VERNON TYRONE YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Vernon Young was convicted of vehicular homicide and sentenced to five years imprisonment, departing from sentencing guidelines that recommended community control or 12-30 months. On appeal, Young challenged the trial court's use of his traffic violations as grounds for the upward departure, arguing they were improper civil infractions or arrests without conviction.
The court affirmed the trial court's upward departure from sentencing guidelines. The trial court properly considered Young's traffic violations as establishing a pattern of dangerous activity posing a threat to public safety, and the use of civil traffic violations did not violate Rule 3.701(d)(11) because such offenses did not result in arrests and could not have resulted in convictions.
[1] A trial court may depart from sentencing guidelines when a defendant's lengthy record of traffic offenses demonstrates an inability to obey the law and poses a serious da…
[2] Civil traffic infractions, which do not result in arrests or convictions, may be considered by a court when departing from sentencing guidelines.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court's reason for departure can be viewed as more than a mere reference to his past traffic violations, but rather as an indication of a pattern of dangerous activity posing a threat to the safety of others”
Establishes the court's rationale for distinguishing between improper consideration of past violations and proper consideration of a pattern of dangerous behavior
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung was convicted of vehicular homicide after a jury trial. He had a lengthy record of traffic violations between 1982 and 1984, including five conv…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellant, defendant below, was found guilty after a jury trial of vehicular homicide and was sentenced to five years incarceration. He now raises three issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion.
A sentencing guidelines scoresheet was prepared in this case, reflecting a recommended sentence of community control or twelve to thirty months incarceration. The trial court departed from the recommended sentence, however, and imposed a sentence of five years incarceration, citing the following as the reason for departure:
Defendant’s lengthy record for traffic offenses demonstrates his inability to obey the law. He has five convictions for careless driving, seven for speeding, two other traffic violations and two convictions for driving while license suspended. Defendant’s driving represents a serious danger to the safety of pedestrians and other motorists. Appellant now contends that since all of these offenses, with the exception of the two convictions for driving while license suspended or revoked, were civil infractions, the court erred in using them as a basis for departing from the guidelines. In particular, appellant argues the departure is prohibited by Rule 3.701(d)(ll), Fla.R. Crim.P., which states that “reasons for deviating from the guidelines shall not include factors relating to prior arrests without conviction.” We disagree, and affirm the trial court’s departure.
The presentence investigation prepared prior to the sentencing hearing in this case shows numerous incidents of speeding and other traffic offenses between 1982 and 1984, including a speeding ticket two days prior to the accident (for driving 60 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. speed zone) and a speeding ticket three weeks after the accident (for driving 50 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone).. The evidence presented at trial indicated that appellant was speeding in a 30 m.p.h. residential area at the time he struck and killed the six-year-old victim in the instant case. In light of these facts, the trial court’s reason for departure can be viewed as more than a mere reference to his past traffic violations, but rather as an indication of a pattern of dangerous activity posing a threat to the safety of others. See Williams v. State, 480 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1986). Moreover, the use of appellant’s civil traffic violations does not violate Rule 3.701(d)(ll) since the offenses did not result in arrests and could not have resulted in convictions.
Accordingly, appellant’s judgment and sentence is hereby AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, C.J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
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Jennings Harold Leffew v. State, 518 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…lines sentence. But there were additionally three traffic infractions for careless driving which the trial court considered as a reason for departure. The state maintains that a departure based upon those infractions is supported by Young v. State, 488 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), while the defendant contends that Young is distinguishable. The trial court was specifically considering Young when it made its decision to depart and read the entire Young opinion into the record at the sentencing hearing. Con…
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Middleton v. State, 489 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…ection of Society Based Upon Pattern of Conduct Shown by Defendant’s Prior Record As Explained by Trial Court May Be Enough Agatone v. State, 474 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Williams v. State, 484 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Young v. State, 488 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Fuller v. State, 488 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Contra: McCray v. State, 488 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Roberson v. State, 483 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Casteel v. State, 481 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Ou…