ROBERT P. SULCER, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM MCFATTER, SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, APPELLEE
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[*1350] PER CURIAM.
At issue is whether a county school board has the discretionary authority to award attorney’s fees and costs to an employee who prevails in an administrative proceeding. We hold that the board does have such discretion and reverse the board’s holding to the contrary.
Under the provisions of Section 230.03(2), Florida Statutes (1985) a school board has full governmental authority and “may exercise any power except as expressly prohibited by the State Constitution or general law.” That authority, in our view, includes the authority to reimburse employees for attorney’s fees and costs in instances deemed appropriate.
We reject the school board’s assertion that Section 230.234, Florida Statutes (1985), which was enacted before the current provisions of section 230.03(2) became law, bars such a policy. Section 230.234 was enacted at a time when the school board had limited powers and a specific legislative authorization was necessary to provide for legal services to employees. This section specifically authorized fees for employees who were “charged with civil or criminal actions arising out of and in the course of the performance of assigned duties and responsibilities.” Such a grant of authority is unnecessary under the current provisions of section 230.03(2), and the existence of such a specific grant does not bar the award of fees in other appropriate situations. Our holding should not be construed as mandating an award of fees. Rather, we are holding that the board possesses the authority to award fees.
DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., and WILLIS, BEN C., Associate Judge (Retired), concur.
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Werthman v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 599 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…ul defense by the employee or officer. As with section 448.08, we find that the term “civil actions” as plainly used in section 230.234 does not encompass an administrative termination proceeding initiated by a school board. Cf. Sulcer v. McFatter, 497 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In considering whether Werthman was entitled to attorney’s fees for the successful defense of his termination proceeding, we find that the language of section 231.36(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) is compelling. Section 231.36(…
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Davis v. The Sch. Bd. OF Gadsden Cnty., 646 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…t demonstrate entitlement to attorney’s fees. While the School Board could lawfully have reimbursed appellant for the attorney’s fees he incurred, Krueger v. School District of Hernando County, 544 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Sulcer v. McFatter, 497 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), we do not have authority to require it, and we do not disturb the School Board’s refusal to make such an award. In order to provide all relief to which the Board’s findings established appellant’s entitlement, however, we rever…
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Sch. Bd. OF Collier Cnty. v. Fla. Teaching Profession Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 559 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…es (1987), these cannot be construed to limit a school board’s power under section 230.03(2) after 1983. The specific grant of authority does not prevent a school board from delegating authority which is not expressly prohibited. Sulcer v. McFatter, 497 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). We find the other points raised on appeal to be without merit. The case is reversed and remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. SCHOONOVER and PARKER, JJ., concur.…