THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
GIP GIBSON AND GEORGE EGBERT, APPELLEES
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The court considered whether a railroad company was entitled to an injunction for future trespasses and damages from past logging. The court found the railroad was entitled to an injunction for future trespasses but not for past damages due to insufficient allegations of ownership.
The railroad company was entitled to a temporary injunction to prevent future trespasses, as provided by statute. However, it was not entitled to recover damages for past trespasses because the bill did not sufficiently allege ownership of the land or the logs.
“The bill of complaint in this case, so far as it sought to enjoin the commission of .future trespasses upon the lands therein described, stated a case within the provisions of section 1469 of the Revised Statutes, and to> that extent entitled appellant to a 'temporary injunction”
Establishes the basis for granting an injunction for future trespasses.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company filed a bill seeking to enjoin future trespasses and recover damages for past logging on its land. The bil…
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Glen, C.
The bill of complaint in this case, so far as it sought to enjoin the commission of .future trespasses upon the lands therein described, stated a case within the provisions of section 1469 of the Revised Statutes, and to> that extent entitled appellant to a 'temporary injunction át the hearing of its application, therefor. Appellant, however, was not entitled upon the case made by its bill to any further relief. The bill ‘did not allege that appellant was the owner'of the lands at the time appellees were alleged to have cut the five hundred cypress logs, more or less, therein alleged to be cut and lying upon the lands, nor that appellant was 'the owner of the log’s so cut. Appellant, therefore, was not clearly shown to have any interest in the logs cut, entitling it to enjoin their removal. Sullivan vs. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200. The demurrer filed to' the bill, and sustained' by the court, was a general demurrer for want of equity, and extended to' the eráire bill. For that reason it ought not to have been sustained by the court, as the bill was not entirely wanting’ in equity. The right to relief rested wholly upon the statute, and under the decision in Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 South. Rep. 859, the bill could not be maintained in so far as it sought an ascertainment of damages sustained by appellant on account of'the alleged prior trespasses, and a decree for the payment thereof, even if its allegations had been sufficient to show that appellant was the owner of the lands at the time the alleged trespasses were committed, but that was not'ground for sustaining a general demurrer to the entire bill. Durham v. Stephenson, 41 Fla. 112, 25 South. Rep. 284.
The decree refusing 4 temporary injunction, to the extent indicated, and the decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill should be reversed, and further proceedings had in accordance with this opinion.
Hooker, C., and Maxwell, C., concurred.
Per Curiam.
The foregoing opinion has been examined by the court and is hereby approved and adopted and ordered to be filed as the opinion of the court in said cause.
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Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla. 441 (Fla. 1906)…. 91 Am. Dec. 747 ; Garnett v. J. St. A. & H. R. R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 889, text 901; Shivery & Streeper, 24 Fla. 103, 3 South. Rep. 865; State v. Black River P. Co., 27 Fla. 276, text 326, 9 South. Rep. 205; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Gibson, 43 Fla. 315, 31 South. Rep. 230. This is required for two [*451] reasons, first because courts are reluctant to interfere with the free use and enjoyment of property by an owner or occupant, and will only interfere where it is clearly made to appear that the us…
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Byrne Realty Co. v. S. Fla. Farms Co., 81 Fla. 805 (Fla. 1921)…v. Orange County, 56 Fla. 829, 47 South. Rep. 363. A general demurrer for want of equity should be over [*853] ruled if there is any ground for equitable relief stated in the bill. Thompson v. Maxwell, 16 Fla. 773; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gibson, 43 Fla. 315, 31 South. Rep. 230. From the statement of this case, it' appears that the allegations of the cross-bill show that, by contract entered into between John A. Henderson and the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, in 1884, the said Henderson wa…
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McMillan v. Wiley, 45 Fla. 487 (Fla. 1903)…last cited case that we deem it unnecessary to say more than that we fully approve thereof and think the conclusion correct. To the same effect are the cases of Hughes v. Hannah, 39 Fla. 365, 22 South. Rep. 613, and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gibson, 43 Fla. 315, 31 South. Rep. 230. As there seems to be some misapprehension upon the part of some members of the bar as to the effect of the decision in the case of Brown v. Solary, 37 Fla. 102, 19 South. Rep. 161, we will state that, properly understood, there…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wiggins & Johnson v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637 (Fla. 1895)
- Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200 (Fla. 1882)
- Lucien Durham v. Stephenson, 41 Fla. 112 (Fla. 1899)