WILMON EDWARDS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Wilmon Edwards was convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine with a confidential informant. The appellate court reversed, holding that a person cannot be convicted of conspiracy with a government agent, and alternatively, that the evidence was insufficient to prove an agreement to sell cocaine.
Edwards's conviction cannot stand because a person may not be convicted of conspiracy when one of the alleged conspirators is a government agent. Additionally, even if Edwards had been properly charged with conspiring with Al Joe, the evidence would not support conviction because merely referring Young to another person and stating when that person would return does not constitute an agreement or conspiracy to sell cocaine.
[1] Proof that a defendant was present at the scene of a crime, had knowledge of it, or aided others in the commission of the substantive offense is insufficient to prove con…
[2] A conspiracy requires proof of an express or implied agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal offense, coupled with an intent to commit that offense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when one of two persons charged with a conspiracy is a government agent, the other person may not be convicted of the conspiracy”
Establishes the controlling legal rule that bars conspiracy conviction when a conspirator is a government informant
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrenda Young, a confidential informant, was instructed by police to buy cocaine from someone named Al Joe. Unable to find Al Joe, she was directed to …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Circumstantial Evidence In Conspiracy Cases cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Wilmon Edwards appeals his judgment and sentence for conspiring with Brenda Young to sell or deliver cocaine. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We agree.
Brenda Young was asked by officers of the Sebring Police Department to act as a confidential informant and make a controlled buy of an eighth of cocaine from an Al Joe in Sebring. Upon her arrival in Sebring, Young was unable to find Al Joe.
However, she was directed by a young man to Al Joe’s brother, the appellant. Young told the appellant what she wanted, and he informed her that Al Joe was at the dog track and would be back around midnight. The appellant then left the room and came back with a plastic bag with white powder in it. He told Young the powder was cocaine.
However, he did not offer to sell the substance to Young and she did not offer to buy it, as her instructions were to buy only from Al Joe. The two discussed the price of the amount Young wanted to buy from Al Joe. The appellant then told Young that Al Joe might return about 12:30. Young left and was instructed by the law enforcement officer with whom she was working that she could buy the cocaine from the appellant. When Young returned the appellant told her he could not do anything for her and she would have to see Al Joe, who had not yet returned.
The appellant was charged by an amended information which read in pertinent part as follows: “Wilmon Edwards, Jr., and Brenda Young, on the 14th day of January, 1986, ... did agree, conspire, combine, and confederate together to commit an offense, to-wit [sic]: to unlawfully sell or deliver a controlled substance, to-wit [sic]: Cocaine, in violation of Sections 893.13 and 774.04, Florida Statutes.... ”
The offense of conspiracy consists of an express or implied agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and the intention to commit a crime. Gonzalez v. State, 455 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). These elements of conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence. Id. However, when one of two persons charged with a conspiracy is a government agent, the other person may not be convicted of the conspiracy. King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730 (Fla.1958); LaPolla v. State, 504 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
It is evident from the information filed in this case that only two persons were charged with conspiracy, the appellant and Brenda Young. Because Young was a confidential informant working with the Sebring Police Department, the appellant’s conviction cannot stand. King.
Furthermore, if the appellant had been properly charged with conspiring with A1 Joe to sell or deliver cocaine, the evidence would not have supported his conviction.
The state argues that the facts show that the appellant represented to Young that he could arrange for the sale of cocaine by A1 Joe to Young.
However, Young testified that the bottom line was that the appellant told her she would have to deal with A1 Joe, and the tapes of her conversations with the appellant (Young was wearing a concealed electronic listening device) contain nothing to contradict her testimony. Telling someone seeking to purchase cocaine that she will have to deal with another individual and only advising her of the time that other individual is expected to return is not evidence of an agreement, conspiracy, combination, or confederation with that other individual to sell or deliver cocaine. See § 777.04(3), Fla. Stat. (1985).
Accordingly, we reverse the appellant’s conviction and remand with directions that he be discharged. Because of our disposition of this cause we do not reach the appellant’s argument regarding costs.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Spioch, 706 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…onspiracy may not be inferred from mere aiding and abetting. Velunza, 504 So. 2d at 782. While circumstantial evidence alone will support the existence of a. conspiracy, Wilder v. State, 587 So. 2d 543, 545-547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Edwards v. State, 516 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), a special standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence applies when a conviction is based wholly on circumstantial evidence. State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989); Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla.1982). Wh…
-
State v. Edwards, 536 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…racy § 1547 (1979). It is also clear that the conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; participation in a criminal conspiracy may, of course, be shown by circumstantial evidence. Resnick v. State, 287 So. 2d 24 (Fla.1973); Edwards v. State, 516 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1987); Gonzalez, supra. There appears to be little question from the evidence which was presented to the trial court that the statements made by Edwards prior to November 5 purporting to implicate Hernandez are not admissible against…1 / 2
-
Baxter v. State, 586 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…ncur. . We note that this conspiracy is not based upon an agreement between the defendant and the confidential informant. Such an agreement does not provide the basis for a conspiracy. See King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730 (Fla.1957); Edwards v. State, 516 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). . See generally McCormick, Evidence § 145 (3d ed. 1984); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2072 (1978); D. Nissman, E. Hagen & P. Brooks, Law of Confessions § 10:2 (1985); 3 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 691 (13th…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1957)
- LaPOLLA v. State, 504 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Gonzalez v. State, 455 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)