PHELAN A. LITTLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Phelan Little appealed his conviction and sentencing, challenging jail time credit, a public defender's lien, and probation revocation. The court affirmed the jail time credit calculation but found the public defender's lien required remand for a proper hearing, and partially reversed the probation revocation by requiring deletion of the cocaine possession violation that occurred after the probationary period expired.
The court held that Little was properly credited only for time spent in jail for the charge leading to each sentence; that the public defender's lien required remand for a hearing complying with Jenkins v. State; and that while probation revocation was proper based on pre-expiration technical violations to which Little admitted, the cocaine possession violation occurring after expiration must be deleted from the revocation order.
[1] A court must conduct a hearing to impose a public defender's lien and costs, providing notice and an opportunity to be heard, unless the record demonstrates such procedur…
[2] A court is divested of jurisdiction over a probationer upon the expiration of the probationary period unless proceedings for revocation or modification were initiated pri…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon expiration of the probationary period, the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the probationer unless prior to that time the processes of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of probation.”
Establishes that probation revocation must be initiated before expiration of the probationary period or the court loses jurisdiction.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLittle was sentenced to three years probation on February 25, 1983, and placed on concurrent three-year probation for sexual battery conviction on Jul…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jail Credit Calculation cases and more on FLexlaw
FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
The appellant, Phelan Little, raises three issues on appeal, two of which are meritorious. Little first challenges the amount of jail time credit he received as a result of various concurrent sentences. Consistent with our opinion in Keene v. State, 500 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), Little was properly credited only for the time he spent in jail for the charge which led to each sentence. Id. at 594. This point must, therefore, fail.
Little’s second point concerns the imposition subsequent to the hearing on August 21,1986, of a public defender’s lien in the amount of $300 and costs totalling $69. The state has conceded, and we agree, that remand for a hearing in compliance with Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984), is necessary in the absence of a record disclosing that such obligations were imposed following notice and an opportunity to be heard. Canale v. State, 509 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Sescon v. State, 506 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
Little’s final contention challenges the revocation of his probation. Little was sentenced to a three year probationary term on February 25, 1983. On July 15, 1983 Little was placed on a concurrent term of three years probation following a conviction for sexual battery. On February 19, 1986, five days prior to the expiration of that period, an affidavit was filed alleging that Little had committed acts technically violative of his probationary status. Amended affidavits were executed on April 25, 1986, alleging as an additional violation, his arrest for possession of cocaine on April 5, 1986.
Little urges that his probation was erroneously revoked based upon the possession offense which occurred after the expiration of his probationary term. If Little’s probation had been revoked solely as a result of the possession charge, his contention would be correct. “Upon expiration of the probationary period, the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the probationer unless pri-or to that time the processes of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of probation.” Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Little, however, specifically admitted to the technical violations which formed the basis for the affidavit filed prior to the expiration of the probationary term. Little’s probation was properly revoked based upon his admission. Bexley v. State, 490 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Upon remand, however, the order revoking Little’s probation must be corrected to delete the violation of condition (5) stemming from the possession of cocaine. Kimble v. State, 396 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Stevens v. State, 599 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…nd he was unsuccessful in repairing it before arrest). Under the circumstances, the court could well determine, as it obviously did, that even the most technical violation of the terms of probation would justify its revocation. See Little v. State, 519 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), review denied, 528 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1988); May v. State, 472 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Jess v. State, 384 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). It is required, however, that any such deviation be the product of a knowing and willf…
-
Brown v. State, 537 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…pon the expiration of the probationary period, the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the probationer unless prior to that time the processes of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of probation.” Little v. State, 519 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 528 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1988); Minninger v. State, 517 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Robinson v. State, 474 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Clark v. State, 402 So. 2d 43…
-
Aguiar v. State, 593 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…riod expires, the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the probationer unless, prior to that time, the appropriate steps were taken to revoke or modify the probation. Purvis v. Lindsey, 587 So. 2d 638, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Little v. State, 519 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 528 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1988); Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The State was required to file the affidavit of violation of probation before the termination of the probationary period. Clark v. Stat…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Keene v. State, 500 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Gardner v. State, 412 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Sescon v. State, 506 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Kimble v. State, 396 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Bexley v. State, 490 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Canale v. State, 509 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)