THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE HONORABLE ARTHUR WINTON, COUNTY JUDGE OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appealed a circuit court order denying the State's petition for prohibition or mandamus against a county judge who placed a criminal defendant into a pretrial intervention program without the State Attorney's required consent. The court reversed, holding that Florida law requires state attorney consent for pretrial intervention program placement, and prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion.
A county judge lacks the authority to place a defendant in a pretrial intervention program without state attorney consent, as required by Florida Statutes § 944.025(2). Prohibition is the appropriate remedy when a trial court attempts to interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of the state attorney.
[1] A judge may not place a defendant in a pretrial intervention program without the consent of the State Attorney.
[2] The consent of the State Attorney is required for a defendant to be eligible for release to a pretrial intervention program.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Any first offender ... who is charged with any misdemeanor ... is eligible for release to the pretrial intervention program on the approval of the administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the state attorney, and the judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing of the offender.”
Statutory requirement establishing that state attorney consent is mandatory for pretrial intervention program placement
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeorge Baro was charged in county court with falsely impersonating an officer. The county judge entered a pretrial order placing Baro on probation and…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Pretrial Intervention Program cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court denying the State’s petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus which sought to prevent the appellee, a judge of the county court, from acting in excess of his jurisdiction by placing a criminal defendant in a pretrial intervention program without the consent of the State. Concluding that the State’s petition should have been granted, we reverse.
George Baro was charged in the county court with the misdemeanor offense of falsely impersonating an officer. Sometime thereafter, the appellee entered a pretrial order placing Baro on probation and directing his entry into, and completion of, the Advocate Program, a pretrial intervention program. It is undisputed that the State Attorney’s office never approved Baro’s entry into the program; that Baro’s application for the program specifically called for such approval, but contained none; and that the clerk of the county court was advised of the State’s disapproval on several occasions.
Section 944.025(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in pertinent part and in no uncertain terms that:
“Any first offender ... who is charged with any misdemeanor ... is eligible for release to the pretrial intervention program on the approval of the administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the state attorney, and the judge who presided at the initial appearance hearing of the offender.” (emphasis supplied).
There is to be no judicial second-guessing of the State Attorney’s withholding of consent. As the Supreme Court of Florida said in Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla.1982): “The pretrial diversion is essentially a conditional decision not to prosecute similar to the nolle prosequi.... It is a pretrial decision and does not divest the state attorney of the right to institute proceedings if the conditions are not met. The pretrial intervention program is merely an alternative to prosecution and should remain in the prosecutor’s discretion .... The fact that the state attorney has th[e] discretion to reinstate prosecution is consistent with the view that the pretrial diversion consent by the state attorney is a prosecutorial function.”
Prohibition being “the appropriate remedy when a trial court attempts to interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of a state attorney,” State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla.1986); see Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, the circuit court erred in failing to grant the State’s petition. Accordingly, the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant the State relief by way of prohibition and, if necessary, issue a writ of prohibition to the county court judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)…n of the “explicit statutory admonition that, whenever a defendant has entered and completed a pretrial intervention program, ‘[t]he state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue’ ”); State v. Winton, 522 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (reversing a circuit court order denying the State’s petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus seeking to prevent the appellee, a judge of the county court, from acting in excess of his jurisdiction by placing a criminal defend…
-
State v. Turner, 636 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…on pending review of decision to revoke it reversed; present issue of defendant’s entitlement to dismissal reserved); State v. Bryant, 549 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (state, not trial court, makes decision whether to prosecute); State v. Winton, 522 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (trial court cannot second-guess state’s decision to withhold consent to defendant’s entry into pretrial intervention program); State v. Brown, 416 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (court improperly dismissed information where stat…
-
State v. Mancuso, 355 So. 3d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…oval for Mancuso to participate in veterans court is required for Mancuso to be eligible to participate. Under the applicable statutes, “[t]here is to be no judicial second-guessing of the State Attorney’s withholding of consent.” State v. Winton, 522 So. 2d 463, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Here, the state attorney objected to Mancuso’s participation in veterans court. Yet, the trial court by order allowed Mancuso’s criminal case to be transferred to veterans court over the state attorney’s objection. The lo…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986)
- Ophelia Johnson Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1982)