HUNTER
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT
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The court held that a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is not the proper vehicle to challenge child support orders or domestic violence injunctions when the petitioner is not in custody, nor can it be used to intervene in ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking relief from a child-support order, a domestic-violence in…
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Pro se Petitioner Jason Hunter, Sr., initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Mr. Hunter seeks “habeas relief" from a child-support order and a domestic-violence injunction. (Id. at 1, 6-7). He alleges that he "never committed violence for injunction" and he “should have never been required to pay." (Id. at 3, 6). Mr. Hunter separately seeks relief as to a pending state criminal prosecution for written threats to kill or do bodily injury, corruption by threats against a public official, and unauthorized practice of law. (Id. at 7; see also State v. Hunter, 2019- CF-348 & 2015-CF-729 (Fla. 10th Jud. Cir. Ct.)). Mr. Hunter is not incarcerated; he was released on his own recognizance. State v. Hunter, 2019-CF-348 & 2015-CF-729, Docket (Fla. 10th Jud. Cir. Ct.).
After careful review, the Court concludes that Mr. Hunter's petition must be dismissed without prejudice. First, Mr. Hunter cannot challenge his child-support
obligations or the domestic-violence injunction under § 2241 because he is not "in custody" pursuant to those orders. Section 2241 applies only to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “The question of whether a person is ‘in custody' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) is one of subject-matter jurisdiction." Howard v. Warden, 776 F. 3d 772, 775 (11th Cir. 2015). Here, Mr. Hunter does not allege that he was ever incarcerated or placed on probation pursuant to his child-support obligations or the domestic-violence injunction. Accordingly, Mr. Hunter cannot challenge those orders under § 2241. See Hall El v. Hall- El, No. 1:24-cv-546, 2024 WL 3905568, at *1 (M.D.N.C. July 12, 2024) (§ 2241 petition subject to dismissal because petitioner did "not assert that he was on probation or incarcerated pursuant to the challenged child support order,” and “[o]bligating a [p]etitioner to make child support payments does not make him 'in custody"), adopted by 2024 WL 3898668 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2024); Sierra v. Florida, No. 3:18-cv-345-LC- CJK, 2018 WL 1958403, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2018) (federal court lacked jurisdiction over § 2241 petition because petitioner "had no restraint on his liberty from the February 22, 2018, contempt order or any other child support order”), adopted by 2018 WL 1950443 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2018).
Second, intervention in Mr. Hunter's criminal case is unwarranted at this juncture. “When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief prior to a pending state criminal trial the petitioner must satisfy the ‘Younger abstention hurdles' before the federal courts can grant such relief." Hughes v. Attʼy Gen. of Fla., 377 F. 3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (referring to the abstention doctrine that the Supreme Court articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971)). And except in “extraordinary circumstances,” a federal court should “abstain from deciding issues implicated in an ongoing criminal proceeding in state court." Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F. 2d 1495, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Green v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 563 F. 3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2009). Younger identified those "exceptional circumstances" as follows: “(1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Hughes, 377 F. 3d at 1263 n.6. Mr. Hunter's petition does not allege facts to support a finding under any of the three Younger exceptions. Thus, the Court cannot intervene at this time in Mr. Hunter's ongoing state proceedings.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
1. Mr. Hunter's petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. Mr. Hunter is DENIED a certificate of appealability because he cannot show "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Because Mr. Hunter is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
3. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 4, 2025.
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Slack v. McDANIEL, 529 U.S. 473 (U.S. 2000)
- Hughes v. Attorney General OF Florida, 377 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2004)
- Green v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 563 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2009)
- Howard v. Warden, 776 F.3d 772 (11th Cir. 2015)