school athletic programs was essential by relying on persuasive authority that carefully analyzed—on a factually developed evidentiary record—the purpose and significance of age limits in high school sports. See, e.g., McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119

and that the rule was ‘essential to preserving the philosophy that students attend school primarily for the classroom education . . . .’”); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F. 3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995) (reaching the same conclusion from evidence that an age limit prevented competition between students with different levels of physical maturity). Here, Defendant points to no factually analogous cases in which courts have determined that the cited eligibility requirement is essential to the program or that a waiver of it would result in a fundamental alteration. Instead, Defendant unilaterally provides one justification for its insistence on the two-mile rule: the convenience of a bright-line rule.¹² See Motion at 13–14. Not only does Defendant not explain why its two-mile rule is “essential” to its transportation scheme, any such explanation would require consideration of information beyond the four corners of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. As such, it would not warrant dismissal at this stage of the proceeding.

Accepting these allegations as true, as the Court must, Defendant offered a hardship exception to certain parents who live less than two miles from the school. It is a reasonable inference that Ambrose, as one such parent, met the eligibility requirements for this exemption—either as written or with reasonable modifications. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining a “qualified individual with a disability” for purposes of the ADA). Accordingly, Ambrose has plausibly alleged that she is a qualified individual with a disability for purposes of the Motion.¹³

2. Meaningful Access

Defendant next argues that Ambrose was not denied meaningful access to any benefit “because B.D. makes it to and from school ‘most of the time.’” Motion at 12. Under the ADA and Section 504, a defendant need not accommodate a plaintiff who has meaningful access to the benefits in question. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301–03 (holding that a 14-day limit on Medicaid services did not deny plaintiffs meaningful access to those services for purposes of Section 504); see also Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F. 3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that, like Section 504, the ADA requires meaningful access). In particular, Defendant cites Todd, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1334, for the proposition that difficulty does not preclude meaningful access. See Motion at 12. Like the instant case, Todd involved a parent who was unable to drive her children to school due to a disability. See Todd, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1316. For several reasons, Todd is not compelling here.

First, Todd came before the court on a motion seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. Id. at 1315. The court denied relief, but only after “carefully evaluat[ing] the evidence presented . . . and the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. at 1329. This included evidence that the children had

“reasonable, safe access” to school because, based on their ages and specific distance from school, they could “reasonably walk to school by themselves.” Id. at 1331. No such evidence is available or considered here, because in resolving the Motion, the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ well pleaded allegations of fact and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Milikovic, 791 F. 3d at 1297.

Further, the defendant in Todd offered the plaintiff multiple alternative accommodations, all of which the plaintiff rejected. See id. at 1334–35 (describing the availability of a student-led walking group and a parent who had volunteered to drive the plaintiff’s children). In contrast, Ambrose has pleaded that she has no consistent alternatives for driving B.D. to school, and that Defendant has not offered any accommodations. See Complaint ¶¶ 49, 59.14 Ambrose further alleges that B.D. often misses school entirely when assistance is unavailable. 15 See Complaint ¶ 54. Accordingly, Todd is

3. Because of Disability

Defendant also argues that any differential treatment that Ambrose experienced was not because of her disability, but because of the location of her home. See Motion at 15. But Ambrose alleges that Defendant has made exceptions to the two-mile rule for some parents who were not disabled. See Complaint ¶¶ 34, 52. Although Defendant characterizes this as a “conclusory allegation,” see Motion at 15, 16 the Court is not persuaded by this characterization. Ambrose’s allegation is one of fact, and the Court must refused to push the plaintiff—the prison assigned a new orderly when the plaintiff complained. Ganstine, 502 F. App’x at 910. From these admissions, the court held that no reasonable jury could conclude that the prison “denied [the plaintiff] access because of his disability.” Id. Unlike the present case, it is not clear that the plaintiff in Ganstine was denied access, meaningfully or otherwise. To the extent that Ganstine could be read as a meaningful access case, the Court is not convinced, in the absence of evidentiary development, that meaningful access to a prison weightlifting facility requires the same regular attendance as early childhood education, nor does Defendant make such an argument. 16 Defendant also asserts that its PTWP Policy “does not operate as a waiver of the Two-Mile Rule.” See Motion at 15. As previously noted, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs’ reference to the “‘hardship exemption’ to the two-mile rule” in the Complaint refers to the PTWP Policy Defendant identifies. See Complaint ¶ 52. This is especially true because Defendant asserts that the PTWP Policy is not an exemption to the two-mile rule at all. See Motion at 5. At this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot determine whether the “hardship exemption” and the PTWP policy are the same thing. Even if it could, the Court would be required to accept the allegation that the PTWP Policy was modified after Ambrose’s request. See Complaint ¶ 53 (alleging that Defendant “removed the hardship exemption from its policies”). accept the alleged facts as true for purposes of the Motion. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, this argument is unavailing.

While Defendant analogizes to Pritchard in asserting that Ambrose is categorically ineligible for transportation services, see Motion at 15, the Court notes that the plaintiff in Pritchard later survived a motion to dismiss on the same claim after amending his complaint to allege that the rule at issue was not neutrally applied. See Pritchard v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-94-FtM-29MRM, 2019 WL 3503019, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug.¹, 2019) (“While the Court dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim in plaintiff's previous complaint on [qualified-individual and causation] grounds . . . , the Court finds the Amended Complaint alleges sufficient additional facts to survive a motion to dismiss . . . .”). Thus, Pritchard does not support the proposition that a facially neutral rule cannot give rise to an ADA or Section 504 claim. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F. 3d 1247, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining, in the employment context, that “[a]llowing uniformly-applied, disability-neutral policies to trump the ADA requirement of reasonable accommodations would utterly eviscerate that ADA requirement”). Because Ambrose alleges that Defendant waived the two-mile rule for non-disabled individuals but not for her,

she has plausibly alleged discrimination on the basis of disability.¹⁷ To the

B. B.D.’s Claim of Associational Discrimination In Counts II and IV, B.D. brings claims for associational discrimination pursuant to the ADA and Section 504, respectively. See Complaint at 14, 17. Defendant argues that B.D.’s claims should be dismissed because associational discrimination claims “are not cognizable in this case.” See Motion at 17. In support, Defendant cites Todd, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1339, in which the court distinguishes Title II claims from those brought under Titles I and III of the ADA. See Motion at 17; Todd, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1339 (concluding that Title

II does not protect non-disabled individuals). B.D., in contrast, relies on McCullum, 768 F. 3d at 1142, to argue to the contrary. See Response at 2. In that case—although it did not reference Title II directly—the Eleventh Circuit noted that “non-disabled individuals have standing to bring claims when they are injured because of their association with a disabled person.” See id.

River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F. 3d 334, 349 (11th Cir. 2012)). This argument is without merit because Ambrose alleges that Defendant denied both her hardship exemption and her request for a reasonable rule modification. See Complaint ¶¶ 52–53, 55–56. According to Defendant, these allegations at most “represent a misunderstanding of Ambrose’s unique needs.” Motion at 17. But, in making this argument, Defendant is construing the facts in the light most favorable to it, not Ambrose. Accordingly, this argument does not provide a basis for the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 18 Defendant’s only argument for dismissing Ambrose’s Florida Constitution claim is that this claim is “construed in conformity with the ADA.” Motion at 6. The Court need not reach this issue in light of the Court’s determination that Ambrose has stated a plausible ADA claim. In analyzing the parties’ arguments, the Court begins with the text of Title II. Title II prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual with a disability . . . by reason of such a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. However, Title II’s standing provision is broader: it provides a remedy to “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of” Title II. Id. § 12133 (emphasis added). Significantly, non-disabled individuals only have standing if they allege that Title II has been violated. See id. And Title II is only violated when there is discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability.” Id. § 12132 (emphasis added). While the court in Todd concluded that Title II does not prohibit “discrimination against nondisabled individuals,” see Todd, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1337, this does not necessarily mean that nondisabled individuals do not have a cause of action. Were the Court to find Todd persuasive, it would simply mean that a non-disabled person must allege an injury flowing from discrimination against someone with a disability.¹⁹ Such an interpretation would not contradict the Eleventh Circuit’s binding decisions. See McCullum, 768 F. 3d at 1143 (holding that “the threshold for associational standing under both the RA and the ADA is the same: non-disabled persons have standing to seek relief under either statute

V. Conclusion

Because Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendant discriminated against

Ambrose when it denied her waiver request, Defendant’s Motion is due to be denied. Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendant St. Johns County School Board’s Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 13) is DENIED.
2. Defendant must answer the Complaint on or before April 14, 2023.
3. No later than June 2, 2023, the parties must appear before the

assigned Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference. 4. In the event the case does not resolve at the settlement conference, the parties must submit an Amended Joint Uniform Case Management Report no later than¹⁴ days after the Magistrate Judge declares an impasse. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 27th day of March, 2023.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge le31 Copies to: Counsel of Record