LARRY JOE JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Larry Joe Johnson, under death warrant, filed a post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence under Florida Rule 3.850, claiming prosecutorial misconduct, judicial bias, and jury confusion regarding murder charges. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary denial of his motion and denial of stay of execution, finding all claims procedurally barred or without merit under binding precedent.
The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Johnson's rule 3.850 motion and stay of execution request. All three claims were procedurally barred because they were raised and rejected on direct appeal. The Court found that new law cited by Johnson (Sumner v. Shuman) was not applicable to his case, as Johnson received a full and fair sentencing hearing with discretionary imposition of the death penalty, not automatic.
[1] A claim previously raised and rejected on direct appeal is procedurally barred from collateral review, absent a showing that new evidence fundamentally alters the claim.
[2] Improper prosecutorial statements during closing argument, while potentially prejudicial, do not warrant vacating a sentence if they did not deny the defendant a fair sen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although certain statements were improper they were not so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair sentencing proceeding.”
Establishes the Court's reasoning for rejecting the prosecutorial misconduct claim on res judicata grounds—the claim was previously adjudicated with this analysis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was convicted and sentenced to death. Under execution warrant, he filed a motion to vacate his sentence raising three claims: improper prosecu…
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PER CURIAM.
Under death warrant, appellant Larry Joe Johnson filed in the trial court a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. He further filed a motion for a stay of execution. The trial court summarily denied both motions and Johnson appeals that decision to this Court. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The first claim raised by Johnson concerns certain improper prosecutorial statements made during closing argument of the sentencing proceeding. While it is true that this claim is one that was asserted on direct appeal, Johnson urges this Court to review it now because the law has changed so significantly in this area. We do not agree. On appeal this Court disposed of this claim by stating that although certain statements were improper they were not so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair sentencing proceeding. We see no reason to depart from that ruling.
The second issue raised by Johnson centers on the dual role or “caretaker of the jury” and “chief investigating officer” played by the county sheriff in the Johnson case. This issue was raised on direct appeal, and it was rejected. At that time, we expressed our displeasure with that practice, but we nonetheless upheld the conviction. Our disdain for the dual conflicting role practice remains, but that is insufficient to require reopening the issue at this time. Johnson alleges that there is new evidence of the sheriff’s bias against Johnson which would cause this Court to reexamine that issue. Again, we do not agree. The charges of bias on the part of the sheriff were also made on direct appeal. We assumed then, as we do now that there was some bias against Johnson.
We rejected the claim on the ground that the error did not prejudice Johnson, not because the evidence to support the claim was insufficient.
Therefore we reject Johnson’s second claim because it was raised and rejected by this Court on direct appeal, and is thus procedurally barred.
The final claim raised in this motion concerns the alleged confusion in the guilty verdict between premeditated murder and felony murder. This also was raised on direct appeal. Johnson alleges that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Sumner v. Shuman, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987), that automatic death penalties violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, is new law rendering this issue open for further review. While it is true that the Sumner opinion does represent new law, it is in no way applicable to the present case. Sumner involves the automatic, non-discretionary imposition of the death penalty in any situation. Johnson was afforded a full and fair sentencing hearing. While his sentence was proper, it was by no means automatic.
Therefore, the new law cited by Johnson does not apply to this case, and does not require this Court to reconsider an issue raised and disposed of on direct appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s rule 3.850 motion, and deny the request for a stay of execution. No motion for rehearing will be allowed.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
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Loren v. State, 601 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…could be properly brought on direct appeal, and because the issue was raised below and ruled on by the trial court, any attempt to raise this particular effectiveness issue by postconviction proceedings is procedurally barred. See Johnson v. State, 522 So. 2d 356 (Fla.1988); Parker v. State, 491 So. 2d 532 (Fla.1986). We decline, however, to affirm the order insofar as it relates to the reasonableness of defense counsel’s delay in adequately preparing for trial, because we recognize that “counsel has a duty…
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Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2002)…(Fla.2001) (finding that the purpose of preservation is "to place the trial judge on notice that an error may have occurred and provide him or her with the opportunity to correct the error at an early stage of the proceedings”). . Johnson v. State, 522 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla.1988) ("Therefore we reject Johnson’s second claim because it was raised and rejected by this Court on direct appeal, and is thus procedurally barred.”). . Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 644 (Fla.2000) ("This Court has previously re…
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Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2006)…he trial court issued improper jury instructions, were considered and denied by this Court on direct appeal. See Ponticelli, 593 So. 2d at 487; Ponticelli, 618 So. 2d. at 154-55. Therefore, these claims are procedurally barred. See Johnson v. State, 522 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla.1988) (finding claim raised in a 3.850 motion procedurally barred because the claim was raised and rejected on direct appeal). Furthermore, Ponticelli’s second claim that the trial court erred in denying counsel’s motion to exclude Freeman…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (U.S. 1987)