LOUISE B. MOSS, APPELLANT,
v.
INVERNESS HIGHLANDS SOUTH AND WEST CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellant was enjoined from renting rooms in her single-family home to elderly residents under an adult congregate living facility arrangement. The court reversed the injunction, holding that the restrictive covenant limiting use to "residential purposes only" was not violated merely because the appellant charged rent, as the elderly residents were using the property for residential purposes.
The restrictive covenant is not violated. The elderly residents are using the lot for purely residential purposes, and the fact that the appellant receives rental income does not convert the use to a nonresidential purpose. Restrictive covenants must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner and free use of property; if the drafter intended to forbid rental, the restriction should have explicitly provided so.
[1] A restrictive covenant stating that lots shall be used for residential purposes only is not violated by operating an adult congregate living facility where residents pay…
[2] Restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the landowner and the free use of property.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is our considered judgment that these elderly folks are using the lot, along with appellant, for purely residential purposes and that the covenant has not been breached.”
Establishes the court's holding that residential use with paid occupants does not violate the covenant.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant owns a single-family residence in a subdivision burdened by a restrictive covenant requiring that "all lots shall be used for residential pu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Construction Of Restrictive Covenants cases and more on FLexlaw
DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment enjoining appellant from renting portions of her home on the grounds the rental was in violation of deed restrictions. We reverse.
Appellant owns a single-family residence in a subdivision which is burdened with a restrictive covenant saying “All lots shall be used for residential purposes only.” Appellant has opened her home to elderly people who pay for their room and board under a scheme called an adult congregate living facility.
The question on appeal is whether the restrictive covenant is being violated by appellant. It is our considered judgment that these elderly folks are using the lot, along with appellant, for purely residential purposes and that the covenant has not been breached. Just because appellant is receiving rental income, or making a profit, from her business of sharing her home with elderly people does not mean the lot is being used for nonresidential purposes. If she were using the lot for a hospital, or a treatment center with overnight “residents,” then we would agree that the restriction would be violated. But only the fact that appellant charges her residents while they reside there does not violate the literal meaning of the restrictive covenant.
Restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed in favor of the landowner and the free use of his property. Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879, 106 So. 901 (1926); Young v. Tortoise Island Homeowner’s Association, Inc., 611 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 6th DCA 1987). If the drafter of this restriction had intended to forbid rental or leasing, as the trial judge did in his injunction, then he should have so provided. The fact that each elderly resident pays to live in appellant’s home does not reflect a violation of the deed restriction. If paying for the right to reside is a violation of the deed restriction, then each resident in the subdivision is violating, or has violated, the restriction. It is reasonable to assume that each one has paid rent, mortgage payments or a purchase price for the place to reside, except some children and other elderly folks who have others pay for them. The judgment is reversed.
REVERSED.
SHARP, C.J., concurs.
DANIEL, J., dissents without opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Robins v. Walter, 670 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…ementary breakfast is served as part of the services to guests is immaterial, especially in light of the fact that many hotel and motel chains offer this amenity. [*975] The case of Moss v. Inverness Highlands South and West Civic Association, Inc., 521 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1353 (Fla.1988), relied on by appellant also fails to support appellant’s argument that a bed and breakfast inn constitutes a residential use. In Moss, the fifth district determined that an adult congregate li…
-
James v. Smith, 537 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…against the party claiming the right to enforce the restriction. Moreover, deed restrictions are to be strictly construed in favor of the landowner and the free use of his property. Moss v. Inverness Highlands South and West Civic Association, Inc., 521 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). It is beyond dispute that horses and ponies are domestic animals. Groh v. Hasencamp, 407 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Moessinger v. Johnson, 292 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Even normally wild animals such as deer and h…
-
Clark v. Bluewater Key RV Ownership Park Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 226 So. 3d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…ities assist Clark’s business and her ability to profit from the rental program; therefore, they constitute the commercial [*283] activity that the restrictive covenants clearly prohibit. Moss v. Inverness Highlands South and West Civic Ass’n, Inc., 521 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), relied upon by the Clarks and Glenz, is distinguishable (the fact that a homeowner received rental income and made a profit from sharing her home with elderly people did not violate the covenant’s restriction that property can o…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879 (Fla. 1925)