JEFFREY EUGENE TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STANLEY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION AND CLAIMS CENTER, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A workers' compensation claimant appealed a deputy commissioner's denial of temporary total disability benefits for a back injury. The court found the deputy's order ambiguous regarding whether the injury was denied on causation grounds or on the basis that no disability resulted, and remanded for clarification with explicit findings.
The court held that the deputy commissioner's order was ambiguous and did not provide sufficient explicit findings for appellate review. If the deputy found a compensable industrial accident occurred but no disability resulted, he was required to offer detailed reasons for rejecting the unrefuted medical testimony.
[1] An order denying benefits is subject to remand for clarification when the deputy commissioner's reasoning is ambiguous and does not clearly articulate the basis for the d…
[2] A deputy commissioner must provide explicit and detailed reasons for rejecting expert medical testimony and denying benefits to ensure appellate review.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Based upon all of the foregoing, and assuming for the sake of argument that the alleged accident occurred and was an accident within the definition and meaning of the Act, it is clear (and I so find) that the effects of the alleged accident were immaterial, inconsequential, and insubstantial and did not result in the condition Claimant has suffered from from (sic) and after April 23, 1984.”
The deputy commissioner's order language that the court found ambiguous regarding the grounds for denial
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant reported a back injury to his employer on August 11, 1983, stating he had injured his back two weeks prior while lifting fan motors. He was d…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Industrial Accident cases and more on FLexlaw
ERVIN, Judge.
The claimant appeals the final order of the deputy commissioner (dc) denying temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and medical care. Because we are unsure from our examination of the order of the dc’s reasons for denying the claim, we remand the order for clarification.
The claimant reported a back injury to his employer on August 11,1983, informing his supervisor that he had injured his back approximately two weeks before while lifting fan motors. The employer directed the claimant to go to the hospital emergency room, where he was diagnosed as having sprained the thoracic spinal area and was directed to place ice on the sore area and pain medication was prescribed. The claimant returned to work and, over the course of the next two years, was seen by three authorized physicians, all of whom diagnosed him as suffering from a lower lumbar syndrome. In September 1986, Dr. Hurst, a chiropractor, advised the claimant to take a few weeks off from work to receive extensive physical therapy. The claimant remained out of work from September 8th through October 11th. The employer paid TTD benefits for the period of September 8th-19th, but controverted all claims thereafter. At the hearing for TTD benefits, the employer/carrier presented evidence that the claimant had been in an auto accident on July 31,1983 — approximately the same time that the claimant stated he had injured his back at work. The claimant testified, however, that he had sustained only a cut on his chin in the non-work related accident, and the emergency room records disclose no evidence of any complaints of lower back pain.
In denying the claim for benefits, the dc stated:
Based upon all of the foregoing, and assuming for the sake of argument that the alleged accident occurred and was an accident within the definition and meaning of the Act, it is clear (and I so find) that the effects of the alleged accident were immaterial, inconsequential, and insubstantial and did not result in the condition Claimant has suffered from from (sic) and after April 23, 1984.
(emphasis supplied)
We conclude the above language in the dc’s order is ambiguous, in that it is unclear whether the dc denied the benefits because of a lack of carnation, or whether he found that a compensable injury did occur, but that the evidence reflected that the claimant suffered no disability. If the effect of the deputy’s order was indeed a finding that the claimant had sustained an industrial accident, but suffered no disability, he should offer explicit and detailed reasons, sufficient for appellate review, why he rejected the expert medical testimony and denied benefits, as the unrefuted medical testimony in the record shows that the claimant was in fact suffering from lower lumbar syndrome. See Curtis v. Florida Correctional Institute, 509 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The dc’s order is therefore
REMANDED for clarification and proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JOANOS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Carson v. Gaineswood Condos., 532 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…ejection of the unrefuted medical testimony, and to explain how claimant’s testimony regarding his physical capabilities was inconsistent with the activities depicted in the videotapes. See Taylor v. Stanley Industrial Corporation and Claims Center, 528 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); South v. Heartland Employment & Training Administration, supra; Perez v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 496 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, this cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings to permit the deput…
-
Above ALL Drywall and Facca v. Shearer, 651 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…orida Statutes. . The supreme court’s interpretation of the statute has been restated by this court in a number of different ways. See, e.g., Grace v. Collier County Sch. Bd., 552 So. 2d 961, 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Taylor v. Stanley Indus. Corp., 528 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Curry v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 522 So. 2d 1010, 1011-12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). . As all of claimant's medical testimony was submitted by deposition, without objection, we are required to assume that both of claimant's exper…
-
Lowry v. JIM Bassitts Auto & Claims Ctr., 566 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…record before us. It is well settled that inconsistencies and inaccuracies in a workers’ compensation order can preclude appellate review, especially when the decision was the result of the conflicting findings. Taylor v. Stanley Industrial Corp., 528 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Based on the inconsistencies in the instant order with regard to the acceptance and rejection of the expert testimony received below, we reverse and remand for clarification of that order. Reversed and remanded with direc…
Authorities Cited
- Curtis v. Fla. Corr. Inst. & Div. of Risk Mgmt., 509 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)