FREDRICKSON
v.
HOLLAND (PASCO COUNTY

M.D. Fla. | 2023-05-03
No. 8:20-cv-885
District Court, M.D. Florida (2023)

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Holding

The court held that the petitioner's claim regarding the statute of limitations is not cognizable on federal habeas review because it is an issue of state law and is procedurally barred due to failure to exhaust state remedies.


Facts & Procedural History

The petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault on law enforcement officers and improper exhibition of a firearm. He sought federal habeas corpus r…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court

The pending application asserts one ground for relief — the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the second and third amended informations were filed in May 2015, one month after the expiration of the three-year limitation for aggravated assault. (Doc. 1-1 at 5–9) Fredrickson admits that under Florida law, later-filed informations “will not be subject to the statute of limitations when they are shown to be connected with and in continuation of a prosecution timely begun.” State v. Douglas, 919 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). He contends, however, that this principle does not apply to the second and third amended informations because they replaced the attempted second-degree murder charge with the “wholly different felony charge” of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. (Doc. 1- 1 at 7) Fredrickson does not argue that the allegedly untimely prosecution violated his rights under the federal constitution. Fredrickson cannot obtain relief because his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review, which for a person in custody under the judgment of a state court is available only if the custody violates the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). Accordingly, “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Swarthout v. Cooke,

562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)). Fredrickson’s claim that he was prosecuted in violation of the applicable limitation raises an issue of state law not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F. 3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[A] state court’s failure properly to apply a state statute of limitations does not violate due process or . . . any other provision of the Constitution or a federal statute.”); Beverly v. Jones, 854 F. 2d 412, 416 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that habeas petitioner’s statute-of-limitations argument was “beyond [the court’s] consideration” because “a state’s interpretation of its own laws provides no basis for federal habeas relief since no question of a constitutional nature is involved”); Reed v. Toole, No. 1:18-cv-3970-AT-CMS, 2019 WL 11868548,

at *9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2019) (“State law statutes of limitations for the prosecution of state crimes, and the interpretation of those statutes, are matters of state law and provide no grounds for federal habeas corpus relief.”), adopted by 2020 WL 8920972 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2020). Consequently, ground one is denied. Even affording ground one a lenient construction and assuming that Fredrickson asserts a federal constitutional violation, he cannot obtain relief because the claim is unexhausted. An applicant must present each claim to a state court before raising the claim in federal court. “[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners ‘fairly presen[t]’ federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the ‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)); accord Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982) (“A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error.”). “To provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). Fredrickson did not raise his limitation defense before the trial court or on direct appeal. Nor did he present the issue in his Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief.2 The failure to properly exhaust each available state court remedy

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Because Fredrickson fails to demonstrate either a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right or that reasonable jurists would debate both the merits of the grounds and the procedural issues, a certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Fredrickson must obtain permission from the court of appeals to appeal in forma pauperis. ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 3, 2023. Ala tWrvagetony

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Footnotes
2 In his Rule 3.850 motion, Fredrickson argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a statutory limitation defense. (Respondent’s Exhibit 7 at 6) For purposes of exhaustion, (continued…) causes a procedural default of the unexhausted claim. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847 (1999) (“Boerckel’s failure to present three of his federal habeas claims to the Illinois Supreme Court in a timely fashion has resulted in a procedural default of those claims.”); see also Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F. 3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen it is obvious that the unexhausted claims would be procedurally barred in state court due to a state-law procedural default, we can forego the needless ‘judicial ping-pong’ and just treat those claims now barred by state law as no basis for federal habeas relief.”). Consequently, Fredrickson’s sole ground is barred from federal review absent a showing of “actual cause and prejudice” or “manifest injustice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 72, 29–30 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The basis for “cause” must ordinarily reside in something external to the defense. Marek v. Singletary, 62 F. 3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995). To show “prejudice,” the applicant must establish “not merely that the errors at his trial created the possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Hollis v. Davis, 941 F. 2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only if a however, a substantive claim is “separate and distinct” from an ineffective-assistance claim based on the substantive claim. LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 421 F. 3d 1237, 1260 n.24 (11th Cir. 2005). Consequently, the ineffective-assistance claim did not preserve the underlying statutory limitation argument for federal habeas review. See Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F. 3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An ineffective-assistance claim is analytically distinct from the substantive claim underlying it. Therefore, whether or not [petitioner] exhausted his ineffective-assistance claim regarding the voluntariness of his predicate convictions, his current substantive claim was not presented to the Alabama courts.”). constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006). A petitioner “must establish that, in light of new evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” House, 547 U.S. at 536-37 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Fredrickson neither demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default nor shows that the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception applies. Because Fredrickson proffers no specific facts showing an exception to the procedural default, ground one is procedurally barred from federal review. Il. CONCLUSION Fredrickson’s application for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The clerk must enter a judgment against Fredrickson and CLOSE this case.

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