HOWARD M. NEU, APPELLANT,
v.
HONORABLE ROBERT ANDREWS AND DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES; SENTIMENTAL JOURNEYS, INC. AND LEONARD WEINGRAD, APPELLANTS, V. DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; GREGORY L. LANGSETT AND KATHLEEN M. LANGSETT, APPELLANTS, V. DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Three consolidated appeals challenge a trial court's forfeiture of a marital home owned as tenancy by the entireties, denial of a motion for disqualification, a contempt order, and denial of intervention by innocent purchasers of the home. The appellate court reversed, finding the home was improperly subject to forfeiture, that the trial judge should have been disqualified, and that the innocent purchasers should have been allowed to intervene.
Property owned as a tenancy by the entireties cannot be made available to answer for the judgment debts of one tenant individually when the other tenant is not a party to the action. The trial judge should have been disqualified based on circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent person to conclude they would not receive a fair and impartial trial. The innocent purchasers of the home should have been allowed to intervene in the action.
[1] Property owned as a tenancy by the entireties cannot be made available to answer for the judgment debts of one of the tenants individually, absent evidence of fraud.
[2] An order of contempt filed subsequent to a ruling on a motion for disqualification is void.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Property owned as a tenancy by the entireties cannot be made available to answer for the judgment debts of one of the tenants individually.”
Establishes the core legal principle that protects tenancy by the entireties property from individual creditor claims when the other tenant is not a party.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Department of Legal Affairs sued tour operator Leonard Weingrad and his company Sentimental Journeys, Inc. for failing to refund consumer deposits…
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[*1279] WALDEN, Judge.
There are before this court three consolidated appeals arising out of an action brought by the Department of Legal Affairs against a tour operator, Leonard Weingrad, and his company, Sentimental Journeys, Inc. The essence of the action was that Sentimental Journeys, Inc. and Weingrad had failed to refund deposits and other monies of consumers who had can-celled their trips. Two days before the original complaint was filed by the Department of Legal Affairs, Mr. Weingrad and his wife entered into an agreement to sell their home to Gregory and Kathleen Lang-sett. The agreement to sell the marital home was entered into prior to the time that the Department sought a temporary injunction to prevent the disbursement of Weingrad’s assets.
The first point on appeal, by appellant Weingrad, challenges a final order of forfeiture. He asserts, and we agree, that the trial court erred in determining that the Weingrad’s marital home, which is jointly owned by Mr. Weingrad and his wife, could be used to satisfy Mr. Wein-grad’s debt. The property is not properly subject to forfeiture because the home is owned as a tenancy by the entireties and Mrs. Weingrad was not a named party to the action. Property owned as a tenancy by the entireties cannot be made available to answer for the judgment debts of one of the tenants individually. See Balding v. Fleisher, 279 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 285 So. 2d 20 (Fla.1973). We note, in passing, the exception to the rule which allows such an estate to be attacked in cases involving fraud. However, there is no evidence to warrant application of the exception in the instant case.
The second point on appeal challenges an order denying a motion for disqualification and an order granting a motion for contempt. We treat the appeal as a petition for writ of prohibition and grant the writ on authority of White v. Price, 13 F.L.W. 1561 (Fla. 4th DCA July 6, 1988) (wherein this Court granted a writ of prohibition finding that the transcript furnished a valid basis upon which a reasonably prudent person would conclude that he would not receive a fair and impartial trial). Additionally we conclude that the order of contempt which was filed subsequent to the ruling on the motion for disqualification is thereby void.
The final question on appeal concerns the failure of the trial court to allow the Lang-setts, the innocent purchasers of the Wein-grad’s home, to intervene in the action. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Langsetts an opportunity to be heard.
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith, in addition we grant the writ of prohibition concerning the motion for disqualification.
HERSEY, C.J., and DELL, J., concur.
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Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…judgment lien. E.g., McDowell v. Trailer Ranch, Inc., 421 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). A joint tenant whose interest is by the entire-ties, however, does not have an interest that is subject to execution on a judgment lien. E.g., Neu v. Andrews, 528 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). There is nothing indicating that section 56.29(5) expands on these two basic legal principles and by its own terms the statute does not permit its application to exempt property. The trial court found that Dr. Shackleton’s inte…
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Amsouth Bank OF Fla. v. Hepner, 647 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…a judgment lien. E.g., McDowell v. Trailer Ranch, Inc., 421 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). A joint tenant whose interest is by the entireties, however, does not have an interest that is subject to execution on a judgment hen. E.g., Neu v. Andrews, 528 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (emphasis deleted). No hen superior to Amsouth’s judgment encumbered the car. When the sheriffs office dechned to follow Amsouth’s instructions for levy on the…
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Sperber v. Sperber, 609 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…trial judge, which was granted. Sperber v. Sperber, 608 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Because the contempt order was entered subsequent to the erroneous denial of appellant’s motion for disqualification, the contempt order is void. Neu v. Andrews, 528 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Accordingly, we reverse the order appealed and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED. HERSEY, GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ„ concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Balding v. Fleisher, 279 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Cheramie v. State, 285 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1973)
- Cohen v. Sarasota Cnty., 285 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1973)