WANDA HUDDLE, JOYCE M. OSTENDARP AND JAMES A. OSTENDARP, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
WE TRY HARDER, INC., ETC. AND MADELINE B. BICKING, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed a summary judgment that dismissed a third-party contribution claim against Wanda Huddle, holding that a prior jury verdict finding no negligence against Bicking could not be read as establishing Huddle's sole negligence through collateral estoppel. The court clarified that Huddle's negligence remained a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
A jury verdict that Bicking was not negligent does not necessarily establish that Huddle was negligent, as this represents a logical fallacy. Huddle's negligence remained a genuine issue of material fact, making summary judgment improper and requiring the case to proceed to trial.
[1] A prior jury verdict finding a defendant not negligent in causing a plaintiff's injuries does not necessarily mean the jury determined the plaintiff was solely at fault.
[2] Collateral estoppel does not apply when a prior jury verdict only determined the absence of negligence on the part of one party, not the sole negligence of another.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To conclude that this necessarily meant the jury had determined that Huddle had been negligent is a logical fallacy. That is not the only possible alternative to Bicking's being negligent.”
Establishes that the prior jury verdict cannot be interpreted through collateral estoppel to establish Huddle's negligence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoyce Ostendarp owned a vehicle driven by Wanda Huddle that was rear-ended by a car driven by Madeline Bicking, owned by We Try Harder, Inc., during r…
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
We reverse the trial court’s order which denied the motion for rehearing filed by the plaintiffs and the third party defendant, following entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants/third party plaintiffs.
Joyce Ostendarp is the principal plaintiff in the trial court and an appellant here. She was owner of and a passenger in the car driven by Wanda Huddle when she slowed down (or, according to appellees, made a sudden stop) during rush hour on Interstate 95. Madeline B. Bicking was the driver of a car owned by We Try Harder, Inc. The latter vehicle rear-ended the Os-tendarp vehicle driven by Huddle. Huddle was permanently injured in the accident, and, in a prior action sued We Try Harder and Bicking, the defendants/third party plaintiffs in the instant case. The jury verdict in the prior suit found no negligence on the part of Bicking that was the legal cause of injury to Huddle.
Subsequently Ostendarp, owner of the vehicle driven by Huddle and passenger at the time of the rear-end collision, sued Bicking in an automobile negligence action. Bicking then instituted a third party complaint for contribution against Huddle. The trial court granted Bicking’s motion for summary judgment on the third party claim. The court read the jury verdict that Bicking had not negligently caused Huddle’s injury as meaning that Huddle was solely at fault in causing the accident. It concluded that if Bicking and We Try Harder were found liable in the present suit, the court would direct a verdict in the latters’ favor against Huddle for ninety-nine percent of the damages.
Lorf v. Indiana Insurance Company, 426 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), is inapposite; hence appellees’ reliance upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel, discussed therein, is misplaced. It may be that, had the jury in the first trial here actually found Huddle to have been negligent, appellees would be right. But all that the jury in that trial determined was that with respect to Huddle’s injuries, Bick-ing had not been negligent. To conclude that this necessarily meant the jury had determined that Huddle had been negligent is a logical fallacy. That is not the only possible alternative to Bicking’s being negligent.
ANSTEAD and WALDEN, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
We clarify our opinion by reciting that it was error for the trial court to enter summary judgment because Wanda Huddle’s negligence remained a genuine issue of material fact. On remand the trial court is directed to proceed in a manner consistent with this holding.
ANSTEAD and WALDEN, JJ., concur.