HOOKER

v.

HANRETTA

Hooker v. Mulcahy, No. 8:15-cv-1062-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2015) (Merryday, J.); Hooker v. McDonald, No. 8:16-cv-03085-EAK-JSS (M.D. Fla. Nov.¹, 2016) (Kovachevich, J.); Hooker v. Dept of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:18-cv-349-VMC-CPT (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2018) (Covington, J.); Hooker v. Shulkin, No. 8:18-cv-696 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2018) (Covington, J.); Hooker v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:18-cv-2000-CEH-JSS (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2018) (Honeywell, J.); Hooker v. Klinker, No. 8:18-cv-2163-TPB-AAS (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2018); Hooker v. Secretary Department of Veterans Affairs Agency, No. 8:18-mc-7-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2018) (Covington, J.); In re: Carlton Hooker, Jr., No. 8:18-mc-89-CEH-JSS (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2018); Hooker v. Wilkie, No. 8:19-mc-90-JSM-CPT (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2019) (Moody, J.); Hooker v. Wilkie, No. 8:20-cv-1248-WFJ-CPT (M.D. Fla. June¹, 2020) (Jung, J.); Hooker v. Mulcahy, No. 8:20-cv-1788-CEH-JSS (M.D. Fla. Aug.³, 2020) (Honeywell, J.); Hooker v. Wilkie, No. 8:20-cv-2557-KKM-JSS (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2020) (Mizelle, J.); Hooker v. USDOJ – Executive Office of United States Attorneys, No. 8:20-cv-2749-SDM-TGW (M.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2020) (Merryday,

J.); Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:20-cv-2750-SDM-AEP (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2020) (Merryday, J.); Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:20-cv-2994-CEH-TGW (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2020) (Honeywell, J.); Hooker v. Wilkie, No. 8:20-mc-94-CEH-JSS (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2020) (Honeywell, J.); Hooker v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:22-cv-956-CEH-SPF (M.D. Fla. April 22, 2022) (Honeywell, J.); Hooker v. Sly, et al., No. 8:22-cv-957-TPB-AAS (M.D. Fla. April 24, 2022) (Barber, J.); Hooker v. Secretary, Dept. of Veteran’s Affairs, No. 8:22-mc-12-WFJ-AEP (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2022) (Jung, J.); Hooker v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, No. 1:20-cv-2840-CJN (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2020); Hooker v. Dept of Veterans Affairs, No. 1:21-cv-1691-CRC (D.D.C. June 21, 2021). Each of these lawsuits has ultimately been dismissed. The Government argues that this case should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Hooker himself explicitly alleges that the instant case is inextricably tied to a number of the past cases that he filed against numerous defendants, and he asks the Court to revisit rulings made in those other cases. A review of this case and Hooker’s other cases reveals that Hooker has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged the “ban” at the center of this suit under a variety of theories, including in Bivens cases, employment discrimination cases, and under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The instant action is exactly the type of filing the doctrine of res judicata is intended to prevent. This case has already been litigated – multiple times – and Hooker lost. It would be unfair to the parties, inappropriate, and a waste of everyone’s time and resources to litigate this case again.

Most, if not all, of Hooker’s claims, including his official capacity claims against Defendants, are likely precluded by res judicata. “Res judicata bars the filing of claims which were raised or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.” Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F. 3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). An action is precluded by prior litigation if “(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are identical in both suits;

and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both cases.” Renner v. Indymac Bank, F.S.B., No. 14-cv-1394-T-27EAJ, 2014 WL 4145338, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) (quoting Schafler v. Indian Spring Maint. Ass’n, 139 F. App’x 147, 150 (11th Cir. 2005)). The Court takes judicial notice of the court documents in Hooker’s prior cases without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.¹ See, e.g., Horne v. Potter, 392 F. App’x 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F. 3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999)). A court of competent jurisdiction – the federal district court for the Middle District of Florida – reached numerous judgments and decisions against Plaintiff. Certainly, as to the official capacity claims, Defendants are in privity with the other governmental defendants. In addition, the current case and each of Hooker’s prior cases arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. See, e.g., Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:18-cv-349-VMC-CPT (Docs. 1; 9); Hooker v. Shulkin, No. 8:18-cv-696-VMC-TGW (Docs. 10; 57); Hooker v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:18-cv-2000-CEH-JSS (Docs. 13; 76); Hooker v. Klinker, No. 8:18-cv-2163-TPB-AAS (Docs. 14; 62). It would therefore appear that res judicata precludes the claims against Hanretta and Mulcahy. But “[r]es judicata applies only when the parties to the action, or their privies, are identical in the prior and subsequent action.” Lozman v. City of Riviera

Beach, Fla., 713 F. 3d 1066, 1075 n.7 (11th Cir. 2013). “Generally, a government official sued in his or her official capacity is considered to be in privity with the

Yet, even if the case were not barred in its entirety by res judicata, Hooker would not be entitled to relief. For example, if the individual claims against Hanretta were not precluded, the same qualified immunity analysis employed by the court in other prior cases, including 18-cv-696-VMC-TGW and 18-cv-2163-TPB-AAS (Doc. 62), would apply here. Those cases, which raised substantially similar or identical Bivens claims, were dismissed with prejudice. Under the facts of the instant case, Hanretta was acting within his discretionary authority, and he is entitled to qualified immunity. See Hooker v. Wilkie, No. 8:18-cv-696-VMC-TGW, 2018 WL 4107952, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2018) (Covington, J.). There is simply “no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent showing that [Hanretta’s] conduct – banning a former employee and veteran from a single medical facility because of alleged disorderly conduct – violates Hooker’s due process rights.” Id. Without demonstrating a clearly established right, and then a violation of that right, Hooker cannot defeat qualified immunity. And even if the actual claims against Hanretta and Mulcahy were somehow not precluded, and the Court were to consider the merits of the claims, Hooker

Id. (citing Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 517 F. 3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). This action, like Hooker’s prior actions, is frivolous. The motion to dismiss is due to be granted. The vexatious litigant orders in cases 20-cv-2557-KKM-JSS, 22-cv-00537-KKM-MRM, and 22-cv-1862-TPB-JSS remain in effect.³ Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

1. “Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice” (Doc. 17) is hereby GRANTED to the extent that this case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

/ / | VY [Sf ‘ Se / / OC) ee ¢ +

TOM BARBER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE