WILLIAM MELVIN WHITE, PETITIONER,
v.
RICHARD L. DUGGER, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1988-01-28
No. 71184
MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur., BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur in result only.
523 So. 2d 140 Florida Supreme Court (1988) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

William White challenges his death sentence for first-degree murder on habeas corpus, arguing that jury instructions improperly limited consideration of mitigating circumstances to those enumerated in the sentencing statute. The Florida Supreme Court rejects his claim, finding any instructional error harmless.


Holding

The court holds that even assuming the instruction was erroneous under Hitchcock, any error was harmless because: (1) residual doubt is not a valid nonstatutory mitigating circumstance and White's guilt was absolute; (2) disparate sentencing of co-defendants is permissible where culpability differs; and (3) White's alcohol consumption was adequately considered despite any instructional limitation.


Headnotes

[1] A jury instruction restricting mitigating circumstances to those set forth in the sentencing statute may be harmless error if no mitigating evidence existed.

[2] Residual doubt as to guilt is not a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance in a capital sentencing proceeding.

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Key Quotes

“Following Hitchcock we have looked at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether or not it was likely that the jury was so constrained. If so, we then consider whether there was evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances of such a degree that it might have affected the jury's recommendation or the trial court's consideration.”

Establishes the post-Hitchcock harmlessness framework applied to instructional error regarding mitigating circumstances.

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Facts & Procedural History

White was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after the jury unanimously recommended capital punishment. The trial court imposed t…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

White files this habeas corpus action contending that he is entitled to relief under Hitchcock v. Dugger, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(9) of the state constitution and disagree.

White was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury unanimously recommended death which the trial judge imposed. We affirmed both the conviction and sentence. White v. State, 415 So. 2d 719 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 474, 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982).

White complains that the standard jury instructions in use at the time of his trial, and given in his case, restricted mitigating circumstances to those set forth in the sentencing statute. § 921.141(6), Fla.Stat. (1977).

We rejected this argument numerous times prior to Hitchcock. E.g., Armstrong v. State, 429 So. 2d 287 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 203, 78 L.Ed.2d 177 (1983); Francois v. State, 423 So. 2d 357 (Fla.1982); Straight v. Wainwright, 422 So. 2d 827 (Fla.1982). Following Hitchcock we have looked at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether or not it was likely that the jury was so constrained. If so, we then consider whether there was evidence of nonstat-utory mitigating circumstances of such a degree that it might have affected the jury’s recommendation or the trial court’s consideration. Delap v. Dugger, 513 So. 2d 659 (Fla.1987). If no mitigating evidence existed, we can clearly find the erroneous instruction to have been harmless.

White now asserts that three areas of nonstatutory mitigating evidence should have been presented and considered: (1) alleged residual doubt as to his guilt; (2) the complicity of his co-defendant, Richard DiMarino; and (3) White’s use and consumption of alcohol. We have rejected the residual doubt theory as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. King v. State, 514 So. 2d 354 (Fla.1987). Even so, in this case no legitimate argument can be made as to lingering doubt because it is absolute ly clear that White mercilessly killed the victim.

White’s co-perpetrator, Richard DiMarino, was convicted of only third-degree murder. In White’s original appeal we noted this fact and stated: “While this is fortunate for him [DiMarino], it does not require the reduction of White’s sentence.” 415 So. 2d at 721. The two juries found different culpabilities. It is permissible to impose different sentences on capital co-defendants where their various degrees of participation and culpability are different from one another. Hoffman v. State, 474 So. 2d 1178 (Fla.1985).

Incidentally, trial counsel argued the disparate treatment, and we fail to see how the absence of an instruction on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances could have affected the jury’s handling of this issue. The same is true of White’s use and consumption of alcohol. Although counsel argued this primarily in reference to one of the statutory mitigating circumstances, it is plain that the jury and the judge, and this Court on review, considered intoxication as a potential mitigating circumstance. On the totality of the circumstances of this case we can, and do, unhesitatingly find that the instant evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, if in fact not considered by the jury and/or the judge, would conclusively have had no effect upon the recommendation of the death sentence imposed in this case. The charge which may have limited the jury to a consideration of statutory mitigating circumstance was clearly harmless.

We therefore deny relief.

It is so ordered.

MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur. BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur in result only.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • WAY v. State, 760 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2000)
    …t evidence relevant only to establish a lingering doubt of the defendant’s guilt is a mitigating circumstance that the Eighth Amendment requires the fact-finder to consider. See King v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla.1990); White [*917] v. Dugger, 523 So. 2d 140, 140 (Fla.1988); see also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (finding that Eighth Amendment does not require that sentencing jury be instructed that it can consider lingering doubt of guilt as a mitigating fact…
  • White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2002)
    …inal disposition of the ha-beas petition. We rejected appellant’s claim for relief, concluding that “[t]he charge which may have limited the jury to a consideration of statutory mitigat [*803] ing circumstance was clearly harmless.” White v. Dugger, 523 So. 2d 140, 141 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 184, 102 L.Ed.2d 153 (1988). The trial court subsequently held an eviden-tiary hearing on most of appellant’s claims and denied relief on all claims by order.... Id. at 910-11. In White’s appeal o…
  • Bernell Hegwood v. State, 575 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1991)
    …have cast on the verdicts of guilt which was a major thrust of defense counsel’s closing argument at sentencing. However, this Court has consistently held that lingering doubt cannot be the basis of a jury recommendation. See, e.g., White v. Dugger, 523 So. 2d 140 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 184, 102 L.Ed.2d 153 (1988); King v. State, 514 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S.Ct. 2916, 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988). Consequently, that evidence cannot serve as a basis for th…

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