MARGUERITE STOWE, FORMER WIFE, SHELLY STOWE AND WALTER B. STOWE, III, APPELLANTS,
v.
WALTER E. STOWE, APPELLEE
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In this family law case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of a former wife's petition to enforce a property settlement agreement. The court held that the husband was obligated to reimburse the wife for documented medical and orthodontic expenses for their children totaling $9,402.67, and remanded for determination of attorney's fees based on the parties' relative financial circumstances.
The husband was obligated to pay the daughter's medical expenses of $8,052.67 and the son's orthodontic expenses of $1,350.00, entitling the wife to reimbursement of $9,402.67. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to award attorney's fees without properly balancing the parties' relative financial circumstances; therefore, the case must be remanded for evidence on the parties' financial positions to determine the appropriateness of an attorney's fee award.
[1] A party is entitled to reimbursement for medical expenses incurred by a child between the date of a prior expense payment and the child's emancipation, if the other party…
[2] A party is entitled to reimbursement for a child's orthodontic expenses if such expenses are deemed an appropriate charge against that party.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the award of attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding depends not upon who wins but rather upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties”
Establishes the legal standard for awarding attorney's fees in family law cases, focusing on financial disparity rather than outcome.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA property settlement agreement between the former spouses required the husband to pay certain expenses for their two children. The wife paid medical …
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HERSEY, Chief Judge.
The former wife’s amended petition to enforce a property settlement agreement and for attorney’s fees and costs was denied. Two children of the parties, beneficiaries of the provisions in contention, joined in the petition and are also appellants here.
We conclude that medical expenses of the daughter incurred between May 1983 (all prior expense having been met by the husband) and July 30, 1984 (stipulated as the date of the daughter’s emancipation), supported by record evidence as totaling $8,052.67, were properly an expense that the husband was obligated to pay and did not. The son's orthodontic expenses in the amount of $1,350.00 were also an appropriate charge against the husband. Thus, the wife is entitled to reimbursement from the husband in the amount of $9,402.67, which the trial court on remand shall award.
Appellant’s objections to evidentiary rulings are without merit and are rendered moot by the foregoing.
Failure to include a prior cost award of $40.00 in the final judgment has no effect on its efficacy and we therefore do not treat this aspect of the appeal.
Finally, appellant suggests an abuse of discretion in the failure of the trial court to award her attorney’s fees and costs. It is elementary that “the award of attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding depends not upon who wins but rather upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties.” Hudgens v. Hudgens, 411 So. 2d 354, 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). A trial court’s failure to award fees to a wife whose financial position is substantially inferior to the husband’s constitutes an abuse of discretion. McClay v. McClay, 447 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Johns v. Johns, 423 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Appellant here is financially able to pay her attorney’s fees, but that does not end the matter. The trial court must engage in a balancing process, the relevant factors of which include the income and net worth of the respective parties. The record here is insufficient to permit a com parison of the parties’ ability to pay since the parties stipulated that the husband has the ability to pay any fee that might be awarded, which stipulation was in lieu of production of the husband’s financial records. Upon remand it will be necessary to take evidence on the relative financial positions of the husband and the wife. We do not determine the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence now in the record as to the wife’s financial status. We note only the absence of any evidence on the husband’s finances. The burden will be on the husband to come forward with evidence on this issue. Failure or refusal to do so will permit an inference, based upon the stipulation and the wife’s evidence, that the wife’s financial position is substantially inferior to the husband’s.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED.
DOWNEY, J., concurs.
LETTS, J., dissents without opinion.
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Dwyn Daniels Robbie v. Robbie, 591 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…dissenting in part with opinion. . We note that a number of trial courts have been reversed for abusing their discretion in refusing to award any temporary alimony at all. See e.g., Lang v. Lang, 551 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Stowe v. Stowe, 502 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1987); Littlejohn v. Littlejohn, 495 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).…
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Armstrong v. Faye Armstrong, 623 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…ial court abused its discretion when it awarded [*1218] appellee attorney’s fees. We agree and reverse. The principal criterion for an award of attorney’s fees in a marital case is the relative financial resources of the parties. See Stowe v. Stowe, 502 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). There is no evidence in this record of a need for attorney’s fees on appellee’s part and appellant’s corresponding ability to pay these fees. On the contrary, the record shows relatively equal financial circumstances. Appellee a…
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Davis v. Davis, 547 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…financial position. Under these circumstances, a trial court’s failure to award attorney’s fees and costs constitutes an abuse of discretion. Barry v. Barry, 511 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 523 So. 2d 576 (Fla.1988); Stowe v. Stowe, 502 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.1987). AFFIRM IN PART; REVERSE IN PART; REMAND. LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hudgens v. Hudgens, 411 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- McCLAY v. McCLAY, 447 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Bette Johns v. Johns, 423 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)