JACK ECKERD CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION AND MAPSIE P. JOHNSON, APPELLEES
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Jack Eckerd Corporation appealed an order assessing appellate costs against it in an unemployment compensation case where it had been a named party but did not actively participate. The court affirmed the cost assessment, holding that Eckerd, as the unsuccessful real party in interest with a financial stake in the outcome, must bear the costs under Florida's general costs statutes.
Jack Eckerd Corporation was correctly held liable for appellate costs as the unsuccessful real party in interest. Although the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission is made a party respondent in every appellate proceeding under section 443.151(4)(e), it has no cognizable interest in the outcome, whereas the employer has a direct financial stake through its tax account. Accordingly, the employer, not the commission, must bear the costs under section 57.021, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400.
[1] An employer who is a named party appellee in an unemployment compensation appeal, and who stands to gain or lose financially from the outcome, is liable for appellate cos…
[2] The Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, as a tribunal making a ruling, is not considered a party with a cognizable interest in the outcome of an appeal from its own…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is apparent that no cognizable 'interest' of the commission, which, in common with any other decision-making body, does not care who wins the case, is involved in the appeal”
Establishes that the commission, despite being a named party, has no real interest in the outcome of the compensation appeal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a prior appeal (Johnson v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 513 So.2d 1098), the court held that Johnson had not been discharged for miscon…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
In Johnson v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 513 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), this court held, contrary to the commission’s view, that Johnson had not been discharged by his employer, Jack Eck-erd Corporation, for misconduct and was therefore entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. After remand, the commission assessed the costs of the appeal against Jack Eckerd, which had been a named party appellee, but which, for its own reasons, did not actively participate in the appeal. In the present appeal from the order taxing costs, Jack Eckerd claims that it is not liable for such costs as a matter of law,1 and that this expense must be borne by the commission instead. We do not agree.
While, under section 443.151(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), the commission is made a party respondent in every appellate proceeding involving a decision on the merits of a compensation claim — thus, strangely enough, rendering a tribunal a party to an appeal from its own ruling — it is apparent that no cognizable “interest” of the commission, which, in common with any other decision-making body, does not care who wins the case, is involved in the appeal. Thus, the acceptance of the appellant’s contention that the commission should pay the costs would place it in the curious position of taxing costs, as the “lower tribunal,” see Fla.R.App.P. 9.400(a), against itself as the losing party.
In contrast, only the employer and employee are parties in a position to gain or lose by the results of a compensation appeal. As to an employer, this is because an ultimately successful claim adversely affects the tax account maintainable under section 443.131(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1987); in this case, therefore, Eckerd would simply have been better off financially if Johnson had lost rather than won the case. It follows that it was the unsuccessful real party in interest. As such, under the established law, and even though there is no specific such provision in the Unemployment Compensation Act, Eckerd was correctly held liable under the general costs statute, section 57.021, Florida Statutes (1987), and rule, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400, for the costs in question. See 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs § 26 (1965); 12 Fla.Jur.2d Costs § 13 (1979).
Affirmed.
. Jack Eckerd does not dispute the amount of the costs assessed.
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- Mapsie P. Johnson v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Jack Eckerd Corp., 513 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)