WILLIE BRADWELL, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE CHARLES D. MCCLURE, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Willie Bradwell sought habeas corpus relief challenging his pretrial detention on charges of sexual abuse of a child. The Florida appellate court granted the writ, holding that the trial court's detention order failed to comply with statutory requirements because it did not find that Bradwell fell within one of the mandatory categories enumerated in section 907.041(4), Florida Statutes.
The trial court's detention order did not comply with the statute because, despite making general findings about Bradwell's dangerousness and flight risk, it failed to find that at least one of the mandatory statutory conditions was present—namely, prior conviction of a capital or life felony, conviction of a dangerous crime within the preceding ten years, or current probation/parole status for a dangerous crime.
[1] A court must make specific findings required by statute before ordering pretrial detention.
[2] A defendant is entitled to pretrial release when the court fails to make a statutorily required finding for pretrial detention.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute requires that: The court must find that at least one of the following conditions is present: a. The defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. b. The defendant has been convicted of a dangerous crime within the 10 years immediately preceding the date of his arrest for the crime presently charged. c. The defendant is on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of sentence or on pretrial release for a dangerous crime at the time of the current arrest.”
Establishes the mandatory statutory conditions that must be found before pretrial detention is permissible under Florida law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBradwell was charged by information with two violations of section 800.04(2), Florida Statutes, for sexual acts upon a child under 16 years of age. Th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Reasonable Bail cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is entitled to reasonable bail and that the trial court erred in ordering pretrial detention. We agree.
Petitioner is charged by information with two violations of section 800.04(2), Florida Statutes, by commission of sexual acts upon a child under 16 years of age. By an earlier order, the circuit court refused to set bail and this court granted a writ of habeas corpus, instructing the lower tribunal to either set bail or show that petitioner was not entitled to bail pursuant to section 907.041, Florida Statutes, (1985). The circuit court responded with a second order which found that there is a substantial probability that Bradwell committed dangerous crimes, that he is a threat to the community, that he has expressed an intent to flee the jurisdiction, and that there are no conditions of release that will reasonably prevent the obstruction of the judicial process or protect the community from risk of physical harm. Bradwell’s petition first attacks the failure of the state to petition for pretrial detention and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings. We find it unnecessary to reach those issues because the order, on its face, does not comply with section 907.041(4). That is, in addition to the findings made by the trial court, the statute requires that:
The court must find that at least one of the following conditions is present:
a. The defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.
b. The defendant has been convicted of a dangerous crime within the 10 years immediately preceding the date of his arrest for the crime presently charged.
c. The defendant is on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of sentence or on pretrial release for a dangerous crime at the time of the current arrest.
In this case, the court made no such finding. Given the plain and mandatory language of the statute, we find that petitioner therefore is entitled to pretrial release. See Gomez v. Hinckley, 473 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Inasmuch as the state attorney has the burden of showing the need for pretrial detention, section 907.-041(4)(f), and in two attempts has failed to show that petitioner may be detained pursuant to the terms of the statute, we grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus and direct the sheriff to deliver petitioner to Circuit Judge Charles D. McClure or his alternate to set reasonable bail.
WRIT ISSUED.
ERVIN, WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. FOX, 647 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…ny punishable by life unless the state makes the specialized showing contained in section 907.041(4)(b), Florida Statutes. The court cited two cases from other districts, Mininni v. Gillum, 477 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) and Bradwell v. McClure, 488 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), and two cases from this district, Swanson v. Allison, 617 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) and Martina v. State, 602 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), as authority for his conclusion. This erroneous ruling constitutes a departure…
Authorities Cited
- Gomez v. The Honorable Harry G. Hinckley, Jr., 473 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)