DONALD T. SWINARSKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A ALPHA MARINE, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN R. KELLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NATURAL GUARDIAN OF DONNA LYNN KELLER, A MINOR, APPELLEE
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Swinarski appeals from a judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress against him. The appellate court reversed, finding that the conduct, while potentially tortious or malicious, did not meet the high threshold of being extreme and outrageous as required by Florida law for this tort.
The court held that the conduct at issue did not meet the required threshold for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The conduct must be so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community—a standard higher than merely tortious or malicious conduct.
[1] Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that is extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable…
[2] Conduct supporting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be so outrageous in character and extreme in degree that reciting the facts would arouse…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”
Statement of the legal standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDonald T. Swinarski engaged in conduct toward John R. Keller and his minor daughter Donna Lynn Keller that a jury found constituted intentional inflic…
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HERSEY, Chief Judge.
Donald T. Swinarski appeals from a final judgment for compensatory and punitive damages based upon a jury’s finding that he intentionally inflicted emotional distress on appellees, John P. Keller and his minor daughter, Donna Lynn Keller. Our supreme court recognized the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Metropolitan Life v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla.1985), adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965), as the appropriate definition of the tort:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
The standard by which the outrageousness of particular conduct is measured in order to determine whether it is sufficiently egregious to support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress originates in comment d. to the Restatement. That comment suggests, in pertinent part:
d. Extreme and outrageous conduct. The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant’s conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by “malice,” or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
On two recent occasions we have had an opportunity to measure particular facts by the standard explained in comment d. and have found the conduct in question not to be sufficiently egregious. See Diamond v. Rosenfeld, 511 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 520 So. 2d 586 (Fla.1988); Scheller v. American Medical International, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 513 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.1987). We are required to do so again here. Our review of the record does not support the conclusion that the conduct in this case was so outrageous in character and “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civi lized community.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below.
REVERSE.
WALDEN and STONE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…that the conduct does not meet the Restatement test of atrociousness, utter intolerability, passing all bounds of decency and impulsion to exclaim, “outrageous!”. E.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So. 2d 574 (Fla.1990); Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.1989); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Most such cases, however, involve situations where the court is simply measuring the level of hatefulness of a defendant’s…
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Blue Cross/Blue Shield OF Fla., Inc. v. Weiner, 543 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…referred plaintiffs’ counsel to Maryland, and that all further discussions were between them. The proof simply failed to reach the heavy burden required for recovery on this tort. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson; Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Davis v. Gulf Life Insurance Co., 502 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). See also Campbell v. Prudential Insurance Co., 480 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Cf. Dominguez v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 438…
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D.B. v. The Wendy's Co. (M.D. Fla. 2025)…ll possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Crespo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 15-60843CIV, 2015 WL 13779200, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2015) (quoting Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So. 2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)). The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' amended complaint because, among other things, the facts alleged therein fell well short of the types of allegations needed to validly state an IIED claim. By Plaintiffs' own ad…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCARSON, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985)
- Zbigniew Scheller v. Am. Med. Int'l Inc., 502 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Diamond v. Rosenfeld, 511 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)