CROSSLAND
v.
HUMANA MEDICAL CORP.
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The court held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and was subject to dismissal under the PLRA.
Plaintiff, a state inmate, filed a pro se civil rights complaint alleging he was shot and received inadequate medical care from various defendants, in…
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Plaintiff, a convicted state inmate serving his sentence at the Clay County Jail, initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint for the violation of civil rights (Doc. 1; Compl.) with exhibits (Doc. 1-1). Plaintiff has since filed a notice (Doc. 3), a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 4), and a motion to subpoena records (Doc. 5). Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee or moved to proceed as a pauper, though in his motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 4), he says he “has requested … leave to proceed in forma pauperis.” Accordingly, the Court infers that Plaintiff wishes to proceed as a pauper under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In his complaint, Plaintiff lists three Defendants or groups of Defendants: Humana Medical Corporation; “Clay County State Att[orney], Medical Staff, Prosecutor, Doctor, Nurses”; and MCDTH Partners LLC, which Plaintiff identifies as a Realty corporation. See Compl. at 2-3. He contends a home medical biller for Humana, which is owned by MCDTH Partners, “shot”1 him at a property owned by MCDTH, causing injuries. Id. at 4. He contends he received “slim to no medication or proper . . . care from hospital” and Clay County was “bias[ed] in [its] investigation.” Id. In his request for relief,
Plaintiff says he is suing Clay County State Attorney’s Office for a “lack of sufficient evidence leading to arrest, millisceous [sic] prosecution,” and other perceived wrongs. Id. at 5. The PLRA requires a district court to dismiss a complaint if the court determines it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). Since the PLRA’s “failure-to-state-a-claim” language mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts apply the same standard. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F. 3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Alba v. Montford, 517 F. 3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
but need not accept as true legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA because he fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that “a person” acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff names entities that are not considered state actors under § 1983. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of
§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff alleges no facts permitting the reasonable inference the private entities he names as Defendants have a “close nexus” with the State. See id. at 52. As such, even accepting as true that a private healthcare company employee injured Plaintiff at her home or office, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under § 1983. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to pursue a claim for malicious prosecution against the State Attorney’s Office or a specific prosecutor or a claim for inadequate medical care against jail medical providers, his allegations are conclusory, amounting to no “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See also Hesed-El v. McCord, 829 F. App’x 469, 472 (11th Cir. 2020)2 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a false arrest claim because the plaintiff’s “conclusory assertion that [the deputy clerk for the warrants office] acted without probable cause [was] devoid of any facts giving rise to a ‘plausible suggestion’ of . . . false arrest”); Tani v. Shelby Cnty., Ala., 511 F. App’x 854, 857 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of a complaint that alleged, as labels and conclusions, violations of various constitutional rights with no supporting facts to “explain what actions caused which violations”).
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 7th day of June 2023.
Zi NO - KM) Armas
United States District Judge Jax-6 Harry Crossland, Jr.
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- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009)
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- Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1997)
- ROE v. Aware Woman Ctr. FOR Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2001)
- Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1999)
- In re Plywood Antitrust Litig. French Quarter Apts., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981)