DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

v.

SUZANNE CAMPBELL AND STATE OF FLORIDA

Michael A. Graves, Public Defender, and Peter J. Sziklai, Assistant Public Defender, Ocala, for Respondent, Suzanne Campbell.

PER CURIAM.

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) petitions this court for certiorari review, challenging the circuit court’s order committing Suzanne Campbell to its care.

DCF argues that the order departs from the essential requirements of law because Campbell does not meet the statutory requirements for commitment. We agree and, therefore, grant the petition, quash the order under review, and remand for further proceedings.

The State charged Campbell with petit theft and burglary of a structure with a motor vehicle or damage greater than $1000. After an issue arose as to Campbell’s competency, a licensed psychologist evaluated her and issued a written report opining that she was incompetent to proceed due to Korsakoff’s Syndrome. 1 In the report, the psychologist recommended residential treatment but concluded that “[i]t is doubtful however that her competency can be restored in the foreseeable future as it is likely that there will be a continual cognitive decline in this individual.” Subsequently, the trial court rendered an order adjudicating Campbell incompetent to proceed and committing her to DCF custody. DCF timely filed a petition challenging the trial court’s order.

“As a general rule, certiorari is the proper vehicle for seeking this court’s review of orders committing an individual involuntarily.” Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). “[T]o obtain a writ of certiorari, there must exist (1) a departure 1 Specifically, the report noted: “Currently, she presents with significant memory deficits which is consistent with Korsakoff’s Syndrome which is most commonly caused by alcohol misuse. This Syndrome reflects an individual’s cognitive decline, usually manifested as significant memory deficits. Korsakoff’s [S]yndrome causes problems in learning new information, an inability to remember recent events as well as long-term memory gaps.” 2 from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal.” Id. We begin our analysis with the first prong, determining whether the court’s commitment order complied with section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2018).

The requirements for commitment pursuant to section 916.13(1) include the existence of “a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 916.13(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). Here, the evaluating psychologist opined that it was “doubtful” Campbell would be restored to competency in the foreseeable future. “Doubtful” is defined as “lacking a definite opinion, conviction, or determination” or “uncertain in outcome.” Doubtful, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/doubtful (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). Thus, the psychologist’s opinion that Campbell’s restoration to competency in the foreseeable future was “doubtful” contrasts sharply with the statutory requirement of a “substantial probability” that competency will be restored in the reasonably foreseeable future. See § 916.13(1)(c).

Accordingly, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by involuntarily committing Campbell under section 916.13(1). See Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Gilliland, 947 So. 2d 1262, 1262–63 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (quashing order of continued commitment under section 916.13(1)(c) where uncontradicted testimony established little or no probability respondent would become competent in future (citing Oren v. Judd, 940 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006))). 3 We also conclude that DCF established the second and third prongs for certiorari relief—the second because DCF suffers material injury as it is responsible for expending its appropriated funds in accordance with the laws governing the agency and the third because DCF has no direct right of appeal.

Accordingly, for the reasons given above, we grant DCF’s petition, quash the order under review, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED; REMANDED.

EVANDER, C.J., COHEN and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 4