ERROL HENDERSON MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Errol Henderson Moore was convicted of drug offenses and appealed, arguing that testimony from a paid confidential informant violated his due process rights under State v. Glosson. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that unlike the informant in Glosson who had a contingent financial interest in convictions, Moore's informant had no such incentive and his testimony was corroborated by police surveillance and a tape recording.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant's due process rights were not violated because the informant's compensation was not contingent upon successful prosecution and he had no financial incentive to perjure himself. The informant's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by police surveillance and a tape recording of the transaction.
[1] A paid informant's testimony does not violate due process when the informant's compensation is not contingent upon a successful prosecution or conviction.
[2] Due process is violated when a confidential informant has an enormous financial incentive to color testimony or commit perjury due to a contingent fee arrangement tied to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the informant ... had an enormous financial incentive not only to make criminal cases, but to color his testimony or even commit perjury in pursuit of the contingent fee”
The Glosson standard establishing when an informant's financial incentives violate due process rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoore was charged with sale and possession of cocaine. An undercover informant was paid $200 per week plus $25 for each drug purchase made, with these…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
Errol Henderson Moore appeals from a judgment of conviction on one count of sale of cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine. He argues only that because a paid confidential informant testified at his trial, State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.1985) requires that his conviction be reversed. Because we find Glosson distinguishable from the facts in the present case, we affirm the appellant’s conviction.
In Glosson, the informant was to receive 10% of all civil forfeitures arising out of successful criminal investigations he completed. He was required to testify in those proceedings in order to receive his contin gent fee from the related civil forfeitures and the State stipulated that a successful prosecution depended upon the informant’s testimony. The Glosson court concluded that the defendant’s due process rights had been violated because “the informant ... had an enormous financial incentive not only to make criminal cases, but to color his testimony or even commit perjury in pursuit of the contingent fee.” 462 So. 2d at 1085.
Here, the facts are completely different. The undercover informant was paid a salary of $200 a week and $25 for each drug purchase he made. Neither his salary nor the additional $25 payment was contingent upon a successful prosecution, nor was he required to return any money for those drug sales that did not result in convictions. Thus, the informant had no financial incentive to perjure his testimony. Furthermore, the opportunity to fabricate or perjure was not present in this case because the informant was searched before and after the sale, his movements were observed by the police at all times and his conversation with appellant was recorded through the use of a concealed microphone carried by the informant. A tape recording of the conversation between the informant and the appellant which resulted in the sale of cocaine was played for the jury. In these circumstances, we find no merit in the appellant’s argument that his due process rights were violated. See also Lee v. State, 490 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Yolman v. State, 473 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); State v. Prieto, 479 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
AFFIRMED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Taylor v. State, 612 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…rson’s fee was neither contingent nor was it conditioned on cooperation and testimony. The same incentive to color testimony or commit perjury is not present in this case, and accordingly, there was no due process violation. See e.g. Moore v. State, 498 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (no due process violation where informant was paid weekly salary and additional sum for each drug purchase, but neither salary nor additional payment was contingent upon successful prosecution, informant was not required to retur…
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Pidkameny v. State, 569 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…tch the largest drug traffickers — bigger pay for bigger deals. 546 So. 2d at 793. We find that Glosson does not control the instant case. State v. McQueen, 501 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), rev. den., 513 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1987); Moore v. State, 498 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Since Butler’s fee was not contingent upon obtaining a conviction or upon his testifying at trial, that fee arrangement did not violate appellant’s due process rights as discussed in Glosson. AFFIRMED. COBB and HARRIS, JJ., co…
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State v. Fernandez, 546 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…to catch the largest drug traffickers — bigger pay for bigger deals. The testimony of the confidential informant was not to be offered at trial. There is ample post-Glosson case law to support this type of police action. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 498 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); State v. Ruiz, 495 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); State v. Perez, 493 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Lee v. State, 490 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); State v. [*794] Prieto, 479 So. 2d 320 (Pla. 3d DCA 1985); Yolman v. State, 47…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Boyce E. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985)
- Howard v. State, 473 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- LEE v. State, 490 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- State v. Prieto, 479 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Bart Wiener v. Pope, 479 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)