CORRINE LOUISE TRASTI, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Corrine Louise Trasti appealed her DUI manslaughter sentence, claiming the trial court's re-imposed non-guideline sentence of ten years and eight months violated the Pearce prohibition against vindictive sentencing. The appellate court affirmed, finding no vindictiveness and that the new sentence was carefully calculated to be equivalent to the original guideline sentence when accounting for parole eligibility differences.
The court held that the re-imposed sentence did not violate Pearce because the record affirmatively demonstrated the trial court imposed the new sentence without vindictiveness and instead carefully formulated it to be equivalent to the prior guideline sentence when accounting for parole eligibility differences.
[1] A defendant who pleads guilty to an offense committed before the effective date of sentencing guidelines and who does not affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the gu…
[2] A sentence imposed after a successful appeal of a prior sentence does not violate North Carolina v. …
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record affirmatively shows that the lower court did not impose the new sentence out of vindictiveness, but, on the contrary, carefully formulated the second sentence, which is subject to parole, in an effort to make it equivalent to the prior guideline sentence, which was not subject to parole.”
This establishes the court's finding that no Pearce violation occurred because the trial court calculated the new sentence to achieve parity with the original sentence when accounting for parole eligibility differences.
Trasti pled guilty to DUI manslaughter under Florida law. The original guideline sentence of five years was vacated on appeal because the manslaughter…
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COWART, Judge.
The defendant pled guilty to the offense of DUI manslaughter,1 and was sentenced to a five year guideline sentence. On appeal, defendant’s sentence was vacated as the manslaughter was committed prior to the effective date of the sentencing guidelines, and the defendant had not affirmatively elected to be sentenced under the guidelines.2 On remand, the defendant again did not elect to be sentenced under the guidelines, and the lower court imposed a ten year and eight month non-guideline sentence. The defendant again appeals, claiming her new sentence violates the dictates of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). We do not agree.
The record affirmatively shows that the lower court did not impose the new sentence out of vindictiveness, but, on the contrary, carefully formulated the second sentence, which is subject to parole, in an effort to make it equivalent to the prior guideline sentence, which was not subject to parole.3
AFFIRMED.
UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Sections 316.1931(2) and 782.07, Florida Statutes.
. See Trasti v. State, 470 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
. See Ryan v. State, 482 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), where the second district rejected the contention that because guideline sentencing had not been affirmatively elected, defendant’s sentence should remain as imposed by the trial court except that defendant should be eligible for parole. The court noted that, given the possibility of parole under traditional sentencing, the trial court could well have imposed a greater sentence if it had not believed it was required to impose a guideline sentence. See also Wright v. State, 478 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Thomas v. State, 638 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…there is any basis for applying a presumption of vindictiveness; or that the new sentence was, in fact, motivated in any way by vindictiveness. See, e.g., Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138-39, 106 S.Ct. at 979, 89 L.Ed.2d at 111; Trasti v. State, 487 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. ALLEN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.…
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Walker v. State, 499 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…. Were we to address this issue, we would hold that appellant’s life sentence, which is subject to parole, is not necessarily harsher than the sixty-year guidelines sentence previously imposed, which was not subject to parole. As in Trasti v. State, 487 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), the record affirmatively shows that the new sentence was not imposed out of vindictiveness, but was imposed in accordance with the dictates of the Florida Statutes and this court's prior opinion in Walker.…
Authorities Cited
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969)
- Wright v. State, 478 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Ryan v. State, 482 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Corrine Louise Trasti v. State, 470 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)