COSTA

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Defendant. ________________________________/

ORDER1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Chantal J. Harrington’s Petition for Award of Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. 406(b) (“Petition”) (Doc. 28). For the reasons stated herein, the Petition is due to be GRANTED.

I. Background

Ms. Harrington successfully represented Plaintiff in this appeal of an adverse decision by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). (See Doc 28-2 at 1 & 8.) The case came before this Court, was reversed and remanded, and Plaintiff was ultimately awarded $80,417.90 in past-due benefits. (See Doc. 28 at 2; Doc. 28-3 at 4.) Ms. Harrington and Plaintiff had a fee agreement providing for attorney’s fees equal to 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Doc. 28-1.) Ms. Harrington requests $15,017.48 for a net attorney’s fee, representing 25 percent

II. Standard

Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), attorneys who secure a favorable result for their clients upon remand from federal court may petition the Court for a fee “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “[T]he 25% cap in § 406(b)(1)(A) applies only to fees for court representation, and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§ 406(a) and (b) . . . .” Culbertson v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 517, 523 (2019). “[A]n attorney who receives fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) must refund the smaller fee to his client . . . .” Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F. 3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010). However, “the attorney may choose to effectuate the refund by deducting the amount of an earlier EAJA award from his subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) fee request.” Id. In capping the fee at 25 percent, “Congress . . . sought to protect claimants against ‘inordinately large fees’ and also to ensure that attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk ‘nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.’” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 805 (2002). In Gisbrecht, the Supreme Court stated: [Section] 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set

III. Analysis

The retainer agreement for this federal court appeal provides that Plaintiff agreed to pay her attorney 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to her. (See Doc. 28-1.) Ms. Harrington requests a net fee award of $15,017.48, which represents 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits less the EAJA fee already received. (Doc. 28 at 2–3.) The Commissioner does not object to the Petition. (Id. at 3.) Therefore, the Court finds the requested award is presumptively reasonable pursuant to Gisbrecht. Moreover, the Court finds no reason for a reduction of the amount of the requested fee. With respect to the character of the representation and the results achieved, Ms. Harrington provided competent representation and achieved a favorable result. The Court reversed the Commissioner’s decision, remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings, and Plaintiff ultimately prevailed on remand. (See Docs. 23, 24, & 28-2 at 1 & 8.) Additionally, there is no indication of any undue delay caused by counsel. Finally, the attorney’s fee requested, which equates to an hourly rate of approximately $844.73 ($20,104.48/23.8 hours = approximately $844.73), does not result in a windfall to counsel.³ See, e.g., Foster v. Astrue, No. 3:08-cv-960- HWM-JK (Doc. 46) (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2012) (adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and approving a contingency fee, which amounted to $1,025.28 per hour, as reasonable under § 406(b)); McKee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:07-cv-1554-Orl-28KRS, 2008 WL 4456453, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Sept.

30, 2008) (approving a contingency fee that amounted to $1,100 per hour as reasonable under § 406(b)); Watterson v. Astrue, No. 3:06-cv-369-J-HTS, 2008

JOEL B. TOOMEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to: Counsel of Record