IN THE INTEREST OF T.T., S.A.W., AND J.O., CHILDREN, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Three students challenged their trespass convictions for remaining on school property after being ordered to leave. The court held that the statutory exemption for "students" applies only to students of the particular school where the trespass occurred, not students of other schools in the system.
The statutory exemption applies only to students of the particular school whose campus they are on, not to students of other schools in the system. The phrase "such school" clearly refers only to the specific school facility involved.
[1] A statute prohibiting trespass upon public school grounds applies to a student who enters or remains on the campus of a public school other than the one in which they are…
[2] A person who is a student at one public school is not automatically exempt from trespass laws when entering or remaining on the property of a different public school.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It very plainly prohibits any person not a student of a public school from remaining upon the campus or other facility of such school after the chief administrative officer of such school ... has directed such person to leave such campus or facility”
Establishes that the statute's plain language prohibits persons not enrolled at that specific school
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants were students at a public school in the school system but were charged with trespass at a middle school after being directed to leave the c…
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ZEHMER, Judge.
Appellants were charged with trespass on the property of a middle school in violation of section 228.091(2), Florida Statutes (1985).
Section 228.091(2) reads as follows:
(2) Any person who:
(a)l. Is not a student, officer, or employee of a public school;
2. Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property; or
3. Is not a parent, guardian, or person who has legal custody of a student enrolled at such school; or
(b)l. Is a student currently under suspension or expulsion; or
2. Is an employee who is not required by his employment by the school to be on the campus or any other facility owned, operated, or controlled by the governing board of such school and who has no lawful purpose to be on such premises; and who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of such school after the chief administrative officer of such school, or any employee thereof designated by him to maintain order on such campus or facility, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the same, is guilty of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a public school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.-083, or s. 775.084.
Appellants argue that since they were students at another public school in the school system they were “a student” within the meaning of the statute and, thus, exempt from the statute’s class of prohibited persons.
We find no ambiguity or vagueness in the meaning and intent of the statute. It very plainly prohibits any person not a student of a public school from remaining “upon the campus or other facility of such school after the chief administrative officer of such school ... has directed such person to leave such campus or facility” (emphasis supplied). Use of the emphasized words “such school” clearly indicates that only a student of such school falls outside the proscription of this statute. We therefore agree with the decisions of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. E.N., 455 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), quashed on other grounds, 484 So. 2d 1210 (Fla.1986), and the Third District in A.P. v. State, 491 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Accordingly, the appealed order is AFFIRMED.
JOANOS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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In the Interest of J.H. v. State, 625 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ordinance, the phrase “legitimate business on the campus” used in section 228.091(1) is clarified by the words which follow it, namely, “or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property.” Cf. T.T. v. State, 506 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). AFFIRMED. JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.…
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State v. M.O., 605 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…or s. 775.083. Various cases have held that a person who is not registered at the school where he is alleged to have trespassed does not fall within the statutory exceptions. State v. E.N., 455 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5 DCA 1984). See also, T.T. v. State, 506 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); A.P. v. State, 491 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Here, appellee was a student of the school where he was arrested, so he falls within the exception. Section 228.091(2)(a)l. It is the argument of the state that because the stu…
Authorities Cited
- A.P. v. State, 491 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- State v. Ellis, 491 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- State v. E.N., 455 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- E.N. v. State, 484 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1986)