THE CITY OF TAMPA, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
LILI MADISON, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 1987-06-05
No. 87-795
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.
508 So. 2d 754 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1987) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The City of Tampa sought certiorari review of a circuit court order that overturned the Tampa City Council's denial of a zoning change request. The appellate court granted the petition, finding the circuit court improperly shifted the burden of proof and that the council's decision was supported by substantial competent evidence.


Holding

The circuit court erred in overturning the city council's decision. The burden of proving the necessity for a zoning change rests upon the party seeking the change, not on the municipality. The city council's decision was supported by substantial competent evidence and was not arbitrary.


Headnotes

[1] A circuit court order overturning a zoning decision constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law when the court improperly shifts the burden of proof to…

[2] The burden of proving the necessity for a zoning change or the arbitrariness of an existing zoning classification rests upon the party seeking the change.

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Key Quotes

“The burden of proving the necessity for a change in zoning, or the arbitrariness of an existing zoning classification, rests upon the party seeking the change.”

Establishes the proper allocation of burden of proof in zoning change requests; the party seeking change must prove necessity, not the municipality.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lili Madison owned a single-family home at the corner of Westshore Boulevard and Cleveland Street in Tampa, zoned R-1A. Commercial development had exp…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The City of Tampa seeks certiorari review of a circuit court order which overturned a zoning decision of the Tampa City Council. We agree that the circuit court’s order represents a departure from the es sential requirements of law and, accordingly, grant the petition for certiorari.

Respondent Madison is the owner of a lot and single family home situated at the southwest corner of the intersection of Westshore Boulevard and Cleveland Street in Tampa. Although considerable commercial development has taken place to the north of Madison’s property, her lot is presently zoned R-1A (single family dwelling). The areas to the south, east, and west remain predominantly residential in character. In June, 1986, Madison sought to have her property rezoned R-P (residential-professional). She claimed that the existing zoning classification, coupled with the proximity of commercial development, severely hampered her ability to sell the property and that rezoning would help create an appropriate buffer zone between the commercial and residential areas.

After hearing from Madison and other interested parties, including the Hillsbor-ough County City-County Planning Commission and residents of Madison’s neighborhood, the city council denied the request for rezoning. Madison thereupon sought certiorari relief in the circuit court. The court overturned the city council’s decision and ordered the property rezoned “not more restrictive than R-P.” In so holding, the court appears to have shifted to the city the burden of proving that the requested rezoning would adversely affect the welfare of the public. The burden of proving the necessity for a change in zoning, or the arbitrariness of an existing zoning classification, rests upon the party seeking the change. Alachua County v. Reddick, 368 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

We find, in the present case, that the issue of Madison’s entitlement to a zoning change was fairly debatable and that the city council’s decision was, in fact, supported by substantial competent evidence. The city council’s decision, therefore, should not have been overturned. Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners v. Longo, 505 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Hillsborough County v. Westshore Realty, Inc., 444 So. 2d 25 (Fla.2d DCA 1983).

The petition for writ of certiorari is hereby granted, the order of the circuit court is quashed, and this case is remanded with directions to reinstate the decision of the Tampa City Council.

Petition for certiorari granted.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • ST. Johns Cnty. v. Owings, 554 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
    …illage of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); City of Miami v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla.1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906, 75 S.Ct. 292, 99 L.Ed. 711 (1955); Tinnerman; City of Tampa v. Madison, 508 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). In making such a determination on review by certiorari, the scope of review by the first court and the second reviewing court is essentially similar. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Ch. 27:27-34. Both have only the record mad…
  • Bailey v. City OF ST. Augustine Beach, 538 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
    …ntitled to the highest and best use of his property, a zoning classification that is arbitrary, unreasonable or confiscatory should not be allowed to stand. See e.g. City of Tampa v. Speth, 517 So. 2d 786 (Fla.2d DCA 1988); City of Tampa v. Madison, 508 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). A zoning classification is confiscatory when it deprives the owner of all beneficial use of the land. See S.A. Healy Co., supra. The only expert testim…

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