CLYDE MILLER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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The court recommended granting the unopposed motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
[1] A party who obtains a favorable sentence-four remand order in a Social Security case under 42 U.S.C. …
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A § 2412(d)(1)(A) attorney's fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to an offset to satisfy the litigant's pre-existing debt to the Government.”
Explaining how Treasury determines whether an EAJA fee award is subject to offset for outstanding federal debts.
Plaintiff Clyde Miller, having prevailed after a sentence-four remand, moved for attorney's fees under the EAJA. The Commissioner of Social Security d…
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The plaintiff Clyde Miller moves unopposed for an award of $4,187.97 in attorney's fees under the Equal Access of Justice Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Doc. 20. Shortly after Miller filed an opening brief, the Commissioner moved unopposed to remand this action under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 15. An order grants that motion, and the Clerk entered a judgement in favor of Miller and against the Commissioner. Docs. 17-18.
The EAJA permits an award of “fees and other expenses” incurred by the prevailing party in certain civil actions against the United States unless the position of the United States was substantially justified or “special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). A "party” means “an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). As demonstrated by his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 2, Miller qualifies as a “party” based on his net worth at the time of filing. Miller argues
and the Commissioner effectively concedes that neither a substantial justification nor a special circumstance warrant denying the request for fees. Doc. 20 at 4.
As the prevailing party, Miller timely¹ moves for an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2414(d)(1)(A); cf. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party), superseded by rule on other grounds, Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). After an order awarding EAJA fees, the United States Department of the Treasury determines whether the plaintiff owes a debt to the government. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592–93 (2010) (“A § 2412(d)(1)(A) attorney's fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to an offset to satisfy the litigant's pre-existing debt to the Government.”). Absent a federal debt, the government will accept Miller's assignment of EAJA fees and pay the fees directly to his attorney.
The Commissioner consents to the requested relief. Additionally, Miller's counsel files a legal memorandum, a billing ledger, and affidavits in support of the unopposed motion. Docs. 20, 20-2, 20-4 to 20-6. Because the fees and hours charged by Miller's attorney appear reasonable, and for the reasons stated by Miller, I recommend granting the unopposed motion for attorney fees under the EAJA,
Doc. 20. Miller should receive $4,187.97 in attorney's fees under the EAJA. Unless the Department of Treasury determines that Miller owes a federal debt, the defendant must pay the fees to Miller's counsel in accord with the assignment of fees. Doc. 20-1.
REPORTED in Tampa, Florida, on this 13th day of November, 2025.
LINDSAY S. GRIFFIN
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from the day of service of this report either to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendation or to seek an extension of the fourteen-day deadline. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, a party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations “waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions." 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If the parties wish to expedite the resolution of this matter, they may promptly file a joint notice of no objection.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Authorities Cited
- Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (U.S. 1993)
- Gates v. Barnhart, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12462 (M.D. Fla. 2002)