LESSIE R. (BUSTER) WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
JOYCE M. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenged the trial court's division of marital property, specifically a parcel of land conveyed to the couple by the wife's parents who retained a life estate. The appellate court reversed the finding of a special equity in the wife's favor, holding that a conveyance of real property from one spouse's parents to a marital couple does not automatically create a special equity absent evidence of the donors' intent.
The court held that a mere conveyance of real property from one spouse's parents to a marital couple does not create a special equity in the property without additional evidence of the donors' intent. The court reversed the special equity finding because there was no evidence in the record regarding the intent of the wife's parents in transferring the property. The court declined to address the lump sum alimony issue as it was not dealt with in the trial court's judgment but permitted the lower court to address it on remand.
[1] A conveyance of real property from a spouse's parents to a marital couple does not, without more, create a special equity in the property for one spouse upon dissolution.
[2] A presumption of a gift to both marital grantees exists when property is conveyed by a spouse's parents to the marital couple.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the mere conveyance of real property from one spouse's parents to a marital couple does not thereby create a special equity in the property, upon the subsequent dissolution of the marriage”
States the controlling legal principle that reverses the trial court's finding of special equity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe marital residence was located on land conveyed to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety by the wife's parents, who retained a life estat…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant, the husband, raises three issues on appeal of this final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
We affirm as to issue one without discussion, reverse and remand as to issue two, decline to address issue three, as it was not dealt with in the judgment appealed from, and remand with directions. As to issue two, the trial court found a special equity for the wife in the value of land on which the marital residence is located. The land had been conveyed to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, by the wife’s parents, who retained therein a life estate.
We reverse, because the mere conveyance of real property from one spouse’s parents to a marital couple does not thereby create a special equity in the property, upon the subsequent dissolution of the marriage. See Brancolino v. Carretta, 463 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Moore v. Moore, 401 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Manley v. Manley, 360 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). “Without more, such a conveyance constitutes an equal gift to the joint grantees and cannot form the basis for a special equity_” Brancolino, 463 So. 2d at 532. Before one may overcome the presumption that a gift was intended, “the person challenging the effect of the deed must come forward with evidence or testimony that there was no gift to the grantee.” Moore, 401 So. 2d at 843. In the instant case, in that there is no evidence in the record regarding the intent of the donors’ transference of the property to the husband and wife, we conclude that the wife failed to overcome the presumption that a gift to both the husband and wife was intended.
The husband, in the third issue on appeal, argues that the land in question should not be awarded to the wife as lump sum alimony. Although the wife in her dissolution petition requested exclusive ownership and possession of the marital home as either lump sum alimony or as a special equity, the trial court did not address the issue of lump sum alimony in its judgment. Therefore, we decline to address this issue.
The lower court is not, however, precluded on remand from, in its discretion, conducting further proceedings in order to determine whether the husband’s interest in the land should be awarded to the wife as lump sum alimony, or under any other equitable principle.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Thomas v. Thomas, 534 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…ellee’s - special equity in the property. The mere conveyance of real property from one spouse’s parents to a marital couple does not thereby create a special equity in the property, upon subsequent dissolution of the marriage. Williams v. Williams, 497 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Moore v. Moore, 401 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Manley v. Manley, 360 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s finding that appellee has a special equity in the property in question and remand…
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Young v. Young, 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…s well settled that a spouse is not entitled to a special equity in real property based simply upon proof that a spouse’s parents conveyed real property to a marital couple. Thomas v. Thomas, 534 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Williams v. Williams, 497 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Moore v. Moore, 401 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Manley v. Manley, 360 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The following statement made by the lower court during the hearing is therefore not a correct interpretation of the law: “…
Authorities Cited
- Deortha A. Moore v. Moore, 401 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Manley v. Manley, 360 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Brancolino v. Carretta, 463 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)