SIDNEY KONIGSBURG, APPELLANT,
v.
LEONARD GRAND, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A tender of the full judgment amount without express conditions is sufficient to stop the accrual of post-judgment interest, even if the debtor later files a cross-appeal.
[1] A tender of the full amount due on a judgment, made without express words of condition, is sufficient to relieve the debtor from the subsequent accrual of interest.
[2] A debtor's tender of payment on a judgment does not cease to be unconditional and continuing when the debtor files a notice of cross-appeal contesting liability on the ju…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant tendered payment of a judgment against him. Appellee rejected the tender to preserve his right to appeal. Appellant then filed a cross-appea…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Tender Of Payment cases and more on FLexlaw
DELL, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of an order granting appellee’s motion for post-judgment interest. After entry of final judgment against him, appellant tendered payment of the judgment to appellee. Appel-lee rejected the tender solely on the ground that he wanted to preserve his right to appeal. Appellee filed a notice of appeal followed by appellant filing a cross appeal. After a hearing on appellee’s motion for post-judgment interest, the trial court concluded that appellant’s tender was sufficient to cut off interest from the time of judgment until he filed his notice of cross appeal but that appellant’s cross appeal reactivated the running of interest.
Appellant contends on appeal that the award of post-judgment interest was error because he made a sufficient tender to stop any interest from accruing when he tendered checks for the full amount due and without express words of condition. Ap-pellee responds that appellant’s tender ceased being unconditional and continuing when he filed a notice of cross appeal contesting liability on the judgment. We find merit in appellant’s argument and reverse.
Appellee’s election to appeal brought about appellant’s exercise of his appellate rights. The possibility of a new trial warranted appellant’s filing of a cross appeal to present any possible errors affecting the outcome of the original'proceeding. The cross appeal did not modify appellant’s unequivocal tender of payment of the judgment. Appellant’s tender of the full amount due, without words of condition, was sufficient to relieve him from the subsequent accrual of interest. Jobert-Kendall, Inc. v. Kendall Commercial Associates, 491 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Morton v. Ansin, 129 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). In Morton the court said:
It is also generally accepted law that the appropriate office of a tender is to relieve the debtor from subsequent accrual of interest.
Id. at 182.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order awarding post-judgment interest against appellant.
REVERSED.
HERSEY, C.J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…ders had declined to accept the offer. The judgment debtor has two options available to stop the accrual of interest on a judgment. First, the debtor can make an unconditional tender for the full amount due on the judgment. See Konigsburg v. Grand, 529 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In the instant case, Sandage tendered the full amount of the original judgment accompanied by a letter which stated that the check was in full satisfaction of the judgment and furthermore, Sandage enclosed a satisfaction of judg…
-
Carteret Sav. Bank v. Mayer L. Weiner, 601 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…e also hold that the trial court erred when it abated interest on the amount due under the note. The record shows that appellees did not tender the full amount due under the note which would have tolled the interest accrual. See Konigsburg v. Grand, 529 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment in favor of appellees and remand this cause with instructions for the trial court to enter a judgment of foreclosure in the full amount of the monies borrowed by ap…
-
Lewis OIL Co., Inc. v. Milliken, 711 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…t pursuant to the equipment lease, the trial court did not err in declining to award prejudgment interest to Lewis Oil on the value established for the equipment. See Shouse v. Doane, 39 Fla. 95, 21 So. 807 (Fla.1897); see also, Konigsburg v. Grand, 529 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Further, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award costs based on a finding that neither party was the prevailing party. See Prosperi v.Code, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1360 (F…
Authorities Cited
- Emil Morton v. Ansin, 129 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Jobert-Kendall, Inc. v. Kendall Commercial Assocs., 491 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)