CITY OF CLEARWATER, APPELLANT,
v.
HILTON J. HOLZHAUER, APPELLEE
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The City of Clearwater appeals a workers' compensation order awarding medical care to Holzhauer, arguing his claim was barred by the statute of limitations since it was filed over two years after an MMI (maximum medical improvement) determination. The court affirms, holding that voluntary provision of medical care by the employer tolls the statute of limitations.
The court held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run while an employer voluntarily pays compensation or provides remedial care; it only begins when no compensation or remedial care is provided. Accordingly, Holzhauer's claim was timely because the City's voluntary provision of medical treatment tolled the statute of limitations.
[1] The statute of limitations for workers' compensation claims does not begin to run as long as the employer voluntarily pays compensation or provides remedial care.
[2] Voluntarily provided medical care by an employer after an employee has reached maximum medical improvement can toll the statute of limitations.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As long as the employer is voluntarily paying compensation or providing remedial care, the statute of limitations does not begin to run. It is when no compensation or remedial care is provided that the employee must begin to watch the calendar.”
This establishes the controlling legal principle that voluntary employer provision of care tolls the statute of limitations in workers' compensation claims.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHolzhauer reached maximum medical improvement on December 14, 1982, and received permanent partial disability benefits. Between June 1983 and April 19…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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MILLS, Judge.
In this workers’ compensation case, the City of Clearwater (E/C) appeals from an order granting Holzhauer medical care, contending the deputy commissioner erred in making such an award when Holzhauer filed his claim more than two years after an order was entered finding he had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). We disagree and affirm.
On 14 December 1982, an order was entered finding Holzhauer had reached MMI. The permanent partial disability benefits he was awarded were paid out by the E/C on 3 June 1983. Subsequent to this time, however, the E/C voluntarily provided Hol-zhauer with medical care in the form of treatment by Dr. Schuele in March 1983 and Dr. Slomka in February 1984. Additionally, on 19 April 1984, the E/C paid for the claimant’s attendance at a muscle rehabilitative exercise program prescribed by Dr. Slomka. Holzhauer filed the instant claim in August of 1985 seeking further medical treatment.
It is the E/C’s position that Holzhauer erred in filing a new claim and should have proceeded by way of a petition for modification pursuant to Section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1983). The E/C further contends that all care provided to an employee once a date of MMI has been determined must be considered palliative in nature, and such care cannot toll the statute of limitations contained in either Section 440.19(l)(b) or Section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1983).
We do not feel it is necessary to make a direct determination of the relevancy of Sections 440.28 and 440.19(1)(b) in the present case, as it can be decided on the principle announced in Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 471 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. on other grounds 490 So. 2d 1252 (Fla.1986), namely:
As long as the employer is voluntarily paying compensation or providing remedial care, the statute of limitations does not begin to run. It is when no compensation or remedial care is provided that the employee must begin to watch the calendar. In this case, we concur with the following statement made by Judge Wentworth in her specially concurring opinion to General Electric Co. v. Spann, 479 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985):
In the present case I would affirm the award of medical treatment simply because, even assuming § 440.28 might apply to a medical claim, and whatever might be its effect after an order finding MMI, the parties clearly did not treat the 1980 order as one terminating remedial care during the years preceding the current claims.
Affirmed.
BOOTH, C.J., and WENTWORTH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Higdon v. State, 490 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1986)
- Gen. Elec. Co. & Elec. Mut. Liab. v. Spann, 479 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 471 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)