WANDA I. MERCADO
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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Wanda Mercado, the prevailing party in a Social Security appeal, sought and obtained attorney's fees of $3,891.71 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) following a remand order by the court.
A party who wins a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party entitled to recover attorney's fees under the EAJA. Mercado is awarded $3,891.71 in attorney's fees, payable by the defendant to her counsel unless the Department of Treasury determines she owes a federal debt.
[1] A party who obtains a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. …
[2] A party seeking attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act has ninety days after judgment to file an application.
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Establishes that Mercado qualifies as a prevailing party entitled to EAJA fees
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMercado filed a Social Security case against the Commissioner of Social Security. Shortly after Mercado filed an opening brief, the Commissioner moved…
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The plaintiff Wanda I. Mercado moves unopposed for an award of $3,891.71 in attorney's fees under the Equal Access of Justice Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Doc. 18. Shortly after Mercado filed an opening brief, the Commissioner moved unopposed to remand this action under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 14. An order grants that motion, and the Clerk entered a judgement in favor of Mercado and against the Commissioner. Docs. 15-16.
As the prevailing party, Mercado timely [fn 1] moves for an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2414(d)(1)(A); cf. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party), superseded by rule on other grounds, Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). After an order awarding EAJA fees, the United States Department of the Treasury determines whether the plaintiff owes a debt to the government. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592–93 (2010) (“A § 2412(d)(1)(A) attorney's fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to an offset to satisfy the litigant's pre-existing debt to the Government.”). Absent a federal debt, the government will accept Mercado's assignment of EAJA fees and pay the fees directly to her counsel.
The Commissioner consents to the requested relief. Additionally, Mercado's counsel files a legal memorandum and a billing ledger in support of the unopposed motion. Doc. 18 at 4-11. Therefore, for the reasons stated by Mercado, the unopposed motion for attorney fees under the EAJA, Doc. 18, is GRANTED. Mercado shall receive $3,891.71 in attorney's fees under the EAJA. Unless the Department of Treasury determines that Mercado owes a federal debt, the defendant must pay the fees to Mercado's counsel in accord with the assignment of fees. See Doc. 18-1.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on this 24th day of October, 2025.
LINDSAY S. GRIFFIN
United States Magistrate Judge
[fn 1]: The plaintiff in a social security case has thirty days beyond the sixty-day appeal window to apply for fees and other expenses under the EAJA, for a total of ninety days after judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); Gates v. Barnhart, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2002). Here, Mercado timely filed an application for fees on October 20, 2025, Doc. 18, ninety days after judgment. Doc. 16. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).